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ABSTRACT

A collection of papers on contrastive linguistics includes: "Prototypes and Equivalence" (Tomasz P. Krzeszowski); "Comparing the Incomparable? English Adjectives in "-able" and Their Rendering in Modern Chinese" (Arthur Mettinger); "Classification and Distribution of Lexical Errors in the Written Work of German Learners of English" (Rudiger Zimmermann); "Perception of Stressed Syllables in Natural Stimuli: A Contrastive English-Polish Experimental Study" (Wieslaw Awedyk); "Explorations in Linguistic Sexism: A Contrastive Sketch" (Robert K. Herbert, Barbara Nykiel-Herbert); "Cyclicity and Phonostylistic Interference" (Katarzyna Dziubalska); "Subject Inversion in English, French, Italian, and Dutch and Empty Subjects in German" (Terence McKay); "Postpositions, "Part-of-Speechness," Negation and Other Matters" (Bela Korponay); "A Comparison of Some English and Hungarian Freezes" (Laszlo Pordany); "Processing Strategies in Bilingual Spellers" (Philip A. Luelsdorff); "Danish and Slavic Phraseology Contributions to an Analysis of Idiomatics on a Contrastive Basis" (Christian Hougaard); and "The Fact of Translation in Learning English as a Foreign Language" (M. B. Dagut). (MSE)

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THE POLISH — ENGLISH CONTRASTIVE PROJECT

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PAPERS AND STUDIES IN CONTRASTIVE LINGUISTICS

VOLUME TWENTY ONE

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PROTOTYPES AND EQUIVALENCE

TOMASZ P. KRZESZEWSKI

University of Gdańsk

Rosch's prototype theory (1973, 1977, 1978) as applied to linguistics by Lakoff (1977, 1982) as well as recent developments in cognitive linguistics (Lindner 1981, Brugman 1981, and Langacker 1983) create the necessity of reevaluating the situation of cross-linguistic studies. The harbinger attempts in that direction have been made by Kalisz (1981) and Lewandowska (to appear). Whereas Lewandowska is preoccupied with the pragmatic perspective necessary in conducting cross-cultural comparisons of social interaction, Kalisz focuses on pragmatic semantic and syntactic implications in the contrastive framework as they spring from the new theory. In a brief section Kalisz restates the concepts of *congruence* and *equivalence* in terms of "partial pattern matching" as discussed in Fillmore (1975) and Lakoff (1977). This latter concept is based on the assumption that linguistic constructions can be characterized by clusters of pragmatic, semantic and syntactic properties (parameters). Various constructions, it appears, exhibit various degrees of correspondence of such parameters. This kind of correspondence can be referred to as *matching* and it extends over a continuum from full matching, through partial matching, to no matching at all. Kalisz proceeds to employ the concept of partial matching in explicating the familiar relations of congruence and equivalence, crucial in all contrastive studies based on structural and transformational models. He maintains that "Equivalence betweeen two given structures is a matter of degree of the matching of the properties. Thus, it reflects a degree of partial pattern matching of properties. One can talk about a degree of syntactic equivalence even if lexical properties do not match, a pragmatic equivalence when the two structures produce the same perlocutionary effect in spite of their syntactic and lexical properties etc. The higher degree of matching of syntactic, semantic and pragmatic properties reflects the higher degree of overall equivalence between two or more constructions." (Kalisz 1981: 45--46).

As originally conceived in structural and transformational terms *congruence* and *equivalence* referred to formal and semantic identity of the compared constructions (Marton 1968, Krzeszowski 1967, 1971). The separation of semantic and syntactic representations, as formalized in some versions of TG, led to the "common underlying structure hypothesis", which claimed that equivalent constructions and sentences have identical semantic representations, even if on the surface they are markedly different (Krzeszowski 1971, 1974, 1981). Formal diversifications occurred at various levels of derivations in the subsequent derivational histories of equivalent constructions. More similar constructions shared more rules and were diversified later, i.e. at some level closer to the level of surface representations. The distance from the surface at which the first diversification occurred provided grounds for measuring the *degree* of similarity and difference of the compared constructions (Di Pietro 1971, Krzeszowski 1974). The formal device which was to accomplish this task was called Contrastive Generative Grammar (CGG).

CGG rendered the concept of congruence somewhat redundant, since *all* equivalent constructions were congruent by definition at some level of representation (if only at the semantic level at which congruence was guaranteed as a matter of initial postulate). Therefore, the concept of *degree* of syntactic similarity is not new with Kalisz's suggestion.

The universality of the semantic base in CGG concerned only that aspect of the meaning which is sometimes connected with "sentence semantics" with the added requirement that equivalent sentences be referentially identical (i.e. have identical extensions). All other aspects of the meaning were relegated to the lexicon and were considered to be language specific. These assumptions led to the hope that CGGs as devices enumerating equivalent sentences across languages were possible to construct, not as theories of translation performance, but as theories of ideal equivalence, presumably characterizing bilingual competence.

It is doubtful, however, whether semantic structure is indeed universal, even if the claim is restricted to "sentence semantics". The present author has had problems in deciding what aspects of meaning belong to "sentence semantics" and what aspects of meaning belong to "word semantics". This led to some motivated and some arbitrary decisions. For instance, aspect in Slavonic languages was considered within the domain of "word semantics" on the grounds that it is connected with intraword markers of irregular nature and that it does not bring about any changes in sentence structure (Krzeszowski 1981). This decision seemed to be well motivated. However, various phenomena connected with modality, definiteness, and even tenses, have been arbitratily assigned to either "sentence semantics" or "word semantics" or were completely ignored as being within the domain of performance. The situation which thus began to emerge resembled the situation of the current "core" grammars. Whatever facts do not fit the current syntactic theory are *by definition* outside the scope of the theory. And so, too, in CGG, whatever facts contradicted the initial hypothesis that sentence semantics is universal were disposed of in the ever growing lexical component or in the poorly defined and understood area of "pragmatics", in some indefinite ways connected with performance. Thus shrink all kinds of "core" phenomena and "universal" structures, while the list of unsolved problems becomes intolerably longer and longer.

Kalisz's proposal requires at least two amendments. Firstly, the requirement that pragmatically equivalent structures must produce the *same* perlocutionary effect should be relaxed through substituting "maximally similar cognitive effects" for "the same perlocutionary effects". Marginally, I would like to insist that Oleksy's requirement to the effect that pragmatically equivalent structures should perform a *corresponding* speech act cannot be defended either (Oleksy forthcoming). I would contend that while Kalisz's requirement is too specific Oleksy's requirement is too general. Not all speech acts have perlocutionary effects so that under Kalisz's proposal a number of speech acts such as statements, rhetorical questions etc. would be unaccounted for. Oleksy's proposal is too broad in that it allows for too much freedom in deciding what is pragmatically equivalent outside a specific communicative situation. It seems that one cannot sensibly investigate the issue of pragmatic value of an utterance in abstraction from specific psychosociolinguistic contexts. Such an endeavour involves *contradictio in adjecto*: pragmatics outside the context of language users!

Kalisz's proposal is too restrictive also because it involves an untenable and, I am sure, unintended, implication that only those utterances which happen to be produced simultaneously, in the same setting and with the *same* perlocutionary effect, are equivalent. Even if restricted to perlocutionary effects, the requirement concerning their "sameness" rules out any prospects of generalization and renders the proposal uninteresting. Surely, a given perlocutionary effect can only occur once. Instead, therefore, it is probably reasonable to consider *identity* of effects as a special case of similarity, where identity is to be viewed as the highest theoretically conceivable degree of similarity.

Secondly, the concept of partial pattern matching as envisaged by Kalisz in the context of CA seems to require some constraining. According to Kalisz "Equivalence between two structures is a matter of degree of the matching properties. Thus, it reflects a degree of partial pattern matching of properties" (1981: 45). This claim must be interpreted as suggesting that given a set S of pairs of equivalent constructions, C's and K's, one can arrange these pairs on the scale provided by the varying number of certain matching properties. Let us assume that S contains the following pairs of equivalent constructions characterized by some properties which match and some which do not match. Let P's stand for those properties which match and let p's stand for those properties which do not match:

$$\begin{array}{llll} S=C_1(PPPP) & C_2(pPPP) & C_3(pppP) & C_4(pppp) \\ \quad K_1(PPPP) & K_2(pPPP) & K_3(pppP) & K_4(pppp)/. \end{array}$$

The pairs of constructions in S display various degrees of similarity, with C_1 and K_1 being identical in all relevant respects and with C_4 and K_4 being different in all relevant respects. Concerning this latter case the question immediately arises on what grounds C_4 and K_4 are compared?
Notice, too, that we have artificially limited the number of properties (parameters) to four, providing the upper bound on the scale of similarity with the value of 4, the lower bound having the value of 1. No such limitations can be arbitrarily imposed on actual constructions. However, even if we do impose some more or less arbitrary limits on the number of properties considered, we shall still face the following problem: If two linguistic forms match with regard to *one* property, can they be said to exhibit partial pattern matching? From the set theoretical point of view the answer seems to be "yes". After all one property out of four is a part of the total four and if it matches, which can be expressed in terms of set intersection, then it is involved in partial pattern matching.

However, consider the following examples from English and Polish:

(1) All visitors are kindly requested to leave the boat immediately.

(2) Proszę siadać. 'Please sit down'.

(1) and (2) evidently share at least one property — request. But can they be said to be equivalent, pragmatically or otherwise, just because they exhibit this extremely low degree of pattern matching? Consider, moreover:

(3) Spieprzajcie stąd. 'Get the hell out of here'.

(4) Statek zaraz odpływa. 'The boat departs in a moment'.

In certain circumstances (1) and (3) may have identical perlocutionary effects (visitors leaving the boat); it is doubtful, however, whether anybody would like to consider them as pragmatically equivalent. On the other hand (4) may in some situations be a better equivalent of (1) than (3), even if it exhibits even less pattern matching than do either (2) or (3).

The discussion so far leads us to the following somewhat paradoxical conclusions:

(a) The mere number of shared properties is not relevant in establishing the pragmatically significant concept of equivalence which does not seem to be correlated with the degree of similarity as grasped by partial pattern matching.

(b) The identity of perlocutionary effects does not guarantee that the corresponding utterances are pragmatically equivalent. Instead pragmatic equivalence appears to be dependent on elements of extralinguistic context attending the production of equivalent utterances (see also Janicki 1983). Less trivially, pragmatic equivalence seems to depend on the *status* attributed to various properties characterizing the compared constructions.

In what follows I would like to justify the claim that if equivalent linguistic forms belong to *one category within* the domain of CA, the properties crucial in determining the category membership are of unequal status as category determinants. In other words, some properties are more important than others in assigning two linguistic forms in two different languages to one category within the domain of CA. Moreover, the properties which are critically important in determining pragmatic equivalence constitute a *gestalt* in the sense of Lakoff (1977). In the case of (1) the most important parameters constituting the relevant gestalt are the following:

/polite request to leave the boat/

It must be noted that all three elements of the gestalt are equally important in providing the pragmatic content of (1). Other parameters, such as syntactic congruity or lexical congruity seem to play a less important role. The three relevant parameters are: type of speech act (request), modality (politeness) and *anticipated* perlocutionary effects (visitors leaving the boat). Focusing on any *one* of these three elements of the gestalt in the rendering of (1) into Polish results in a distortion of the original pragmatic content. Thus in (2) the anticipated perlocutionary effect is different, while in (3) the modality is different (rudeness rather than politeness), which in turn may influence the perlocutionary effect. This explains why (4) ranks higher on the scale of pragmatic similarity than either (2) or (3), since (4) is neutral with respect to politeness and at the same time it does not rule out the possibility of being interpreted as a request with the perlocutionary effect such as intended (anticipated) in (1). Naturally, (5) would rank even higher than (4) on the same scale:

(5) Uprasza się gości o natychmiastowe opuszczenie statku. 'Visitors are requested to leave the boat immediately'.

(5) is the most accurate equivalent of (1) in all respects: syntactic, semantic and pragmatic. At this stage I would like to suggest that (5) is the most *prototypical* equivalent of (1), while (3) is less prototypical. At the same time (4) is a poor representative of the category of equivalents of (1), situated near the fuzzy edge of the category, while (2) is probably outside the category.

The tentative conclusion which can be drawn from these observations is that linguistic forms have more or less prototypical equivalents in other languages.

Let us consider one more example in order to explore some further consequences of the prototype theory of equivalence.

In her study of English prepositions and particles Brugman (1981) distinguishes twenty senses of preposition-particle-prefix (ppp) *over* as exemplified by the following sentences.

1. The plane flew over the town.



2. The plane flew over the hill.



3. The helicopter is hovering over the town.



4. The helicopter is hovering over the hill.



5. He is walking over the hill.



6. Sam lives over the hill.



7. The glider flew over the wall.



8. Harry jumped over the wall.



9. Harry jumped over the cliff.



10. The wall fell over.



11. Sam turned the page over.



12. Sam rolled the log over.



13. The power line stretches over my yard.



14. She spread the tablecloth over the table.



15. The guards were posted all over the hill.



16. He walked all over the hill.



17. She held the veil over her face.



18. He drove over the bridge.



19. He's over.



20. The water overflowed.



Each of these senses is associated with a specific image scheme where TR stands for the trajector or the object situated somewhere or moving, LM stands for the landmark or the place at which the trajector is situated or with respect to which it moves and P stands for the path wherever a path is involved. These examples do not include metaphorical extensions of the ppp *over* in such sentences as "He has the authority *over* a staff of hundreds" as an extension of 3 or "He turned the question over in his mind" as an extension of 12. All these senses are related by virtue of family *resemblance* (in the sense of Wittgenstein 1953) and can be chained in such a way that the most prototypical ones, i.e. 1 and 2 are situated in the centre, while the progressively less prototypical ones grow in various directions. Towards the edges of the chaining one finds those senses which bear the least resemblance to the prototypical ones, but which are locally correspondingly more similar. The relevant part of the chain is presented in (6):

(6)



In addition senses 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, and 20 have metaphorical extensions, which are not indicated on the chain.

In attempting to compare this material with the relevant material in another language, say Polish, the investigator faces the usual question: what is the equivalent of *over* in Polish? Naturally, given at least twenty senses of *over* in English one cannot expect a single word equivalent in Polish. In search of the equivalents Brugman's examples were submitted to a group of Polish students of English with the request to translate them into Polish. There were 25 respondents, all well advanced in English. The purpose of the exercise was to find out how the ppp *over* would be rendered in Polish. The following results were obtained:

English senses	Polish equivalents
1	"nad/ponad" — 25 answers
2	"nad/ponad" — 24
3	"nad/ponad" — 25
4	"nad/ponad" — 25
5	"nad/ponad" — 1 "po" — 10 "przez" — 9, "instr." — 2 "wokól" — 1 "na" — 2
6	"na" — 3 "obok" — 1 "za" — 18 "przy" — 1 "po drugiej stronie" — 1 "niedaleko" — 1
7	"nad/ponad" — 24 "przez" — 1
8*	"przez" — 16 accusative — 11
9**	"po" — 1 "przez" — 10 accusative — 6 "poprzez" — 1 "z" — 6
10*	other means — 24
11	accusative — 23 "na drugą stronę" — 2
12	accusative — 22 "na drugą stronę" — 3
13***	"nad/ponad" — 19 "przez" — 4
14	"na" — 25
15	"po" — 13 "wokół" — 1 "na" — 10 "na obszarze" — 1
16	"po" — 15 "przez" — 4 "wokół" — 1 accusative — 4 "wzdłuż i wszerz" — 1
17****	"nad" — 1 "na" — 15 accusative — 8
18**	"po" — 1 "prez" — 21 accusative — 2
19**	other means — 24
20	"prze-" — 17 "wy-" — 18

10 and 19 were nearly always rendered as pseudotransitive verbs "przewrócić się" and "skończyć się", respectively.

These results are interesting for several reasons. Firstly, if we coalesce

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* In two cases two answers were provided: accusative and "przez".

** One respondent provided no answer.

*** Two respondents provided no answer.

**** In one case a completely irrelevant answer was given.

"nad" and "ponad" as free variants, at least in the contexts in question, we notice that the most prototypical senses of *over* (*over 1, 2, 3, and 4*) are without any variation rendered as "nad/ponad", which therefore must be recognized as the most prototypical equivalent of *over*. *Over 7* comes second by a very narrow margin of one rendering "przez". "nad/ponad" as the most prototypical equivalent of *over* deserves the first mention in an English-Polish dictionary, although Stanislawski has "na", which is, it will be noticed, the only equivalent of the less prototypical *over 14*.

Secondly, in less prototypical senses the Polish equivalents of *over* vary over a considerable range of prepositions, prefixes and certain other means, such as inflections and special forms of verbs.

Thirdly, the Polish equivalents of non-prototypical senses of *over* evoke varying degrees of agreement among the respondents. On the one hand in the case of 8, 9 or 15 there occur considerable divergencies, on the other hand we deal with complete unanimity in the case of 14. Although the reasons of these differences remain to be investigated, one can surmise that they are partly due to the gaps in the linguistic competence of the respondents, but also, at least to some extent to their different *cognitive* processing of the situations as depicted by the examples (especially in the case of 15 and 17).

Fourthly, less prototypical senses of *over* may have very *prototypical equivalents* in Polish alongside less prototypical ones. For instance, "po całym wzgórzu" appears to be the most prototypical equivalent of *all over the hill* in 16, while "przez wzgórze" or "wzdłuż i wszerz wzgórza" are less prototypical equivalents of *over 16*.

Fifthly, "nad", the Polish equivalent of the five most prototypical senses of *over*, i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7, itself has a number of senses, many of which have metaphorical extensions and which do not correspond to *over*. I have been able to distinguish eight senses of "nad" as a preposition and at least fourteen less basic senses of "nad" both as a preposition and as a prefix. The eight basic senses of "nad" are exemplified as follows:

1. Balon unosi się nad miastem.
'The balloon is hovering over the town'



2. Samolot przeleciał nad miastem.
'The plane flew over the town'.



3. Wierzba pochyla się nad wodą.
'The willow leans over the water'



4. Balon uniósł się nad wyspę.
'The balloon rose over the island'.



5. Balon przylecial nad wyspę.



6. Usiedli nad wodą.
'They sat near the water (front)'



7. On mieszka nad morzem
'He lives near the sea'.



8. Wyjechali nad morze.
'They went to the seaside'.



Senses 1 and 2 are the most prototypical and constitute the core of the following chaining:



In addition there are the following senses:

9. On *nad*biegł. 'He came running'.
10. *Nad*budowali strych. 'They built the attic above'.
11. *nad*wozie. 'Car body'.
12. *nad*komisarz. 'police superintendent'.
12. *nad* śnieg bielszy. 'whiter than snow'.
14. *nad*czlowiek. 'superman‘.

15. *nad*ciśnienie. 'hypertension'.
16. *nad*spodziewany. 'unexpected'.
17. *nad*lać. 'pour out a little'.
18. *nad* ranem. 'before dawn'.
19. sądownictwo *nad* chłopami. 'peasant jurisdiction'.
20. prace *nad* słownikiem. 'work on a dictionary'.
21. zachwyt *nad* urodą. 'delight at someone's beauty'.
22. *nad*butwieć. 'start being affected by rot'.

Allowing for possible modifications and further extensions, the basic chaining can be augumented thus:



In addition to the extensions mentioned here, many of which become metaphorical towards the end of the chain (e.g. 13 onwards), some of the spatial senses have "direct" metaphorical extensions, for example, 2 — *prześlizgnął się nad tym problemem* "he slid over the subject", 3 — *wyrastał nad przeciętność* "he grew above the mediocrity", 4 — *pochylał się nad każdym bliźnim* (= interesował go każdy bliźni. "he was interested in his every neighbour").

The chaining of the senses of *nad* is quite complex, but they all exhibit family resemblance. Through relating all these divergent senses by means of family resemblance we obtain a fairly coherent view of otherwise disparate phenomena.

It will be noted that each of these senses of *nad* will have its more or less prototypical equivalents in English. 1, 2 and 3 will prototypically correspond to the English *over*, while 4 to *above*, etc.

Incidentally, Brugman does not distinguish that sense of *over* which corresponds to the Polish *nad 3* as in *The willow is leaning over the pond*, which would have to receive the image scheme: TR — ——— LM.
If this omission is considered in our account, it will be possible to conclude that *over* and *nad* are prototypical equivalents in the two languages and that the relevant spatial senses, i.e. 1, 2, 3, and 4 in English and 1, 2 and 3 in Polish exhibit complete pattern matching with respect to the image schemes associated with these senses.

To provide a complete CA of the area of senses covered by *over* and by *nad* a similar procedure will have to be adopted for each sense individually. Consequently, each sense will have to be explored with the prospect of finding its prototypical and less prototypical equivalents in the other language, until the entire area is thus explored. The resulting chainings will then be mutually interconnected by a complex network of links, representing the equivalence of specific senses. Such findings can be additionally supported by the studies of image schemes associated with particular linguistic forms. For example, the research could either confirm or refute the prediction, which seems to ensue from the foregoing discussion, that the image schemes evoked by *over* in its four most prototypical senses and by *nad* in its three most prototypical senses are centered around the following image scheme:

(8)



where TR is either stationary or moving but at a certain time either its fragment or its complete body finds itself in the position indicated with relation to LM. Dotted and dashed lines represent these potential paths. The image scheme is a gestalt against which the most prototypical senses of *over* and *nad* are centred. Apart from this gestalt there are other gestalts which serve as centres for other senses of *over* and of *nad*. These other centres *attract* other equivalents, etc. The cross-linguistic landscape of senses can, therefore, be seen as a multifocal space with various linguistic forms in both languages interconnected by identical gestalts. Every instance of the use of *over* involves *focusing* on the relevant sense associated with the relevant gestalt.

In the case described above we have been dealing with linguistic phenomena which exhibit a great deal of resemblance. The very fact that the most prototypical equivalents of the most prototypical senses of the English preposition *over* correspond to a preposition in Polish suggests a high degree of pattern matching (syntactic, semantic and pragmatic). Yet, when less prototypical and hence more conventionalized senses are considered, or when typologically more distant languages are involved, one would expect a smaller degree of similarity (less pattern matching). Consider *over 9* which is connected with the image scheme (9):

(9)



A small majority of ten respondents rendered *over 9* as "przez", misconstruing the image scheme and visualizing it as

(10)



Another group (6 respondents) apparently had a different image, namely something like (11), when they rendered *over 9* as accusative case "przeskoczył skałę":

(11)



Finally, another group (6 respondents), by rendering *over 9* as "zeskoczył z cliffu" imagined something in the nature of (12) and thus obtained the highest degree of pattern matching:

(12)



Disregarding other, less numerous possibilities, we face at least three distinct gestalt interpretations of the situation in *over 9* and three grammatical, though hardly accurate translations of *over 9* into Polish. These divergent interpretations are due to the fact that Polish has no way of expressing the situation depicted in (9) by grammatical means similar to those which were needed to translate the preceding eight senses of *over*. Therefore, any attempt to use an equivalent preposition or at least an inflectional ending yields results which only partially match the original with respect to the relevant image scheme. The relatively conventionalized English expression "to jump over the cliff" associated with (9) can be more fully matched with the Polish periphrastic (hence highly motivated!) expression "skoczyć w dól przez krawędź urwiska". Full matching of the image schemes is in this case bought at a price: the degree of *syntactic* pattern matching is now lower.

To conclude: in cross-linguistic studies equivalent forms exhibit varying degrees of pattern matching. Thus similarity (and difference) can be evaluated by means of a gradient scale. The upper bound of the scale is delimited ***inherently*** by complete pattern matching of semantic and/or syntactic parameters. This situation is most likely to occur when prototypical equivalents are involved, although by no means this need be the case. The lower bound of the scale is not delimited by the matching patterns themselves, since there is no *a priori* way of deciding on the necessary minimum of similarity required for the recognition of two linguistic forms as matching. Therefore, the lower bound of the scale is delimited ***cognitively*** through the bilingual informant's recognition of two linguistic forms in two languages as belonging to a common cross-linguistic category. Notwithstanding the fact that category boundaries are probably fuzzy, their area is delimited by the extent to which stretch their various non-prototypical senses. Such delimitations must also be based on cognitive grounds.

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COMPARING THE INCOMPARABLE? ENGLISH ADJECTIVES IN -ABLE AND THEIR RENDERING IN MODERN CHINESE

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1. INTRODUCTION

It has often been maintained that the aim of contrastive linguistics is "...the comparison of two or more languages (or subsystems of languages) in order to determine both the differences and similarities that hold between them". (Fisiak 1980:1)

The study in hand will try to answer the question whether a comparative analysis of phenomena found in allegedly structurally disparate languages like English and Chinese can be attempted and whether there are any results to be obtained from such an undertaking.

As subject matter I have chosen the rendering of English adjectives derived from verbs or nouns by means of the suffix *-able*[1] in Modern Chinese.[2] As this is one of the first attempts of a comparative English-Chinese microstudy I confine myself to a purely surface-structural analysis, and I should also like to point out that, as the material of my investigation consists largely of entries in Chinese-English and English-Chinese dictionaries, any conclusions I make should be regarded as tentative, requiring further corroboration or rejection from a large-scale corpus study.

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[1] The variants [əbl], [Ibl] and [jubl] will be treated alike in this study since from a synchronic-comparative point of view this differentiation has no bearing on the translatability of the respective lexical item.

[2] "Modern Chinese" is to be understood as *pǔtōnghuà*, the standard Chinese spoken in the People's Republic of China ("Moderne chinesische Hochsprache"). The transcription used is *pīnyīn*.

2. ADJECTIVES IN *-ABLE* IN ENGLISH[3]

2.0. In this chapter I shall try to give a preliminary grouping of the adjectives in question with regard to their derivational properties and semantic analysability.

The examination will be a purely synchronic one, i.e. it is concerned with existing lexemes, regardless of their origin and history.

2.1. Terzjan quite correctly observes that adjectives with the suffix *-able* do not form a homogeneous group in the system of present-day English (Terzjan 1962:21). A brief look will show that one large class is formed by suffixation of *-able* to a verb, e.g. *breakable*, *eatable*, *believable* (cf. Chapin 1970:57); another class consists of denominal derivatives, e.g. *marriageable*, *knowledgeable*, *reasonable*, and of adjectives like *possible*, *potable*, *amicable*, usually regarded as having nonfree stems (cf. Chapin 1970:57).

Yet another group consists of derived adjectives in *-able* whose basis exists either as a substantive or a verb — Marchand (1969^2:229) mentions *comfortable*, *favorable*, *profitable*, whereas I think that this description refers more to adjectives like *respectable* or *honourable*, as they have different meanings depending on the word-class of their respective bases.

2.2. For the purpose of classification of adjectives in *-able* in English and subsequent comparison with their Chinese counterparts I shall adhere to

a) Marchand's demand that "prefixal and suffixal composites must be opposable to their unprefixed and unsuffixed forms" (Marchand 1969^2:3), which will exclude forms like *possible*, *potable*, *amicable* for not allowing this opposition, and

b) a scale of word-formational/semantic transparency, which I shall try to establish in order to be able to describe the word-formational and semantic analysability of lexemes according to the principle that "...the meaning of a morphologically complex word will be a compositional function of the meanings of its parts". (Aronoff 1976:127).

2.2.1. Aronoff (1976:127) points out that the basic compositional meaning "for words of the form *Xable* is 'liable to be Yed' or 'capable of being Yed' (where Y is the base of the word in question)". This analysis, however, presupposes that Y is a verb and that the suffix *-able* expresses MODALITY (POSSIBILITY, NECESSITY).

2.2.2. If Y is a noun, we shall find it more difficult to establish a basic compositional meaning. Poldauf (1959:237f) suggests that denominal adjectives in *-able* express evaluation ("Wertung"), and he tries a subdivision depending on semantic features of the base noun Y:

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[3] The following chapter is based on previous investigations in this field: Poldauf (1959), Terzjan (1962), Chapin (1967, 1970), Marchand (1969^2), Abraham (1970), Aronoff (1976).

(i) Y is already marked semantically with regard to evaluation, i.e. Y expresses something positive or negative: in that case the derived adjective would be paraphrasable as 'doing, bringing, affording, showing ... Y', e.g. *knowledgeable* ('showing knowledge'), *pleasurable* ('giving pleasure'), *honourable* ('bringing honour').

(ii) Y is not marked with regard to evaluation: adjectives derived from these nouns could be paraphrased as 'having, showing ... good/great Y'.

Examples of this type would be *reasonable*, *sensible*, *fashionable*, *sizable* ... Poldauf's classification, though based partly on apparently intuitive semantic criteria, nevertheless helps to establish a group of adjectives in *-able* that share similar word-formational and semantic properties.

Yet there are other denominal adjectives like *marriageable* 'fit for marriage', 'old enough for marriage' (ALD)[4]; *impressionable* 'easily influenced' (ALD), *objectionable* 'likely to be objected to' (ALD), *actionable* 'giving just cause for legal action' (ALD), *companionable* 'friendly, sociable' (ALD) and many others that fulfil Marchand's requirement of being opposable to the respective unsuffixed forms as well as to other composites containing the dependent morpheme *-able* (cf. Marchand 1969^2 : 3) and must therefore be included in the analysis and investigated as to how they are rendered in Chinese, although they do not seem to exhibit a basic compositional meaning as the one proposed by Poldauf.

2.3. A contrastive analysis will be meaningful only if we try to arrange the lexical material to be investigated according to a criterion that takes into account both word-formational and semantic properties. The criterion I will use in my study is "word-formational/semantic transparency".

2.3.1. One might, at that point, opt for "lexicalization" to be used as a means of classification, as this term, if used as by Lipka (1977) could cover all the cases where *-able* does not express MODALITY (as in *knowledgeable*, *pleasurable*, *reasonable*, *comfortable*...). On the other hand, as the term "lexicalization" is used both for characterizing complex lexical items that have lost their status as word-formation syntagmas and have become „eine einzige lexikalische Einheit mit spezifischem Inhalt" (Lipka 1977 : 155) and for describing the diachronic process due to which such entities develop (cf. Lipka 1977 : 162), I should like to use the term "transparency" instead for the simple reason that it will be applicable to English and Chinese lexical material alike and that it will reflect more clearly the synchronic viewpoint of my comparison.

2.3.2. A complex lexical item is (fully) transparent if its semantic and formal properties are completely deducible from its constituents and its word-formational model. We must assume different degrees of transparency according to the easiness/difficulty of analysis, which is determined by the degree of deviation from a standard paraphrase. *Believable*, for example, is analysable as V+suffix *-able* '(sth) can be believed'. *Considerable*, on the other hand, though word-formationally identical with *believable*, cannot be paraphrased as '(sth) can be considered' but has to be explained as meaning 'great, much, important' (ALD), and we can say that *considerable* is semantically less transparent than *believable*, i.e. lexicalization and transparency are related in that the higher the degree of lexicalization of a lexical item the lower will be the degree of its semantic transparency.

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[4] ALD means that the meanings of the adjectives discussed are given here as in Hornby (1974^3).

3. COMPARISON

3.1. Fully transparent in English would be deverbal adjectives of the type *eatable, drinkable, fixable, loveable...*, which are formed according to the principle of relative motivation and belong to that group of lexical syntagmas, "deren Bedeutungen bei Kenntnis der Bestandteile und der Kombinationsregeln aus der morphologischen Form abgeleitet werden können" (Kastovsky 1982 : 151). They can be regarded as a clear case of suffixation where the suffix "is a bound morpheme which in a syntagma AB occupies the position B. It thus is the determinatum of a syntagma whose determinant is a simple or complex free morpheme..." (Marchand 1969^2 : 209). Needless to say that the suffix *-able* has changed the word-class of the base.

Semantically, adjectives of this type are marked positively with regard to MODALITY, in a majority of cases more specifically with regard to POSSIBILITY. Different semantic paraphrases have been suggested, e.g. by Marchand (1969^2 : 230): 'fit for doing/being done'; by Aronoff (1976 : 48): 'capable of being Xed' (where X is the base); or by Chapin (1967 : 54):

(1) (i) These coupons are redeemable for cash.
(ii) These coupons can be redeemed for cash.
(iii) One can redeem these coupons for cash.

All these paraphrases (except for Marchand's 'fit for doing' to which I will return later) clearly express that the base verb must be passivizable and that the derivative itself has passive meaning.

I shall use a 'can/may/must be Xed'-analysis (X is the base) and paraphrase

(2) eatable as '(sth) can be eaten'
fixable as '(sth) can be fixed'
loveable as '(sb/?sth) can/may be loved'

3.2. The Chinese counterparts of the three adjectives listed in (2) would be

(3) kě-chī- (de)

'can-[be] eat[en]-(subordinating particle)[5]
kě-guìdìng- (de)
'can-[be] fix[ed]-(subordin. part.)
kě-ài- (de)
'can-[be] love[d]-(subordin. part.)

3.2.1. Word-formationally these adjectives are transparent, too, and can be analysed as containing the element *kě* and a verbal base, where *kě* may be regarded as a prefix. Thus, Chao Yuan Ren in his *Grammar of spoken Chinese* (p. 211f.) speaks of "versatile first morphemes in compounds", which he calls "prefixes", and among prefixes before a verb also lists — *kě* 'worth ... -ing', '-able'. The semantic function of the prefix *kě* is thus obviously the expression of MODALITY.

3.2.2. Both the English *V -able* and the Chinese *kě — V* constructions seem to share the same status as word-formation syntagmas in that they can be matched by appropriate syntactic paraphrases:

(4) eatable things
'things (that) can be eaten'
kě-chī-de dōngxi='dōngxi kěyi chi'
'things can [be] eat [en]'

In many cases Chinese *kě-V* constructions are more difficult to paraphrase syntactically, as their constituents often appear in "abbreviated" form as is also the case with *kě* 'can' which can be regarded as part of *kěyǐ* 'can, may' or *kěnéng* 'can'.

3.2.3. As in English, the passive meaning of the verbal base in the derived word is not morphologically marked, but seems to be indicated by the prefix *kě*, as in

(5) kě-ài-de háizi
'can-[be] love [d]-(subord. part.) child' —
'a loveable child', i.e. 'a child that can be loved'
and not 'a child that is capable of loving'.

3.3. Other examples of deverbal English adjectives in *-able* expressing MODALITY which are rendered by the *kě-V*-construction in Chinese would be:

(6)	appreciable	'(sth) can be appreciated'
	kě-gūjì-(de)	'(sth) 'can-[be] appraise[d]'
	governable	'(sth) can be governed'
	kě-tǒngzhì-(de)	'can-[be] rule[d]'
	kě-kòngzhì-(de)	'can-[be] control[led]/dominate[d]'

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[5] The subordinating particle *de* is often used to subordinate an adjectival construction to the nominal construction it modifies.

comparable	'(sth) can be compared'
kě-bǐjìao-(de)	'can-[be] compare[d]'
explainable	'(sth) can be explained'
kě-shuōmíng-(de)	'can-[be] explain[ed]'

It is, in fact, fascinating to see that this word-formational type has similar properties in English and Chinese:

(i) MODALITY is expressed by word-formational devices (suffixation in English, prefixation in Chinese)
(ii) The basic verb appears in a PASSIVE reading
(iii) The basic verb must apparently be transitive

3.4. Another point worth discussing is the kind of MODALITY expressed by the adjective in *-able*. In the majority of cases this is POSSIBILITY, as in *hateable*, *detestable* (*kě-wù*)[6]; *pitiable* (*kě-lián*), *laughable* (*kě-xiào*); *reliable*, *dependable* (*kě-kào*), *questionable* (*kě-yí*), *removable*, *detachable* (*kě-chāi*).

The adjective *payable*, however, can mean either '(sth) can be paid' or '(sth) must be paid'. Chinese *kě* in that case is used only in the POSSIBILITY reading, viz. *kě-zhīfù-(de)* — 'can-[be] pay[d]', whereas the NECESSITY reading is rendered as *yīng-zhīfù-(de)* — 'must-[be] pay[d]'. This goes to show that the suffix *-able* in English has a wider scope within the dimension MODALITY than the Chinese prefix *kě*.

3.5. It would be an oversimplification to assume that every English *V-able* syntagma corresponds to one Chinese *kě-V*-syntagma. *Breakable*, for example, though apparently clearly analysable as '(sth) can be broken', is rendered in Chinese as *yì-pòsuì* 'easy-break into pieces', and it is impossible without context to decide whether to assume an ACTIVE or a PASSIVE reading. *Changeable*, on the other hand, which Marchand (1969^2 : 230) lists as a deverbal adjective with both an active and a passive sense ('fit for doing'/'fit for being done') is rendered either as *kě-biàn-(de)* — 'can-[be] change[d]' or as *yì-biàn-(de)* — 'easy-change' (in the sense of 'changing easily').

3.5.1. One explanation of this phenomenon might be that *yì* 'easy' is used to form adjectives that refer to inherent qualities of the modified noun. A corroboration of this assumption would be *yì-rán pǐn* 'easy-burn goods', i.e. *inflammable goods*, where inflammability might be regarded as an inherent quality of the goods mentioned.

Variable is regarded by Marchand as having an active sense (Marchand 1969^2 : 230), which should make it paraphrasable as '(sth) can vary'. However, if we look up the item *variable* in an English-Chinese dictionary, we will find two entries: *yì biàn* (*de*) — 'easy vary', which would correspond to Marchand's classification of *variable* as having an active sense, and *kě-biàn-(de)* — '(sth) can-[be] vary[d]'.

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[6] Chinese equivalents given in brackets all show the structure *kě* — V.

3.5.2. A better explanation of this phenomenon of dual rendering would be one on syntactic grounds: *break*, *change*, and *vary* can be either transitive or intransitive verbs. The adjectives derived from the transitive verbs have a PASSIVE reading ('can be broken', 'can be changed', 'can be varied') and tend to be rendered in Chinese by the *kě-V* construction (the lack of a possible *kě-pò* — 'can-[be] break [broken]' in the English-Chinese dictionary should probably be regarded as a gap due to unsystematic listing and should not invalidate the above statement), the adjectives derived from intransitive verbs have an ACTIVE reading and tend to be rendered *yì-V*.

Further corroboration for this explanation would be the rendering of *perishable* (derived from the intransitive verb *perish*) as *yì-sǐ-(de)* — 'easy-die'.

3.6. Another interesting point is the difference of semantic transparency of deverbal adjectives in *-able* in English and Chinese.

It seems to be the case that as soon as the suffix *-able* in a derived adjective loses the feature [+MODALITY] the adjective becomes less transparent semantically and its formation is less clear. Consider, for example, the adjective *honourable*. If it is regarded as a deverbal adjective it can be paraphrased as '(sth/sb) can be honoured' and is rendered as *kě-zūnjìng-(de)* — 'can -[be] honour[ed]', i.e. semantically transparent with regard to MODALITY. If, however, it is regarded as a denominal adjective meaning 'possessing or showing the principles of honour' (ALD) its Chinese equivalent would be *róngyù* (*de*), i.e. in that case the Chinese noun *róngyù* 'honour' would be subordinated by the particle *de* to the noun it modifies and would thus fulfil the function of an adjective meaning 'having honour, showing honour'.

3.7. This dual rendering in Chinese would corroborate Aronoff's assumption (cf. Aronoff 1976 : 48) that there are two different affixes *-able* at work: one found in deverbal adjectives with the meaning 'capable of being Xed' (where X is the base), and one found in denominal adjectives meaning 'characterized by X' (where X is the base), i.e. *-able*$_1$ expresses MODALITY, *-able*$_2$ does not.

Thus deverbal *respectable* '(sth/sb) can be respected' is rendered as *kě-jìng-(de)* — 'can-[be] respect[ed]', whereas denominal *respectable* 'of good character and good social position' (ALD) is rendered as *xiàngyàng-(de)* — 'up to the mark/decent/sound' (the Chinese translation does not seem to cover the scope of meaning denominal *respectable* has in English, which goes to show that the less transparent the item is in English the more difficult it is to find a suitable Chinese counterpart).

3.8. I think that the semantic vagueness of *-able*$_2$, characteristic of non-nexus combinations (cf. Marchand 1969^2 : 39ff.), results in a lower degree of semantic transparency of the denominal adjectives. Therefore it is not surprising to see that Chinese does not offer systematic word-formational devices for rendering English *N-able* constructions, e.g.

(7) profitable 'bringing profit' (ALD):

yǒu yì (de) 'have profit'
yǒu lì (de) 'have advantage'
impressionable 'easily influenced' (ALD):
yì shòu yǐngxiǎng-(de) — 'easy[ly] accept influence'
knowledgeable 'having much knowledge' (ALD):
yǒu zhīshi-(de) — 'have knowledge'
marriageable 'old enough for marriage' (ALD)
dádào jiéhūn niánlíng-(de) — '[have] reach[ed] marriage age'

4. CONCLUSION

By comparing what might have seemed to be incomparable I hope to have proved once again the feasibility and usefulness of contrastive analyses. It has been surprising and fascinating to see word-formation at work in different languages, expressing similar semantic dimensions by similar means. Whether the findings of this paper are to be seen in a wider linguistic context will be the goal of further studies.

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CLASSIFICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF LEXICAL ERRORS IN THE WRITTEN WORK OF GERMAN LEARNERS OF ENGLISH[1]

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0. The starting point of our work on lexical errors was dissatisfaction with error correction in universities and high schools: Generally speaking, there is not enough differentiation. We usually do not get much more than *lexical* errors and some *collocational* and *idiomatic* errors; in addition, sometimes indications of *stylistic* appropriateness. Then we may have *word formation* errors. This is the usual kind of correction in written work that most of us will be used to. The main shortcoming of this procedure must be seen in the undifferentiated category of *lexical error*.

Despite recent scholarly contributions towards a differentiation of this category, especially those by Debyser et al. (1967), Levenston/Blum (1977), Arabski (1979) and Ringbom (1978) we continue to find overall ratings. This is the case e.g. in Steinbach's (1981) paper in *PSCL 13*, where almost 50% of all errors (including grammar and spelling) come under the category of *lexical selection*. These lexical selection errors comprise about 80% of all lexical errors (Steinbach 1981 : 255).

Similar ratios are typical of everyday practice, but I think that such wide categories are not helpful in any way, neither for learner correction nor for remedial teaching.

Arabski and Ringbom have chosen to tackle the problem using what I would call a mixed procedure, namely combining description and explanation of lexical errors: Their description of approximations often contains hypotheses on the sources. *Transfer, false friends* (Arabski 1979 : 32ff; 36 (as "faux amis") or *language switch* and *attempted anglification* (Ringbom 1978: 89) bear witness to this approach.

1. My approach is similar to the mentioned ones in that I also attempt to

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[1] Paper read at the Societas Linguisticae Europaea 16th Annual Meeting, Poznań 1983.

differentiate the concept of lexical error in terms of categories from linguistic semantics. My first question is, then: How relevant are usual semantic categories for the description of one important kind of *real* semantic deviation, namely in learners' errors? Can they account for lexical errors? Which are too wide or too loose? — I think these are by no means trivial questions, since linguistic semantics has often been satisfied with relatively unproblematic examples, e.g. from the field of concrete perceptible objects, whereas social and cultural concepts of higher complexity play a bigger role in foreign language teaching, especially on the advanced level. So my first aim is the exploitation of *one* paradigm. I am making the analytic distinction between linguistic *description* and psychological *explanation* (at least for the time being, in the first phase). In doing so, I hope to do better justice to the *subject matter* of learning by disregarding the learning *process*. In a nutshell: I am interested in a description of the meaning difference between the interlanguage lexeme chosen and the target language lexeme intended, which should be as exact as possible.

While I aim at the possibility of a detailed description of lexical errors I am not sure whether semantic details are also important for the learning process. It may be the case that typical aspects of semantic deviation are more decisive in this respect.

2. A linguistic typology of lexical errors (or: categories of semantic deviation)

At this stage I am disregarding depth and gravity of errors. As to the distinction between lexical and grammatical errors I rely on the usual criteria of semanticity and generalization, i.e. the width of rule applicability.

Let me sketch my typology by way of examples from our data (written work from university and, much less, high school classes)[2].

I am beginning with the confusion of sense relations

(1) Hyp → *Sup
I was thrilled by the white light and the special *smell*
scent/Duft

(2) Hyp → *Sup
I *went* upstairs
jumped/sprang

(3) Sup → *Hyp
Some of his *claims* have become less important
demands/Forderungen

(4) Sup → *Hyp
A dying *colonel* once said
(*commissioned*) *officer/Offizier*

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[2] It should be borne in mind that some illustrative sentences contain errors other than the ones discussed.

(1) through (4) are confusions of supernyms and hyponyms in either direction: **Smell* is more general than *scent*; **claim* is more specific than *demand*. (Such cases need no further comment; other analysts handle them in the same way.)

(5) Hyp → *Sup/Style
... which agreed on *getting rid of* all dialects
eradicate/ausrotten

(5) illustrates what has not been brought out clearly enough in previous work: the necessity of double classifications[3]. **Get rid* is not exact enough in comparison with *eradicate*; that makes it an erroneous supernym, an underspecification. But at the same time the stylistic inappropriateness is felt in this context; *get rid* is too colloquial.

(6) Cohyp$_1$ → *Cohyp$_2$
A final decision to *exterminate* all dialects
eradicate/ausrotten

Interlanguage **exterminate* as well as correct *eradicate* are specific terms of forceful removal (roughly equivalent to *destroy*), but the one does not exclude the other. Here co-hyponyms have been confounded.

(7) Het$_1$ → *Het$_2$
Stairs were being *washed*
scrubbed/gescheuert

In (7), on the other hand, the meanings of *wash* and *scrub* are mutually exclusive; both heteronyms are specifications of *cleaning*.[4]

(8) Part → *Whole
The injury had to be *operated*
sutured/sewn/genäht

(9) Result → *Process
Theodor Siebs had made phonetic *recordings*
records/Aufzeichnungen

There are other minor groups of sense relation errors, such as (8), where *suturing* or *sewing* is part of the whole action of **operating*, or (9), where the process of **recording* was referred to instead of the resulting *record*.

(10) Field E.
in a *memorial* by the Foreign Office
memorandum/Denkschrift

Errors such as (10) are best described as field errors: Instead of using *memorandum*, a word from the semantic field of "written public communication", the learner wrote **memorial*, which is from the field of "public buildings".

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[3] Cf. Legenhausen's work on grammatical errors (1975: 18ff.).

[4] I am still undecided whether cohyponym and heteronym errors should not be classified with feature errors, esp. since there are only few instances in our data.

(11) ? Field E.
The tongue was *stark* swollen.
thickly/dick

(11) gives the impression of a 'macaroni' sentence (Arabski's *lexical shift*), where a German word is used in an English sentence. But this is a causal hypothesis which cannot do justice to the understanding of the native speaker. So it should rather be interpreted as */sta:k/, an adverb-like form with the possible meaning of *utterly*. From this point of view, a word from the field of intensive expressions would have been replaced by a term of extension.

The error types presented so far were based or can be based on a holistic conception of meaning. They are followed by errors which have to be described through partial aspects of meaning, through meaning components, or, in a more formal way, semantic features. I call them feature errors.

(12) Feature E.
I *slided* and fell
slipped/rutschte aus

This is to me a clear case in point: the confusion of **slide* and *slip* is owing to a small difference in meaning. They are loosely synonymous, but in *slip* a component of accident seems to be typical, whereas *slide* is unmarked in this respect.

(13) Field E. or Feature E.
German attempts to establish a standarized language appear much more apolitical, literary, *disinterested*
detached/distanzierter

(13) is rather a border-line case between field and feature errors. It seems feasible to locate **disinterested* in a subfield of "objective attitude" (like *fair*), and *detached* in a subfield of "lack of dedication". On the other hand, the meaning difference can be seen as a case of partial synonymy, which it would be better to grasp through different features.

(14) ? Feature E.
Homecoming is a *nice* adventure
charming/reizendes

Cases like (14) leave me rather insecure: There is a difference in content between **nice* and *charming*, but it seems to be secondary as compared to the pure expression of positive attitudes of different degree and validity.

(15) Word-formation E.
It has been *normed*
become the rule/normiert

This shows one aspect of this error type. Although **normed* is a formal violation of the linguistic norm, it is not a lexical error in the narrower sense: This IL lexeme does not exist in English, but it is a potential word, and communication is not impaired.

(16) The paper is *yellowy*
yellowed/vergilbt

(16), on the other hand, is a word-formation error which is deficient on the formal and semantic level: -*y*-derivations of colour adjectives are impossible, and the meaning is unclear between *yellowish* and *yellowed*. –
This category ends my linguistic classification of lexical errors, as far as deviations of meaning are concerned, but I have to add a few more categories which I think are best dealt with under my general topic.

(17) Collocation E.
red-edged eyes
red-rimmed/rotgerändert

(17) looks like a word-formation error, but what is wrong is the collocation: *red-edged* alone is good, but it does not go with *eye*, and it is only *edge* (instead of *rim*) that cannot occur with *eye*:

(18) Non-interpretable form
... which in one of its *momentos* ends like this
memorandum/Denkschrift
(19) and filled the mouth like a *clops*
lump/Kloß

**Momentos* in (18) looks like an English word, but it does not exist, and it cannot be interpreted. **Clops* instead of *lump* (in the throat) is another instance of such noninterpretable forms.

(20) Idiomatic E.
These negotiations *are cutting a great figure*
play an important role/spielen eine bedeutende Rolle
(21) Harald Wilson, ... the *go-getter/busy-body/Jack-in-the-pot/Jack everywhere*
Jack-of-all-trades/Hansdampf in allen Gassen

Idiomatic errors such as (20) and (21) need no comment in that their classification poses no problems. But it is very interesting to see what constructions learners use to replace them.
Further minor categories are redundancy and omission; (22) and (23), respectively.

(22) Redundancy E.
At a *rate* speed of five miles a second
O/Geschiwindigkeit
(23) Omission E.
I had bitten through——— my tongue
edges/Zungenränder

A last important category are paraphrase errors. Let me just indicate a necessary distinction between formally possible ones, such as (24), and syntactically and semantically deviant ones, like (25).

(24) Paraphrase E.
The *outer parts* of my tongue
edges/Zungen*ränder*

(25) The tongue was a muscle *which could not be missed.*
indispensable/unentbehrlich

Stylistic errors, e.g. (26) and (27), are again unproblematic as such, but they often have to be double-classified.

(26) Stylistic E.
The doors of the *taverns* are open
pubs/Kneipen

(27) My dealing with *written stuff*
written things/Schriftlichem

Connotative (or associative) deviances are rare: (28) is a case in point.

(28) Connotative E.
I *jerked* upstairs
jumped/sprang

3. Problems of delimitation and overlapping of categories

I think it is evident that this typology raises several problems of delimitation and overlapping of categories. After all, it is organized along four principles:

- Most types are based on a holistic conception of meaning (sense relation errors).
- Feature errors derive from a componential approach.
- Deviances in style, register and connotation are concerned with additional aspects of overall meaning, beyond the conceptual core.
- Then there is the syntagmatic point of view in collocational and paraphrase errors whilst the other types were defined on a paradigmatic basis.

It is clear that sense relation errors can also be formulated in terms of feature differences. As far as it seems feasible I have so far preferred a description using holistic categories, since I think this is more promising from a psychological and acquisitional point of view.

The main difficulty lies in the distinction between feature errors and those field errors where members of similar subfields are dealt with. This group of errors with relatively small meaning differences between the IL and the TL lexemes is one of the biggest in the corpus.

I am trying to delimit along the following line: Wherever IL and TL form can be attributed to fairly distinct subfields, I classify as field error. In such cases it is usually a hierarchically higher feature that accounts for the deviance.[5] Feature errors, then, are largely occurrences of almost synonymous lexemes. They have often been treated as 'synonyms' in loose terminology.

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[5] I have to admit that the classification as feature or field error depends largely on whether a semantic feature or meaning component lends itself to description.

Paraphrase errors unite deviances of different content and size: They can be attempts to replace a lexeme or a group of words (like and idiom), they can be deviant in content or style, and of course in their formal make-up. They comprise errors in which the inappropriateness or awkwardness appears to be the main trait of the IL expression.[6]

4. Preliminary results[7]

4.1. Distribution of error types.

A preliminary analysis of about 20% of the errors from our corpus of approximately 2000 items, not including paraphrases, but including word-formation errors, has shown the following tendencies (it seems premature at this stage to speak of results):

- About 20% can be classified as sense relation errors, but this has to be done with the caveat that with comparatively many of them a classification as feature erros may be more exact (esp. for verbs and adjectives).
- About 1/3 can be classified as field (or subfield) errors.
- So far only as little as 10% have been classified as feature errors, that is confusion of near synonyms, owing to our tendency to prefer holistic or field- or scheme-oriented descriptions.
- In about 1/5 of all classified errors, the decisive point was seen in the wrong collocation, a surprisingly high ratio for data mostly from university courses and exams, maybe a Marburg-specific phenomenon.

It should be noted that errors belonging with the descriptively most difficult types, namely field and feature errors, constitute together the biggest group (over 40%).

It can be expected that those errors which proved too difficult to classify so far will mostly be incorporated among the feature errors, or double-classified (<10%).[8]

4.2. Form-class-specific errors

A survey on the basis of slightly more than one thousand errors (complete for all versions of several texts from the corpus) showed, among other things, the following results:

- It is not surprising that noun errors are more frequent than verbal, adjectival and adverbial deviances; their relative frequency of approximately 4 to 3 to 2 to 1 corresponds largely to general word frequencies in texts of this kind.

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[6] It goes without saying that all classifications have been performed using native speaker reactions.

[7] Our data are so far restricted to written work, translations, essays, and other kinds of relatively free text production. We are aware of the limited value of this kind of data for an overall description of learner language, but we have chosen them, since these types of exercises are at the same time desicive in tests and examinations, however anachronistic this may seem.

[8] Let me add at this point that a description which would be optimal from a scientific point of view would certainly lead to an error matrix like the one proposed by Legenhausen (1975: 42).

But there are some more interesting form-class-specific findings: cf. table 1.

Table 1: Error frequencies

Form class / Error type	Number of errors (%)			
	N	V	Adj	Adv
Sense rel. E	25	19	10	8
Field E	17	20	22	18
Word-F. E	25	1	12	—
Coll. E	6	18	18	7
Om. E	1	<1	3	13
Par. E	13	25	14	30

- Typical errors among nouns are worf-dormation, sense relation and field errors, whereas paraphrases are relatively infrequent.
- On the other hand, word-formation errors are extremely rare among verbs; verbal errors are mostly inadequate paraphrases, field and collocation errors.
- Among adjectivals field and collocation errors predominate; paraphrases are again rarer.
- Adverbs of all kinds (but excluding grammatical forms such as intensifiers) show striking peculiarities; almost 1/3 are paraphrases (with *way*, *manner*, *kind* etc.). Field errors are also not rare, and omissions are surprisingly frequent. Finally, there are practically no word-formation errors with adverbs at all.

4.3. Paraphrases and paraphrase errors.

My preceding remarks have made it apparent that paraphrase errors play an important role in our data. It must be kept in mind that these errors are all from written work where there is time enough for planning the utterance. Paraphrases and, consequently, paraphrase errors are even more frequent in oral communication, not only among foreign language learners, but also with native speakers: We often paraphrase a term that does not come to our mind instantaneously, we have something on the tip of our tongue, and we are helped out by others. Paraphrasing, even if it is not as exact and specific as the optimal intended word, is a normal way of everyday communication. It deserves more attention, and, I think, a more positive attitude among foreign language teachers, as do by the way, "creative" word-formations which are not in the dictionary.[9]

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[9] Cf. Zimmermann, in press and Zimmermann/Schneider, in press.

Paraphrases follow certain patterns reflecting again the grammatical and lexical standard of their producers. We use an idealized schema to classify paraphrases, cf. table 2.

Table 2: Paraphrases

meaning-preserving formally correct	* meaning-preserving formally deviant
* meaning-changing formally correct	** meaning-changing formally deviant

Illustrative examples:
Good: **which had the colour of smoke/smoke-coloured*
Only formally deviant: **in a polite form/politely*
Only meaning-changing: **never greedy/always modest*
Completely deviant: **stood *horizontal/stuck crosswise.*[10]
Let me indicate some typical paraphrase structures:
a. Paraphrasing nouns:

$$\mathrm{N} \rightarrow \mathrm{Sup} + \begin{Bmatrix} \text{of NP} \\ \text{inf clause} \end{Bmatrix}$$

*pragmatist→*man of pragmatics*
*nurse-maid→*woman to look after the children*
N→Adj+Sup
pragmatist→*pragmatic man
N-compound→N+rel clause
post-war (hopes)→(hopes) coming up after the war, *(hopes) people had for the time after the war*
b. Paraphrasing verbs:
$\mathrm{V}_x \rightarrow \mathrm{V}_{link} + \mathrm{N}_x$
*Imagined→*had the imagination of*
$\mathrm{V}_x \rightarrow \mathrm{V}_Y + \mathrm{PP}$
flipping (across the surface)→**appearing in a quick movement …*
c. Paraphrasing adjectives
Adj→of +NP
*social-democratic→*of the social democrats*
Adj → rel clause
*icy → *which had become ice*
pol adj_1 → neg+pol adj_2
*bent → *not upright*
d. Paraphrasing adverbs
Only by prepositional phrases
*permanently → *without interruption*

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[10] Non-interpretable paraphrases are grouped with the meaning-changing ones, redundant ones go with redundancy errors.

All these paraphrases were marked as incorrect or somehow deviant, but I think it is clear that many of them would go unnoticed in even educated oral communication. They should be encouraged rather than penalized, and they ought to be furthered by "paraphrasing exercises", which, to my knowledge, do not exist in our universities.

Let me conclude these remarks on paraphrases by pointing out their particular relevance for the expression of idioms, where good paraphrases can of course not be the optimal solution, but nevertheless "idiomatic English". Cf. _*master of all situations_ or even _*man capable of managing everything_ to _*whirling-pool in all lanes *James everywhere_ or even _*busy Jack in all trades_: the first two are certainly much more acceptable than the last three (cf. example 21).

5. Further perspectives

We are now also investigating the relation between communicative damage and sheer irritation in native speakers. Then we are beginning to complement our error files by causal hypotheses, including associative sources in L_1 and L_2 (Zimmermann, to appear).

This should eventually lead to partial analyses of selected errors in terms of learner language. We have some fine examples of only seemingly correct forms which are in reality covert lexical errors: The fraction of correct _extrapolated_ for German _extrapoliert_ does not look so convincing anymore in the light of multiple incorrect forms such as _*excluded_, _*extracted_, _*exposed_, _*extraposed_ and even* _extrapolished_.

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PERCEPTION OF STRESSED SYLLABLES IN NATURAL STIMULI: A CONTRASTIVE ENGLISH–POLISH EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*

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0.1. The concept of stress may be considered from several points of view. From the speaker's point of view it is defined in terms of increased subglottal pressure and it is often maintained that variations in pitch are due to changes in the subglottal pressure. Ladefoged, for example, claims that "... there must be a direct mechanical link between the two" [i.e. between the fundamental frequency changes and the subglottal pressure changes — W.A.] (Ladefoged 1967:34). Ohala's experiments (Ohala 1977) demonstrate that variations in fundamental frequency are independent of the pulmonic system, which is, however, responsible for intensity variations. Thus, these two parameters, i.e. fundamental frequency and intensity, may be investigated independently. The third parameter which the speaker may utilize to mark a stressed syllable is duration.

From the listener's point of view stress is often defined in terms of prominence. Apart from increased fundamental frequency, intensity, and longer duration, prominence of a stressed syllable may also be due to vowel quality since different vowels may have intrinsically different intensities (cf. Lehiste and Peterson 1959). The perception of stressed, i.e. more prominent, syllables may be influenced by phonemic factors, for example, in English aspirated stops appear before stressed vowels while syllabic sonorants occur in reduced unstressed syllables. (cf. Lea 1977). In longer sequences rhythm also plays an important role (cf. Hayes 1984).

0.2. A number of experimental studies using languages such as English (Fry (1958), Morton and Jassem (1965)), French (Rigault (1962)), Czech

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* I am deeply grateful to Prof. William S. Brown, Jr., and Prof. Harry Hollien of the Institute for Advanced Study of the Communication Processes, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida for their help in the conducting of this experiment.

(Janota (1979) and Polish (Jassem, Morton and Steffen-Batóg (1968) show that changes in fundamental frequency are predominant in effecting the listeners' perception of stressed syllables. The other two parameters, i.e. intensity and duration, seem to play a different role in different languages, for example, Jassem, Morton and Steffen-Batóg (1968:306) claim that changes in intensity have a stronger effect for English listeners than for Poles, while variations in duration dominate for Polish subjects.

1.1. EXPERIMENT. In the studies mentioned above the experimenters worked with synthesized speech stimuli. In the study reported in this paper natural speech stimuli were used. The aim of the experiment was to determine the role of fundamental frequency, intensity and duration in the perception of stressed syllables by native speakers of American English and by native speakers of Polish.

1.2. MATERIALS. The materials consisted of 25 nonsense words spoken by two speakers: (a) a native speaker of Polish (KSz) who utilized fundamental frequency, intensity, and duration to mark stressed syllables in a very inconsistent way, and (b) a native speaker of American English (SB) who utilized the three parameters consistently. The forms recorded by the latter were treated as test words.

The list of nonsense words consisted of 15 three syllable words and 10 two syllable words. Each of the five vowels [iueoa] appeared with the same consonant (The list of words is given in the Appendix).

1.3. SUBJECTS. The subjects included both females and males. There were ten Americans and ten Poles. In the two groups there were 'naive' native speakers, some were trained phoneticians, while others had only some phonetic training. The role of this factor was not considered in the present report.

1.4. PROCEDURE. The recordings were made in a sound-treated room. Throughout the entire session a twelve inch subject-to-microphone distance was maintained. The words were printed on a card three times and the vowel to be stressed was marked with an acute accent. Only the second recording was later analysed.

Each of the 25 words was then recorded three times and thus the total number of forms was 150, i.e. 75 forms of each of the two speakers. These forms were recorded in random order with a pause of 6 seconds between each word. The tape prepared in such a way was used in the perception experiment.

The experimenter met his subjects individually or two to four subjects at the same time. The subjects listened to the tape from a tape recorder with two external speakers. They were asked to make judgements as to which syllable was stressed in the words they heard. They were instructed that the aim of the experiment was to test their impression as to which syllable had been stressed and therefore they should not be afraid that they would make a mistake. On the answer sheet the words were presented in four columns (naturally, without the acute accent) and the subjects were asked to circle the syllable of their choice.

1.5. EQUIPMENT. The recording equipment included an ElectroVoice Model 664 microphone and an Ampex 602 tape recorder. In the perception test a Sony TC-530 tape recorder with two external speakers was used.

1.6. TECHNIQUE. Narrow-band spectrograms were made on a Voice Identification, Inc. Model 700 spectrograph. They were analysed for fundamental frequency, intensity, and duration. The accuracy of the measurements was verified using a Honeywell 1508 A Visicorder.

The tape for the perception experiment was also prepared on the same VII Model 700 spectrograph.

2.1. RESUTS. As expected there were significantly different responses to the words spoken by the native speaker of American English (who was very consistent in utilizing all the three parameters to mark stressed syllables) and to the words spoken by the native speker of Polish. The number of syllables marked as stressed differing from the speakers' intention is as follows:

	Americans	Poles
SB	13 (1.7%)	20 (2.6%)
KSz	151 (20.1%)	122 (16.3%)

The number of responses different from the intended ones for the speaker SB is too small to draw any conclusions, especially since those responses do not form any pattern. The responses to the forms spoken by the speker KSz provided the experimenter with interesting data.

2.2. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS. Here the analysis of only some of the most typical examples will be presented.

(1)

KSz — speaker's intention		má	fu	ra
	Hz	166	166	166
	dB	38	32	33
	msec.	220	240	300

(2)

KSz — speaker's intention		ke	fi	sí
	Hz	200	200	200
	dB	29	18	25
	msec.	190	190	460

(3)

KSz — speaker's intention		má	ku
	Hz	166	200
	dB	33	27
	msec.	310	510

(4)

KSz — speaker's intention		sé	pi
	Hz	166	200
	dB	33	26
	msec.	290	400

Since each word was recorded three times, the total number of possible responses was thirty (3×10) in each of the two groups of subjects.

(1) In *máfura*, out of 30 possible responses, American subjects marked the third syllable as stressed in 12 cases, while Polish subjects perceived this syllable as stressed only in 7 cases.

(2) In *kefisí* the first syllable was marked as stressed 17 times by Polish subjects and 9 times by American subjects.

(3) In *máku* only American subjects heard stress placed on the second syllable in 8 cases, while all the Poles marked the first one.

(4) Similarly, in *sépi* the second syllable was marked as stressed 6 times by American subjects and only twice by Polish subjects.

3.1. CONCLUSIONS

(1) When all the three parameters are utilized, i.e. when the stressed syllable has higher fundamental frequency and intensity as well as longer duration, neither native speakers of American English nor native speakers of Polish have any difficulties in perceiving the stressed syllable. It is confirmed by a very small number of responses different from intentions of the speaker SB.

(2) When the syllable which the speaker intended to stress is not significantly higher in fundamental frequency, both American and Polish subjects have difficulties in finding the stressed syllable. The hesitation in responses to the stimuli *máfura* and *kefisí* demonstrates that fundamental frequency is the most important cue in perception of stress.

(3) Responses to the stimuli *máku* and *sépi* show that duration is more effective than intensity for Americans than for Poles.

3.2. SUMMARY. The data in this study corroborate some earlier results, namely, that fundamental frequency is the most important cue in perception of stress (cf. Fry 1958, Morton and Jassem 1965, Jassem, Morton and Steffen-Batóg 1968). They also agree with Fry's (1955) experiment which shows that duration is a more effective cue than intensity for American listeners. Morton and Jassem (1965) obtained opposite results for British English. In their experiment, however, artificial stimuli were used, and this difference may account for different results obtained in the experiments.

APPENDIX

The list of test words

máfura	sófumo	fúkura	síkemi	férise
rumána	tosóla	lafúku	lisíte	kefémi
sukamá	kumosó	kusafú	kefisí	mikefé

máku	sóma	fúma	sépi	mípe
tumá	tasó	kafú	misé	temí

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EXPLORATIONS IN LINGUISTIC SEXISM: A CONTRASTIVE SKETCH

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1. Introduction*

The past decade has witnessed a veritable explosion of interest in the field of sexual linguistics[1], i.e. the study of the complex interaction of language, sex, and gender[2]. This interest can, in part, be understood as arising from a general desire by linguists, anthropologists, and sociologists to elucidate actual interrelated patternings of language, culture, and society. In equal part, however, it is necessary to view the development of sexual linguistics within the context of popular and scholarly feminism, and in fact a large number of the most provocative articles in this field have appeared in journals and newsletters associated with the broader field of Women's Studies rather than in linguistic journals. In a real sense, the politicization of the sexism-in-language issue insured its future prominence in a way that simple linguists could not have hoped to achieve.

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[1] The term is Gregersen's (1979); it is not particularly satisfying, but it is the least cumbersome of the alternatives in the literature.

[2] Thorne and Henley's (1975:ix) prefatory comment to their anthology: "This book rides on the first crest of what we expect to be an ocean of interest in the topic" has proved prophetic.

Sexual linguistics has concerned itself with three basic areas of inquiry, although the distinctions among these areas are not always clearly demarcable. The first area involves the relation between language structure and the sexes, i.e. how does [some particular] language treat the two sexes? Most of the interest in this realm has centered around topics such as the generic use of "he" and "man" in English, address term systems, professional titles, etc. The second broad area focuses on actual differences in language use by the two sexes, i.e. how do the sexes use language differently? Numerous investigators have examined such issues as differences in pronunciation and intonation, patterns of adjective selection, use of tag questions, patterns of interruption, and so forth. Finally, a third area of research has proposed changes in the language system and attempted to demonstrate the psychological and sociological consequences of findings in the first two areas, i.e. what can be done about this situation and does any of it really matter? Positive responses to this latter question derive directly from a belief that ways of speaking/hearing are intimately tied to ways of thinking and that ways of talking are tied to patterns of self- and otherevaluation (Cf., e.g., Heilman 1975; O'Barr and Atkins 1980). It is not our purpose in this brief paper to review or synthesize even a portion of the now voluminous literature in sexual linguistics. Several excellent overviews are available, e.g. Thorne and Henley (1975a), Frank (1978), Gregersen (1979), McConnell-Ginet (1980), to which the reader is referred.

This paper concerns itself with the first-mentioned area of study, i.e. the encoding of sexist/sex-differentiating treatment into the structure of a language. Such differential treatment of women and men is perhaps most obvious in lexicon where, for example, titles and terms for occupations are listed. However, this is by no means the sole phenomenon which some critics have analyzed as institutionalizing sexist values. In Section 2 we review briefly the major critiques of English as a sexist language. In large part, we do not attempt to evaluate the significance of sexist encoding in the language or specific proposals for nonsexist usage. Several studies have set out to determine and, occasionally, quantify such significance, but the results of such studies are not particularly compelling. However, since one of the authors' present interests focuses on the elimination of sexist encoding — or rather the potential for such elimination — some of the various proposals that have appeared in the literature will be reviewed. In Section 3, the issue of sexism in Polish is considered in some detail. The interest in such a treatment derives, we believe, from several points. First, a contrastive study helps to focus on broader, more general issues and to identify and delimit possible general tendencies operative in sex- and gender-marking languages. The bulk of literature on sexual linguistics concerns itself with English, although there are a few treatments of other languages, especially Romance (e.g. Connors

1971; Frank 1978b). Polish, on the other hand, has not been systematically examined in this regard, and because of its rich derivational and inflectional system, unlike that of English, it provides quite interesting features for study. Additionally, there is some interest in comparing languages from different types of societies, and Poland differs in important ways from American and Western European societies. Note that we do not discuss any differences in social organization or structure between English- and Polish-speaking societies. Rather, we assume 1) that all societies are sexist to varying degrees, 2) that a simple contrastive study of sexism in any two societies is not possible without considering the wholes of the social and cultural systems within which sexism is embedded, and 3) that the different degrees of sexism in two societies (if sexism can be quantified) are not directly correlated with different degrees of linguistic sexism. Finally, in pursuit of an answer to the general question of whether nonsexist language is possible, it is important to compare this potential in languages with natural and grammatical sex-gender.[3] Section 4 examines the comparability of one aspect of our analysis of Polish with Russian and highlights different tendencies in these two languages. In the final section of the paper we attempt to provide a synthesis of our current ideas concerning the differential potential for nonsexist usage in different language systems.

2. ENGLISH

The issue of the extent to which English institutionalizes sexist values in its linguistic structure has generated enormous popular interest. One of the first targets identified by feminists was the traditional tripartite address and reference system of Title+Last Name, viz. *Mr.*, *Mrs.*, *Miss.* Historically, the latter two were used to distinguish female children and adults (cf. the obsolete distinction *Master-Mister*), but in the late 18th century they became associated with a distinction in marital status. Critics have charged that apart from the inherent sexism in the asymmetrical treatment of men and women and in labelling a woman as "available for mating" or not, the use of *Miss* applied to women over 25 or so developed to connote social undesirability, unattractiveness, or inherent qualities of spinsterhood. The alternate form *Ms.* had been coined as early as the 1940s (Miller and Swift 1970:88), but it was largely unknown until a significant number of women began to object to being labelled according to their marital status in the late 1960s. Reactions to the "new" title ranged from full endorsement to outright ridicule and hostility. In point of fact, the title *Ms*, is extremely useful in situations where a speaker/writer does not know the marital status of addressee/referent, and this fact, more than any pro-feminist sympathies, probably accounts for its acceptance into the language system[4] although there are still many speakers who eschew its use.

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[3] In this regard, one needs to compare languages in which the gender system does not exploit sex as a classificatory feature as well as languages without gender. Hungarian, for example, has no gender, but there are numerous mechanisms and structures exhibiting male sexist bias (J. Szpyra, personal communication).

Viewed from a current perspective, the introduction of *Ms.* seems like a relatively harmless linguistic change,[5] one which did not threaten a core area of structure, and it is infrequently discussed in the literature now. On the other hand, the so-called generic masculine is the center of active investigation and debate.

2.1 Generic "He"

Two types of structures are usually included under the rubric of the generic masculine: 1) generic "he" and 2) generic "man" and "-man". The basic charges are the same in each case, namely that the generic nature of these structures is a myth, that so-called generics frequently mask an intended male-exclusive interpretation, and that even in cases where a true generic may have been intended language users exhibit a tendency for male interpretation, being biased by the formal surface identity between generic and sexspecific (male) forms. Consider, for example, sentences such as:

(1) Each student intending to graduate in 1983 must submit an official Declaration of Candidacy form signed by his advisor.
(2) I asked for volunteers, but nobody raised his hand.
(3) -Somebody telephoned for you this morning.
-Did he leave his name?
(4) In such a circumstance, that lawyer will be registered as an Officer of the Court. As such, he will be responsible for ...

Examples such as 1 through 4, which display a range of styles, exhibit supposedly generic *he/his*, i.e. *he/his* in these examples is sex-indefinite, following a traditional rule of English grammar that the masculine term, under certain circumstances, includes both males and females. The history of this rule has been treated in detail by Bodine (1975), who noted that despite more than

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[4] Cf., e.g., the need for a sex-neutral address title in situations where one is writing to an individual known only by Initial+Last Name (e.g. L. Gravesend) or by First Name+Last Name in which the FN is not readily identifiable as sex-indicative (e.g. Taghi Modarressi). As a response to this need, the salutation *Dear FN/I+LN* has gained some prominence (e.g. *Dear L. Gravesend*) where it was virtually unknown a decade ago; to be sure, it is still considered gauche by many writers.

[5] Note that the real nature of this change varies from one individual to another. Some individuals emply *Mrs.*, *Miss*, and *Ms.*; others employ only *Ms.*; others never use *Ms.* although they understand it; others use *Ms.* only as a substitute for *Miss*; etc.

300 years of prescriptive grammar there is an increased tension between prescription and actual language usage. The problem with such generics, according to critics, is that people do not understand them as such, or, if they do, the interpretation including women is a secondary interpretation as illustrated by (1) and (2). In (3), a true generic may have been intended by the speaker, but the addressee (a male university professor) may have assumed that another male was the more likely referent for *somebody*. Examples such as (4) are particularly objectionable since they imply, it is suggested, that lawyers are men and in this way insure institutionalization of sexism in society. Compare (5):

(5) A secretary in your institute will provide day-to-day contact with the administration. She will ...

where the sex-expected nature of pronominal reference makes clear that sex-indefinite *he* (such as it is) is inappropriate in certain contexts, although the sex of the antecedent noun is equally unspecified in (4) and (5).

In many dialects of English, the 3rd person plural pronoun *they* serves as a sex-indefinite singular reference:

(1b) Each student intending to graduate in 1983 must submit an official Declaration of Candidacy form signed by their advisor.
(2b) I asked for volunteers, but nobody raised their hand.
(3b) -Somebody telephoned for you this morning.
-Did they leave their name?
(4b) In such a circumstance, that lawyer will be registered as an Officer of the Court. As such, they will be responsible for ...

Bodine (1975) noted that singular *they* has thrived despite grammatical proscription, for at least two and a half centuries.[6] As Gregersen (1979) noted, however, such sex-neutral usage bears no relation to the degree of sexism in the speech community or to the attitudes of individual speakers. On the basis of actual usage, Bodine proposed that the English pronominal system in Figure 1 is a more accurate schemata than the traditional arrangement in Figure 2.[7]

Recognizing the grammatical contradiction inherent in singular *they*, some speakers have opted for an explicit sexindefinite reference: *he or she* (alternatively, *she or he*), *he/she*, *s/he*; although the latter two are largely confined to wriiten English, some speakers pronounce *he/she* as a compound. Some feminists have openly advocated such usage whereas others have opposed it on the grounds that 1) it is clumsy and stylistically awkward in actual discourse, or 2) it does not combat sexism in any meaningful way, i.e. it is the equivalent

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[6] In fact, the male author of this paper regularly uses singular *they* in all styles of speech and reports being unaware of its nonstandardness until, while teaching at the University of Calgary (Alberta), such singular *they*-forms would invariably bring forth smiles, laughter, or correction from his students.

[7] Bodine does not discuss the extension of *you*.





of "Females Allowed" or "Women Too" rather than a sex-neutral reference. A third response strategy to the problem generated by the absence of a true sex-neutral 3rd person singular pronoun in English has been coinage. Specific proposals for new pronouns abound, e.g. *co, tey, hesh, thon, xe, E, po*. Miller and Swift (1977:116) note that such coinages are not new: *thon*, for example, derives from *that one* and was first recorded in 1859 and has been listed in many standard reference works. Many linguists note such proposals with amusement, believing that the pronominal system of a language is such a core element of grammar that it is immune to change.[8] Apart from speakers whose dialect affords them the luxury of singular *they*, the problem of sex-neutral reference is likely to remain because 1) coinages such as those mentioned above meet with extremely limited success, 2) *he or she*, along with its various inflectional forms, is awkward in discourse, and 3) the various guidelines for nonsexist usage, e.g. recasting singular references in the plural, alternating masculine and feminine pronouns, etc. are more suited to writing, where an author has the opportunity to insure conformance with such guidelines.

2.2 Generic "Man"

Similar to the critique of generic "he", the use of *man* as a generic term has also come under feminist attack. For example, Schneider and Hacker (1973) claimed that the term "man" is generally not interpreted to mean "people" or "human beings" but rather "males". In a study investigating sex-role imagery among college students, they found that phrases such as *Political Man, Economic Man*, and *Urban Man* generated more "male-exclusive imagery" than comparable phrases such as *Urban Life, Political Behavior*, etc. However, it should be noted that even the latter phrases frequently elicited male-exclusive imagery, albeit less often than the "man" phrases. Similarly, Nilsen (1973) found that young children interpreted *man* in sentences such as "Man needs food to survive" and "Man is the highest form of life on earth" to mean "male human being". Some feminists have argued that English (and especially male speakers of English) conspires to promote the "visibility and primacy of males" over females (Spender 1980:153). It has been claimed that women employ such structures less often than men and that women do not perceive themselves as being included in the terms "he" and "man" (Martyna 1980). Stanley (1977) provides a detailed treatment of the problems inherent in generic reference in English.

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[8] Cf., however, the history of 2nd person pronouns in English.

Apart from its uses above, "man" also functions as a derivational suffix in English in words such as *postman*, *mailman*, *salesman*, *policeman*, *spokesman*, *milkman*, etc.[9] Here, the claim is that speakers, including children who are acquiring both linguistic and sociocultural competence, exhibit a preferential interpretation of *-man* as sex-specific (male). This claim is difficult to test, however, since even young children have acquired certain sex-role expectations, thereby confusing separate linguistic and cultural issues. E.g., if people tend to think of *a spokesman* as male, is this due to any overt marking in the term, or is this due to the fact that males tend to fill such roles? It has been suggested that such terms be replaced by sex-neutral alternatives, e.g. *spokesperson*, *mail carrier*, *police officer*, *salesperson*, etc. However, such terms also frequently exhibit preferential male-interpretation, suggesting that the real problem is one of cultural stereotyping rather than linguistic labelling. Of course, sex-biased labelling contributes to the maintenance of such cultural stereotyping. Further, though, a good argument can be made in support of synchronic non-identity between the suffix *-man* and the word *man*: *-man* is phonetically always [mən] rather than [mæn]. Matthews (1974) objects to such an argument since one cannot explain the irregular plural of *-man* as *-men*, i.e. if *-man* and *man* are separate units, then the irregular plural of *man* as *men* should be irrelevant to the independent *-man*, and Matthews claims that we should then hear *policemans*, etc. However, in point of fact, there is non-identity in the plural of the two forms *-men* [men] and *men* [mən], at least in some dialects, including that of one of the present authors, where the singular/plural distinction is phonetically neutralized. A stronger objection to a reanalysis of *-man* as distinct from *man* lies in pairs such as *policeman-policewoman*. Since the latter is, for Matthews, a compound, he is forced into analyzing the former as such too. In such oppositions, however, the male-denoting term is necessarily [pəli : smæn] rather than [pəli : smən], i.e. it is clearly not the generic. Rather, both of the above terms are compounds marked for sex reference and both are subsumed by the generic [pəli : smən].

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[9] These occurrences of *-man* are treated as derivation by suffixation as opposed to forms such as *company man*, *preacher man* (dial.), *insurance man* which have an unreduced vowel; these latter are presumably compounds.

2.3. Occupational Terms

The issue of sexism in occupational reference and professional titles is not confined to forms involving the suffix *-man*. Stanley (1977) posited a theory of "negative semantic space" for women, based on several important observations. First, there are fewer nouns that refer to women than to men in English, and more importantly the former are less valued. As Bolinger (1973:541) observed: "Women are taught their place, along with other lesser breeds, by the implicit lies that language tells about them." When women move outside traditional roles (wife/mother) they enter semantic space "already occupied by the male sex" Stanley (1977:67). Woman's anomalous position must then be marked by a female-specific marker. There are two sets of such markers in English: 1 prefixal units such as *lady*, *woman*, *female* placed before prestigious occupations, e.g. *woman doctor*, *female dentist*,[10] and 2 derivational "feminizing suffixes" e.g. *-ette*/*-ess* as in *majoritte*, *waitress*, *poetess*, *aviatrix*. The compound-forming *-woman*, e.g. *congresswoman*, *spokeswoman*, might also be added here. The only professional terms that do not require overt marking are those which are semantically specified as [-MALE], e.g. *prostitute*, *nurse*, *secretary*, *homemaker*, *kindergarten teacher*.

Several interesting points arise in an analysis of the above forms. First, as Schultz (1975) correctly observed, there is a tendency for nouns referring to females to undergo semantic derrogation or trivialization over time. Consider historically parallel pairs such as:

(7a) steward-stewardess
major-majorette
governor-governess
Sir-Dame
master-mistress
bachelor-spinster

where the female-referring term now denotes a trivial occupation, e.g. *majorette*, *governess*, has acquired sexual connotations, e.g. *mistress*, *dame*, or has been otherwise subject to derrogation, e.g. *spinster.*[11] Cf. also semantic shifts such as the following:

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[10] Note that the corresponding *male-* prefix occurs in a very limited inventory, viz. professions stereotypically practiced by females, e.g. *male nurse*, *male secretary*, *male prostitute*, *male stripper*, *male exotic dancer*.

[11] Cf. also the pair *priest-priestess*, which exhibits asymmetry. *Priestess*, in addition to specifying "female practicioner" implies that the religion involved is a cult or "primitive religion". When the Anglican Church allowed the ordination of women, such women were referred to as *women priests* or simply *priests*, never *priestesses*.

(7b) whore — a lover of either sex (not negative)
slut — a person negligent of his (generic) appearance
harlot — a fellow of either sex
wench — a child of either sex

In addition to narrowing so that only females are now included in the scope of reference, all of these terms have acquired strongly negative connotations (Schultz 1975:68-70).

Certain feminists object to sex-specific occupational terms of any sort precisely because of the above tendency. The term *chairperson* (replacing *chairman*) generated great discussion in the 1970s as academic departments and administrations sought a sexneutral reference for "department head". Although the debate is less active now, many individuals simply acquired a new sexspecific reference, i.e. a male would still be *a chairman*, but a female became *a chairperson* rather than *a chairwoman*. Some departments attempted to avoid the awkwardness and political issues involved by substituting the term *chair*, but this tendency has not met with great success. The problem is a serious one though. Even such relatively neutral sex-specific terms (at least for some speakers) as *actress* and *poetess* are under attack since, it is claimed, they do not compare women to the whole class of professionals but only to the subclass of women. Compare:

(8a) Patricia Neal is one of the greatest actresses in the history of American film.

(8b) Patricia Neal is one of the greatest actors in the history of American film.

Similarly, it is alleged that the work of "poetesses" is expected to be trivial, silly, or simply "women's poetry" (whatever that might be), and the term *poetess* is therefore demeaning or insulting. It has been argued that only by designating all practicioners of a profession by a single term will equality of opportunity, expectation, and evaluation be achieved. A certain success has been attained in reaching the goal of nonsexist professional terms, reflecting the fact that the lexicon does lend itself to conscious manipulation and change. The impact of such sex-neutral terms is regarded as minimal by other critics: "The mere fact that there are two sexes gives rise inevitably to two ways of perceiving human life: the 'us' of one view and the 'them' of the other" (Scott 1978:198). It must be pointed out that not all feminists, then, support unmarked terms since they believe that it will only contribute further to the invisibility of women in society. Such feminists are likely to avoid the feminizing suffixes, e.g. *-ess,* and to employ locutions such as *woman artist, woman lawyer, woman's art,* etc.

2.4 Lexical Gaps

A final aspect of English that is consistent with Schultz' theory of negative semantic space is the absence of certain terms relevant to women's experiences, i.e. lexical gaps in English. For example, Beatty (1979) noted that there is no term in English to refer to female sexuality, corresponding to *virility* for male sexuality. Other examples mentioned by Kramarae (1981:8) (attributed to Spender) include: a term for normal sexual power in women (counterpart to *potent*), a word equivalent to *effeminate* for a woman with "manly" qualities, a term for a woman that connotes an individual rather than a qualifying term calling attention to the woman/man division, a positive term to take the place of *nonsexist*.

2.5 Conclusion

The above survey has not been intended as an exhaustive one. On the one hand, it has not been possible to treat several important topics, e.g. the politics of names and naming. On the other hand, constraints of space preclude a comprehensive treatment of any of the above topics. Rather, our purpose has been to provide an orienting overview of the questions, issues, and data raised in the ongoing examination of the sexist bias of the English language as a prelude to an examination of other languages. We have dealt only peripherally with actual proposals for change. Those researchers active in the field believe that patterns such as those reported above can be taken as indexical of culturally shared attitudes and patterns of social role and status distribution. Such an assumption has long been employed as an operating principle in historical linguistics, e.g. in the reconstruction of a proto-culture on the basis of proto-lexicon. What is novel is the attempt to apply this assumption to an analysis of current usage in order to connect language with a widespread misogyny (e.g. Schultz 1975; Spender 1980; Kramarae 1981). Inherent in such an approach is the belief that sexist language perpetuates and institutionalizes sexist values and attitudes. "Just as we can suppose that the young child is an incredibly talented linguist, comparing rival hypothesized grammars against the evidence she encounters in the speech around her, so we can suppose that the child has some talent as a linguistic anthropologist, figuring out the cultural clues dropped in language use" (McConnell-Ginet 1980:8).

3. Polish

In the present section, we intend to provide a fairly detailed linguistic analysis of certain sex-differentiating features of Polish. This discussion will, at times, be rather more technical than that provided for English in § 2, due — at least in part — to inherent differences in the nature of the data observed. Additionally, we attempt to be more comprehensive in our treatment here since, unlike the situation for English where there is a wealth of information available, virtually no treatment of this topic is available for Polish either in Polish or in English and, further, the Polish data will be unfamiliar to many readers. Prior to the presentation of our analysis, it is necessary to address a few words to certain preliminary differences in the structures and organizing systems of the two languages under comparison, especially gender systems.

3.1. Gender Systems

It is common in discussions of gender to distinguish between natural gender and grammatical gender. A *gender system* is essentially a system for classification, and *natural gender* refers to a system which employs natural, i.e. inherent, qualities in an object for classification. Modern English is said to possess such a system since nouns are classified into one of three categories, Masculine, Feminine, or Neuter, on the basis of inherent sex characteristics of each object named. There is no overt nominal marking in English (for gender or any other category except plurality) and gender distinctions are relevant only in pronominal reference and certain selectional restrictions. Thus, a male person or animal is referred to by *he*, a female by *she*, and an inanimate object by *it*. There are several well-known counterexamples to this generalization, e.g. ships and cars are frequently *she*, unborn children are frequently *it*, inappropriate sex reference can be used (frequently derrogatorily) in reference to homosexuals, and there is the interesting question of appropriate pronominal reference for hermaphroditic organisms.

Systems of grammatical gender, on the other hand, classify objects arbitrarily, i.e. there are no inherent similarities or connections between objects in any single category. Perhaps the most common system of grammatical gender is the sex-gender type found in most European languages. It should be mentioned, however, that grammatical gender systems do not necessarily exploit sex as a basis for classification e.g. the Bantu system of classification recognizes between 7 and 13 genders, but sex reference is not a feature of any category; males and females belong to the same gender category, that specified for most human references.[12] There has been an unfortunate confusion in the literature among the terms *sex*, *gender*, and *sex-gender* (not to mention *sex-role* and *gender-role*), but current usage is now institutionalized. The grammatical (sex-) gender systems of European languages distinguish either two, Masculine/Feminine, genders, e.g. French, Danish, or three, Masculine/Feminine/Neuter, e.g. German, Old English, Russian. There is a partial overlap in these languages between natural and grammatical gender: nouns referring to males tend to be Masculine and nouns referring to females tend to be Feminine. There are, however, numerous exceptions to this generalization, and nouns referring to inanimates may appear in any gender category. For a fuller discussion of gender systems, see Adler (1978); Frank (1978b).

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[12] Of course, systems of natural gender are not necessarily based on sex either. The noun classification system of Proto-Bantu is assumed to have been a semantically real and natural system based on inherent qualities such as animation, shape, size, function, etc. The essential difference between grammatical and natural gender is that noun classification in the latter is predictable by regular semantic principles.

3.2 Sex and Gender in Polish

Polish, like most Slavic languages, distinguishes three grammatical gender categories, Masculine/Feminine/Neuter, in the sigular.[13] The citation form for nouns is generally the nominative singular, and there is some correspondence between the phonological shape of a noun and its gender category (Szober 1967:119):

(9) a) nouns with -e, -o, -ę endings are Neuter, e.g. *słońce* "sun", *jajko* "egg"
  b) nouns with final -a, -i are Feminine, e.g. róża 'rose", pani "woman, Ms."
  c) nouns with final consonant are either Masculine or Feminine, e.g. *dom /M/* "house, *twarz /F/* "face"

In the majority of cases, nouns with animate referents are either Masculine or Feminine, depending on sex characteristics. There are, however, important exceptions to this generalization:

(10) a) mężczyzna — "male, man (nongeneric)" is historically Feminine and still exhibits certain Feminine case endings although agreement is as for Masculine nouns
  b) babsztyl — "woman" (pejorative) — Masculine
  c) podlotek — "teenage girl" — Masculine
  d) dziewczę — "girl" — Neuter
  e) pacholę — "boy" — Neuter
  f) chłopina — "man (nongeneric)" — Feminine[14]

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[13] Mańczak (1956) takes issue with this tranditional analysis and proposes, on the basis of distinctions in adjective concord, that one needs to distinguish six genders in Polish (singular and plural) nouns. The complexities of this reanalysis are not relevant here.

[14] Terms such as *chłopina* are frequently listed as having Masculine gender since they take masculine demonstratives and concords although they decline as Feminine nouns. The derivational suffix *-ina* is a feminine suffix, and all derivatives displaying it are unquestionably Feminine, e.g. *psina* "poor small dog" (〈*pies* "dog)", *żakiecina* "miserable old jacket (〈*żakiet* (M) "jacket"), *dziecina* "little child" (〈*dziecko* (N) "child"), *except* those derivatives referring to male human beings, e.g. *aktorzyna* "actor" (pejor.), *adwokacina* "lawyer" (pejor.), etc.

g) babisko — "woman" (pejorative) — Neuter
matczysko — "mother" — Neuter
mężczyźnisko — "man" — Neuter

It is probably true that there is a greater overlap between male-referent terms and Masculine gender than between female-referent terms and Feminine gender; this distinction is observed in many languages.

The three-way distinction Masculine/Feminine/Neuter is replaced in the plural by a two-way distinction between Virile and Nonvirile nouns. Virile nouns are those that refer to male human beings whereas the category Nonvirile includes all other semantic types (females; inanimates; male (nonhuman) animates). There is, thus, only a partial overlap between the Masculine and Virile categories; once again, there are exceptions to the above generalization, which are discussed below.

3.2.1. Singular Concord

The most reliable overt indicators of gender in the singular and plural are demonstrative pronouns and adjectival concord. Polish displays a rich case inflectional system and distinguishes seven cases: Nominative, Genitive, Dative, Accusative, Instrumental, Locative, and Vocative. There are at least four declensional patterns, but these are not of direct relevance here. Taking the nominative and accusative singular and plural as examples, the following concord patterns are observed:

(11)	*Nominative*	*Accusative*
	ten stary stół	ten stary stół "that old table" /M/
	ten stary profesor	tego starego profesora "that old prof" /M/
	ta stara kobieta	tę starą kobietę "that old woman" /F/
	to stare krzesło	to stare krzesło "that old chair" /N/
pl.	ci starzy profesorowie	tych starych profesorów "these old professors" /V/
	te stare kobiety	te stare kobiety "these old women" /NV/
	te stare stoły	te stare stoły "these old tables" /NV/
	te stare krzesła	te stare krzesła "these old chairs" /NV/

Several points require mention at this time. First, there is always inflectional concord between the demonstrative and the adjectives in any given NP. Second, although the grammatical gender of a noun usually (and historically) determines the appropriate concord, there is a certain amount of flexibility with regards to the treatment of nouns in which grammatical gender and sex of referent conflict. In many such cases, the expected pattern of grammatically-determined concord is observed:[15]

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[15] The subscripts$_{n, f, m}$ are used to indicate Neuter, Feminine, and Masculine inflection respectively as well as inherent gender specifications for nouns. Similarly, (M),

(12) ten$_m$ sympatyczny$_m$ podlotek$_m$ "that pleasant teenage girl" /M/
to$_n$ sympatyczne$_n$ pacholę$_n$ "that pleasant boy" /N/
to$_n$ sympatyczne$_n$ dziewczę$_n$ "that pleasant girl" /N/

It is worth noting that there are no grammatically Feminine nouns referring exclusively to males in which grammatical concord (i.e. Feminine concord) occurs; in such situations of conflict (male referent vs. Feminine gender), sex-determined ("natural") agreement obtains, e.g.

(13) ten$_m$ stary$_m$ chlopina$_f$ "that old man" /F/

despite the fact that male referent vs. Neuter gender conflicts are resolved in favor of grammatical agreement:

(14a) to$_n$ stare$_n$ chłopisko$_n$ "that old man" /N/

or, more rarely, in favor of sex-determined concord:

(14b) ten$_m$ stary$_m$ chłopisko$_n$ "that old man" /N/

Note, however, that in conflicts involving female referent nouns, sex-determined concord is generally not possible:

(15) *ta$_f$ stara$_f$ babsztyl$_m$ "that old woman" /M/
*ta$_f$ sympatyczna$_f$ podlotek$_m$ "that pleasant teenage girl" /M/
*ta$_f$ sympatyczna$_f$ dziewczę$_n$ "that pleasant girl" /N/

Viewed from a feminist perspective, such facts easily lend themselves to a change of sexist bias in the grammatical system. That is, male referent nouns are permitted sex-determined concord (male sex is stronger than grammar) if they are grammatically Neuter and are obliged to display sex-determined concord if they are Feminine. On the other hand, the agreements for female referent nouns are always grammatically determined; the language system (and its users) tolerate Neuter and Masculine concords for female referent nouns without difficulty.

This same sexist pattern is observed with certain sexindefinite nouns in Polish, i.e. nouns that may refer either to females or males, e.g. *leń* /M/ "lazy person", *brudas* /M/ "slob", *flejtuch* /M/ "slob", *drań* /M/ "scoundrel", *fajtlapa* /F/ "klutz", *sknera* /F/ "miser", *kaleka* /F/ "handicapped person"; *sierota* /F/ "orphan". These substantives are specified as grammatically Masculine or Feminine. The Masculine group always takes masculine concords, regardless of sex of referent:

(16) ten$_m$ wstrętny$_m$ flejtuch$_m$ Zosia "that abominable slob Sophie"
ten$_m$ wstrętny$_m$ flejtuch$_m$ Janek "that abominable slob John"

Both sentences display masculine concords. Compare, however,

(17) ta$_f$ stara$_f$ fajtlapa$_f$ Zosia "that old klutz Sophie"
{ta$_f$ stara$_f$ fajtlapa$_f$ Janek "that old klutz Johnny"
{ten$_m$ stary$_m$ fajtlapa$_f$ Janek

(F), or (N) following a noun is an indication of its lexical gender. Subscript $_v$ and $_{nv}$ refer to Virile and Nonvirile respectively.

Male referent nouns exhibit either grammatical or sex-determined agreement. The only restriction here, as mentioned above, is that concord within the NP be consistent: *ta$_f$ stary$_m$ fajtłapa$_f$. Nouns specified as Neuter with sex-indefinite reference exhibit the expected sexist patterns of agreement, i.e. grammatical concord is obligatory for female referent nouns whereas male referent nouns allow either grammatical or sex-determined concord:

(18) to$_n$ wstrętne$_n$ skąpiradło$_n$ Zosia "that abominable miser Sophie"
$\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{to}_n \text{ wstrętne}_n \text{ skąpiradło}_n \text{ Janek} \\ \text{ten}_m \text{ wstrętny}_m \text{ skąpiradło}_n \text{ Janek}\end{array}\right\}$ "that abominable miser John" (as above)

although certain informants prefer grammatical agreement for both of the above cases.

Polish also exhibits NP-external agreement in the verb form, which agrees with its grammatical subject in person, number, and gender. The gender distinctions are most relevant in the past tense whereas person and number inflections are pervasive throughout the verbal system. Consider the following sentences:

(19) Ta sympatyczna kobieta *tańczyła*$_f$. "That pleasant woman danced"
Ten sympatyczny chłopiec *tańczył*$_m$. "That pleasant boy danced"
To sympatyczne dziecko *tańczyło*$_n$. "That pleasant child danced"

Sex-specific referent nouns involving conflict between grammatical and natural gender (cf. (12)) resolve the conflict in favor of grammatical agreement:[16]

(20) Ten$_m$ sympatyczny$_m$ podlotek$_m$ tańczył$_m$ (*tańczyła)
"that pleasant teenage girl danced"
To$_n$ sympatyczne$_n$ pacholę$_n$ tańczyło$_n$ (*tańczył)
"that pleasant boy danced"

In situations where natural sex overrides grammatical agreement within the NP, the verb also exhibits sex-determined agreement

(21) Ten$_m$ stary$_m$ chłopina$_f$ tańczył$_m$ (*tańczyła)
(22) to$_n$ stare$_n$ chłopisko$_n$ tańczyło$_n$ (*tańczył)
Ten$_m$ stary$_m$ chłopisko$_n$ tańczył$_m$ (*tańczyło)

Note, however,

(23) *Ten$_m$ stary$_m$ chłopisko$_n$ tańczyło$_n$

where NP-internal agreement is sex-determined but verbal agreement is grammatical. This impossibility follows from Greenberg's (1963) Universal 31, which claims that grammatical agreement within a verb implies grammatical agreement within the NP. Thus,

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[16] However, in cases where subject NPs include additional information, sex-determined concord may override grammatical agreement: *Ten*$_m$ *sympatyczny*$_m$ *podlotek*$_m$ *Zosia*$_f$ *tańczyła*$_f$ "That pleasant teenage girl Sophie danced. "The precise nature of the necessary additional information within the NP is not of interest here. Also, note that there is NP-external concord in predicate adjectives, which is not treated in this paper.

(24) to$_{n}$ stare$_{n}$ chłopisko$_{n}$ tańczył$_{m}$

does not violate Universal 31; NP-internal agreement is grammatical and verbal agreement is sex-determined. Sentence (24) is acceptable for some speakers.

The treatment of gramatically specified sex-indefinite nouns (cf. (16—18)) allows some variation, but verbal agreement is generally sex-determined; occasionally it is grammatical when no further information is contained in the subject NP.

(25) Ten$_{m}$ wstrętny$_{m}$ flejtuch$_{m}$ tańczył$_{m}$ (Female referent)
tańczyła$_{f}$
Ten$_{m}$ wstrętny$_{m}$ flejtuch$_{m}$ tańczył$_{m}$ (Male referent)
Ta$_{f}$ stara$_{f}$ tańczyła$_{f}$ fajtłapa$_{f}$ (Male referent)
?tańczył$_{m}$

Some informants find *Ta stara fajtłapa tańczył* unacceptable since male-referent nouns allow sex-determined concord and prefer *Ten stary fajtłapa tańczył*. When subject NP's are further specified, however, verbal agreement tends to be sex-determined, although this area requires further investigation.

3.2.2. Plural

As mentioned above, the dominant distinction in plural genders is Virile—Nonvirile, and this distinction is marked within the NP and externally in the verb:

(26) a) Ci$_{v}$ młodzi$_{v}$ artyści$_{v}$ tańczyli$_{v}$. "These young artists danced"
Te$_{nv}$ młode$_{nv}$ artystki$_{nv}$ tańczyły$_{nv}$. "These young female artists danced"
c) Te$_{nv}$ młode$_{nv}$ dziewczyny$_{nv}$ tańczyły$_{nv}$. "These young girls danced"

The Virile category includes male human being referents (exclusive and non-exclusive). That is, as in many other languages, in situations of mixed sex referents the male appropriate reference predominates and (26b) necessarily refers only to an exclusively female group of artists, whereas (26a) may refer to either an exclusively male group or mixed-sex group. This situation is not unlike the neutralizing of the Masculine—Feminine opposition wherein Masculine Plural is both generic and sex-specific.

Generic-referent nouns allow different treatment in the plural depending, in part, on the grammatical gender specification in the singular. That is, grammatically Feminine nouns do not permit Virile concords even when the group referred to is exclusively male: so that

(27) Te stare fajtłapy "These old klutzes"

may refer to all-male, all-female, or mixed-sex referents and **Ci starzy faj-*

tlapy/i is ungrammatical. On the other hand, *some* grammatically masculine nouns permit virilization when the referent group is exclusively male or mixed: e.g.

(28) a) Ci$_v$ starzy$_v$ dranie$_v$ "These old scoundrels"
b) Te$_{nv}$ stare$_{nv}$ dranie$_{nv}$

are both acceptable: (28b) is unmarked for sex interpretation whereas (28a) does not allow a female-only interpretation. Note, however, that not all grammatically Masculine nouns allow optional virilization, e.g.

(29) *Ci$_v$ starzy$_v$ flejtusi$_v$ "These old slobs"
*Ci$_v$ starzy$_v$ brudasi$_v$ "These old slobs"

The conditions on vilization seem to be lexically specified for individual nouns, i.e. it is not possible to predict which (Masculine) nouns will permit this process.[17]

Stankiewicz (1968:37) noted that the virile gender is neutralized in nouns of an expressive (mainly pejorative) meaning, e.g. *snoby* "snobs", *chamy* "boors", *pijaki* "drunkards", *kaleki* "cripples", *sieroty* "orphans", *psubraty* "scoundrels". In point of fact, however, most informants allow virile forms for certain of these substantives, e.g. *snobi, pijacy, kalecy* (but **chami*, **sieroci*, **psubraci*) Again, individual nouns seem to be lexically marked as to whether a virile form is allowed. In all cases the nonvirile form is more derrogatory. More importantly, the process of devirilization is observed, in which a male referent noun (nongeneric) may occur in the nonvirile form:

(30) ci$_v$ chłopi$_v$ "These male peasants"
te$_{nv}$ chłopy$_{nv}$ (pejor.)
ci$_v$ muzykanci$_v$ "those male folk musicians"
te$_{uv}$ muzykanty$_{nv}$ (pejor.)
ci$_v$ starzy$_v$ profesorzy$_v$ "these old professors"
te$_{nv}$ stare$_{nv}$ profesory$_{nv}$ (pejor.)

Some of these substantives are clearly not generic since Feminine counterparts are found: *chłopka* "female peasant", *muzykantka* "female folk musician". The essential point here is that the process of devirilization is strongly pejorative and that, functionally, devirilization means placing men in the category normally reserved for non-male-human referents, i.e. the nonvirile.[18]

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[17] The nominative Virile ending *-owie* is semantically restricted in Modern Polish (although historically conditioned by root vowel) and attaches only to prestigious occupations, positions, kinship terms, etc. or at least to semantically neutral terms: *pan-panowie* "sir-sirs", *wódz-wodzowie* "leader(s)", *profesor-profesorowie* "professor(s)", *ojciec-ojcowie* "father(s)". This ending cannot attach to any of the indefinite reference nouns discussed above. Many of these generics are pejorative, but it is not clear whether the syntax (optional viriles) or the semantics (pejoratives) precludes *-owie* suffixation. Cf. Szober (1967:173).

[18] This process is also observed with other classes of substantives, e.g. names for nationalities are typically Virile since they refer to male (and female) human beings. Certain derrogatory references are, however, Nonvirile:

Thus, it is clear that the two plural genders, Virile/Nonvirile, are hierarchically ordered and the Nonvirile is less valued than the Virile.[19] Thus, one could argue that the sexist bias of the language is evident in two facets of this dichotomy: 1) females are included in the more highly valued category (Virile) only in the presence of accompanying males; exclusively-female references are always Nonvirile, and 2 males can be "demoted" to Nonvirile, i.e. to the category of women, animals, and inanimates for the purpose of semantic derrogation. Traditional grammars tend to explain this asymmetry on the basis of the general rule that "the male species subsumes the female", but it is clear that such a claim cannot be maintained in light of 2) above and the hierarchical ordering of the two plural genders. These facts, coupled with those observed for singular nouns, viz. the tendency for male referent nouns to warrant sex-determined rather than grammatical concord whereas no such tendency is observed in female-referent nouns, reflect sexist bias/values within the grammatical system of Polish. Obviously, a language is used by its speakers; it may seem more appropriate to speak of sexism in speakers rather than in the language system. As many researchers have noted, however, the two are intimately related. Feminist critics would point out that a language such as Polish encodes sexist values, ensures the perpetuation of such values in language acquisition, and in this way contributes to a maintenance of the (sexist) status quo. That is, children acquiring Polish learn that males and females are treated in different fashions grammatically (and in other areas of behavior) and that — in some nontrivial sense — males are more highly valued than nonmales. It must be admitted here though that it is difficult to imagine what kind of deliberate manipulation of linguistic structure might succed in eliminating/reducing sexism in the concordial system. Rather, one can hope that the primacy of sex-determined agreement over grammatical concord will increase and that females and males will be treated equally at some future stage in the language's history. There are no similar trends observed in Virile/Nonvirile plural agreements, but more careful investigation of actual language use may reveal interesting patterns of variation.

Szwaby$_{nv}$	"Germans" (pejer.)
szkopy$_{nv}$	"German soldiers" (pejor.) (but, cf. Niemcy$_{v}$ "Germans")
żabojady$_{nv}$	"Frenchmen" (lit. "frog-eaters") (pejor.)
gumożuje$_{nv}$	"Americans" (lit. "gum-chewers") (epjor.; slang)

[19] Corresponding to the tendency for male reference nouns to be more highly valued than female reference nouns, one occasionally observes the "promotion" of female-references to a masculine category in certain styles of speech. Brooks and Nalibow (1970) cite the example of obituaries where masculine forms may be used in reference to a deceased woman to convey "a feeling of esteem or respect while the feminine-gender referential remains neutral" (1970 : 139).

3.3 Generics

There are a certain number of true generic personal nouns in Polish in addition to the sex-indefine forms such as *sierota* "orphan", *leń* "lazy person", *fajtlapa* "klutz" discussed in §3.2.
For example:

(31) człowiek /M/ "man (generic)"
osoba /F/ "person"

the first of which is grammatically Masculine and the second Feminine. Unlike the sex-indefinite forms in 3.2, these true generics require strict grammatical concord, e.g. *osoba* cannot occur with masculine concord if the referent is a male (*ten *mlody*$_{m}$ *osoba*$_{f}$ "that young person", but *ta*$_{f}$ *mloda*$_{f}$ *osoba*$_{f}$); further, true generics never permit virilization in the plural. *Osoba*, according to informants, is truly unmarked for sex and a sentence such as *Pewna osoba mi to powiedziala* "A certain person told me that" suggests nothing about the sex of the referent. Some informants, however, report that *czlowiek* in certain contexts functions as a true generic and in other contexts as English *man*. *Pewien czlowiek mi to powiedzial* "A certain man told me that" has a preferred nongeneric reading for some speakers. The difference between *osoba* and *czlowiek* may be that the latter admits a generic interpretation only as a reference to some unknown, abstract individual whereas a reference to a real (unnamed) individual will more likely produce the male reading. Here, too, further study is required to determine the distribution of generic and nongeneric readings. Note the following example, s prominent social slogan of some years ago: *Kobieta — to też czlowiek* "Woman is also a man", which shares none of the ambiguity or humorous suggestions of the English gloss. It is worth noting that although the grammatically Masculine noun has developed a dual function ((1) generic, (2) male) no such corresponding tendency is observed for the grammatically Feminine *osoba*, i.e. *osoba* has only a true generic reading and does not suggest female referent.[20] *Osoba* is often used by speakers when they specifically want to avoid any suggestion as to the sex of the person referred to; *czlowiek* is not employed for this purpose. The asymmetry of the treatment afforded these generics is, it might be claimed, further evidence of sex-differentiating treatment in linguistic structure.

In addition to the question of sex-indefinite or generic interpretation of certain substantives, there is the question of pronominal reference for such substantives. Polish distinguishes three 3rd person pronouns in the singular and two in the plural:[21]

(32) ona — she /F/

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[20] Derivatives from *osoba* may be sex-specific, e.g. *osobnik* "male person" (freq. pejor.), *osóbka* "little person (female or child)" (F). The suffixes in such cases are themselves marked for gender, e.g. *-ek* (M), *-ka* (F).

on — he /M/
ono — it /N/
oni — they /V/
one — they /NV/.

Several interesting points require mention in this context. First, anaphoric pronouns are generally sex-determined rather than grammatically determined. The pronoun is usually optional in discourse, but agreement is sex-determined:

(33) Ten$_m$ sympatyczny$_m$ podlotek$_m$ tańczył$_m$ (cf. (20))
(Ona$_f$) robiła$_f$ to bardzo dobrze.
"That pleasant teenage girl /M/ danced. She did it very well."
To$_n$ sympatyczne$_n$ pacholę$_n$ tańczyło$_n$
(On$_m$) robił$_m$ to bardzo dobrze.
"That pleasant boy danced. He did it very well".

In many situations, the grammatically determined pronominal reference is unacceptable, e.g. *Ten*$_m$ *podlotek*$_m$ ... *On*$_m$ *robił*$_m$ "That teenage girl /M/ ... He did". This tendency is in keeping with Moravcsik's claim that every language with grammatical gender may pronominalize according to sex (cited in Baron 1971). The treatment is parallel for sex-indefinite nouns such as *leń*, *sierota*, *fajtłapa*, etc. and pronominal reference (as well as subsequent verbal agreements) in such cases frequently serves to indicate sex reference, e.g.

(34) Ten$_m$ wstrętny$_m$ flejtuch$_m$ tańczył$_m$ ale bardzo dobrze (ona$_f$) to robiła$_f$.
"That abominable slob danced but she did it very well".
Ten$_m$ wstrętny$_m$ flejtuch$_m$ tańczył$_m$ ale bardzo dobrze (on$_m$) to robił$_m$.
"That abominable slob danced but he did it very well".

Pronominal agreement with true generics, e.g. *osoba*, is grammatical rather than sex-determined. Certain sex-indefinite substantives also exhibit grammatical agreement within a single sentence, e.g. *ofiara* "victim" /F/, *postać* "character" /F/, but either sex- or grammatically-determined pronouns outside the simple sentence. Consider the following sentence, spoken about a male accident victim:

(35) Ofiara$_f$ została$_f$ przewieziona$_f$ do szpitala.
Lekarze podali $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{jej}_f \\ \text{mu}_m \end{Bmatrix}$ krew.

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[31] These pronouns also inflect for case agreement, e.g.

	feminine	*masculine*
nom.	*ona*	*on*
gen.	jej	jego, go
dat.	jej	jemu, mu
acc.	ją	jego, go

"The victim was taken to the hospital. The doctors gave him some blood."

In the first sentence, both the verb *została* and the past participle *przewieziona* are marked for grammatical agreement with the Feminine antecedent *ofiara* "victim" despite the speaker's knowledge that the victim was male. The personal (dative) pronoun in the second sentence may be either feminine *jej* (agreeing with *ofiara*) or masculine *mu* (agreeing with sex of referent). The tendency for sex-determined concord rather than grammatical concord is observed in many languages and principles of discourse may account for the distribution of forms. This topic requires further study.

True indefinites, e.g. *ktoś* "someone", *nikt* "nobody", *ktokolwiek* "anybody" etc. also exist and decline as masculine pronouns; for example, *ktoś* (nom.), *komuś* (dat.), *kogoś* (gen., acc.), etc. *Każdy* "everybody" is also indefinite, but as an adjective it declines in all three singular genders (*każdy*$_m$, *każda*$_f$, *każde*$_n$). The masculine form is used for generic reference, e.g. *Każdy wie, że* ... "Everybody knows that ...". Verbal agreement with these indefinites is always masculine:

(36) Ktoś zapomniał$_m$ ... *Ktoś zapomniała, *zapomniało
"Somebody forgot ..."
Ktokolwiek widział$_m$ ... *widziała$_f$, *widziało$_n$
"Anybody who saw ..."

even when addressed to a female-exclusive group:

(37) Czy ktoś zapomniał ...?
"Did anyone forget ...?
"Czy ktokolwiek widział ...?"
"Did anyone see ...?"

The pattern here, then, is akin to the so-called generics of English, i.e. grammatical agreement is necessarily masculine. Pronominal reference is also sex-biased:

(38) Każdy wie, czego mu potrzeba.
each know what him need
(gen) (dat)
"everybody knows what he needs"
*Każdy wie, czego jej potrzeba.

(39) Kto nie pracuje, ten nie je.
who not work that-one not eat
"He who doesn't work doesn't eat"
*Kto nie pracuje, ta$_f$ nie je.

By way of provisional summary, the concordial and pronominal system of Polish, despite the historical prominence of grammatical agreement and gender, exhibits certain sexist tendencies in which the higher valuation of masculine forms and male referents is evident. In part, these tendencies are displayed in the introduction of sex-determined agreement for certain male referent substantives and in devirilization as a process of pejoration, but the prominence of masculine concords with indefinites also contributes linguistically to the expression of male superiority.

3.4 Lexicon

3.4.1 Occupational Terms

There are other areas of language, in addition to the syntactic features described above, which point to sex-differentiating treatment of women and men. In particular, the Polish lexicon easily demonstrates the same male bias found in many other languages. As a preliminary point, consider the simple fact that in most masculine-feminine pairs of parallel terms, the feminine term is derived from the masculine by means of a derivational suffix:

(40)	*masculine*	*feminine*	
	pan	pani	"Mr./Ms."
	student	studentka	"student"
	Szwed	Szwedka	"Swede"
	dozorca	dozorczyni	"caretaker"
	Mirosław	Mirosława	(personal name)
	Cygan	Cyganka Cyganicha	"gypsy"

As in English, the reverse process of masculine derivation is decidedly rare:

(41) wdowiec wdowa "widower/widow"

There are other pairs where a masculine term is historically derived from a feminine term:

(42) położnik położna

However, the terms are not parallel semantically: the form *położna* "midwife" is the historical base for *położnik* "obstetrician". Note that the (derived) masculine term is the more valued one and that female obstetricians are referred to by the more prestigious masculine form, i.e. the masculine is used generically. The same asymmetry is observed in pairs such as *sekretarz-sekretarka* where the feminine term means "(clerical) secretary" and the masculine "secretary; organizational official"; the masculine form is also used generically, e.g. the First Secretary of the Communist Party, if a woman, is necessarily *Pierwszy Sekretarz Partii*, never *Pierwsza Sekretarka Partii.*

In many other instances where a particular occupation was traditionally practiced only by females, the sole professional term is a feminine derivative: *prządka* "spinner", *maszynistka* "typist", *niańka* "baby-sitter", *prostytutka* "prostitute", *kosmetyczka* "cosmetician", *przedszkolanka* "kindergarten teacher", *modystka* "milliner", *gorseciarka* "corset maker", *gosposia* "housekeeper", etc., most of which exhibit the feminizing suffix *-ka*. It is not possible, however, to back-form a parallel male professional term, e.g. _*prząd/prządek_, _*prostytut_, _*przedszkolanin_, etc. Male practitioners of these professions are necessarilly referred to by alternate terms, e.g. *kosmetolog* (actually a medical practitioner, male or female), or more commonly by circumlocutions, e.g. *wychowawca przedszkolny* (lit. "tutor male of kindergarten"), or by explicit "male" marking, e.g. *prostytutka-męska* (lit. "prostitute-male",) *niańka-męska*, etc. Such forms directly parallel English ones such as *male prostitute*, *male belly dancer*, etc.

It is worth noting in this context that the so-called feminizing suffix *-ka* is formally identical to the suffix used for diminutivization. This identity between feminine and diminutive is not uncommon in languages (cf. English *-ette* <Fr.) Functionally, *-ka* attached to a grammatically Feminine base typically has a diminutive reading (e.g. *dziewczyna* "girl" — *dziewczynka* "little girl" whereas when attached to a masculine base it tends to have the "female counterpart to" interpretation. *-ka* has a number of other functions, e.g. it can serve to derve the name of an object associated with a particular profession:

(43)	marynarz	"sailor"	marynarka	"jacket"
	kawaler	"bachelor"	kawalerka	"studio apt"
	tokarz	"lathe operator"	tokarka	"lathe"

or the name of the craft or profession:

(44)	marynarz	"sailor"	marynarka	"navy"
	stolarz	"carpenter"	stolarka	"carpentry, woodwork"
	murarz	"bricklayer"	murarka	"masonry, brickwork"

There is a grammatically masculine suffix *-ek*, which serves to form diminutives from masculine bases (e.g. *człowiek* "man" — *człowieczek*" "little man", *pies* "dog" — *piesek* "little dog"). This suffix cannot serve any of the other functions listed above, e.g. it cannot derive "male counterpart to" terms from feminine bases, which, as mentioned above, are not synchronically derivable.[22]

Corresponding to professions traditionally associated with females for which no male terms exist, there are professions traditionally practiced for which the parallel female terms are not in general use. Consider, e.g.

(45)	szofer	"chauffeur"
	murarz	"bricklayer"
	marynarz	"sailor"

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[22] The only other function associated with the *-ek* suffix is illustrated when it attaches to masculine professional terms to form a pejorative reference as in *profesorek* "professor", *dyrektorek* "director", *oficerek* "officer". The feminine suffix *-ka* can attach to certain professional terms, used for both female and male practitioners, for pejorative feminine reference, e.g. *docentka* "female associate professor", *profesorka* "female university professor". This topic is treated in the following section.

oficer	"officer"
kominiarz	"chimney sweep"

The general non-occurrence of female counterparts is related to the appropriate lexical slots (STEM+ *-ka*) having been filled by one of the other *-ka* functions:

(46)	szoferka	"drivers' booth"
	murarka	"masonry, brickwork"
	marynarka	"jacket, navy"
	oficerka	"officer's boot"[23]
	kominiarka	"(type of) hat"

Since women did not fill professional roles in the occupations in (45), there was no need for female counterpart terms, and the existence of forms such as those in (46) blocks such derivations, cf. Satkiewicz (1981). This is not true in all cases: certain *-ka* forms function both as the female counterpart term and as the object associated with the profession:

(47)	konduktor	"conductor"
	konduktorka	"conductor (female), type of bag"
	pilot	"guide, pilot"
	pilotka	"guide (female), type of hat"

On the whole, though, such "female counterpart" meanings are secondary and many such interpretations are semantically blocked. Thus, there are certain instances in Polish in which lexical gaps arise in the professional vocabulary for women, and there are other situations in which gaps occur in the professional vocabulary for men. Note, however, that the two types of situations are quite distinct: 1) female professional terms are blocked when the appropriate form already functions in the language with a separate meaning 2) male professional terms are not blocked by any such identity of form, but rather by restrictions on deriving masculine terms from feminine ones. This asymmetry again points to bias in the language system, a bias derived from cultural history and values, but which is linguistically encoded nonetheless. The question of professional terms is discussed in further detail in §3.5.

3.4.2 Lexical Gaps

There are numerous other lexical gaps in the language, some of which are clearly related to cultural and sexist values. A rather interesting gap in Polish is exhibited in the absence of a term for "male virgin" in general use. The general term for virgin, *dziewica*, is grammatically Feminine and refers to females. There is no corresponding male derivative (*dziewiec), (a back-formation), and most speakers view such a derivation as a joke. Some, relatively few, speakers allow that the Feminine term might be used to refer to male virgins as well as to female virgins, but most informants claimed that this could only occur in very colloquial speech and would have a jocular connotation. An unrelated form *prawiczek* was supplied by one informant. This form, although rejected by other informants, is itself interesting since it appears to be a backformation from *prawiczka*, another term for female virgin that is now somewhat obsolete. Both terms are listed in *Słownik Języka Polskiego*, but this reference lists a second meaning for the male term as "naive, gullible man; uncouth" but no corresponding meanings for the Feminine term. Both of these words are in restricted use (unknown to some informants). It is worth noting the asymmetry in secondary semantic development, i.e. "male virgin" seems to be a concept that is, in the words of one (male) informant, "culturally irrelevant" and the Masculine term therefore developed a secondary meaning. "Female virgin", as in all sexist societies, is a differentially valued concept and the language therefore permitted no further semantic development for the corresponding term. *Dziewica*, similarly, has a single meaning. Many of the other lexical gaps that are observed for Polish, e.g. the absence of terms for "male prostitute", are found in many other languages.

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[23] The correct form is *oficerek* (M), but it has been replaced by *oficerka* (F) for many speakers. There is identity in the more frequently occurring plural form (Nonvirile) *oficerki* and reanalysis as Feminine singular.

3.5. Professional Titles, Reference, and Address

There is a tendency in Polish, described above, to derive female occupational terms from corresponding male terms via several derivational suffixes, of which *-ka* is the most productive, both synchronically and historically. There is, however, another tendency, observed since the early part of the present century, for practitioners of certain professions to share a single title regardless of their sex (Klemensiewicz 1957), e.g. *doktor* "doctor" *prezes* "president", *adwokat* "lawyer", *magister* "holder of M.A. degree". On the whole, only prestigious occupations allowed this treatment although there is a growing tendency to extend this phenomenon to other professions,[24] e.g. *kasjer* "cashier", *sprzedawca* "salesperson", *referent* "office clerk". The official title for such occupations tends to be the generic (masculine) term; practitioners tend to refer to themselves by this term, and the generic is also used when there is a distinction in rank, e.g. *starszy referent* "senior clerk", although feminine derivatives are available for all of these latter terms: *kasjerka*, *referentka*, *sprzedawczyni*. These derived terms are used widely as terms of reference, especially in colloquial speech. It does not seem that feminine derivatives are disappearing, and in fact forms such as *doktorka* "female doctor", *lekarka* "female doctor" (<lekarz "doctor"), *adwokatka* "female lawyer"

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[24] Note that the absence of a definite article in Polish may assist in this tendency. Distinct masculine and feminine articles are said to hinder the development of common gender nouns in Romance languages. Cf. Frank (1978b).

are employed in colloquial speech. Recall, however, that the feminine derivative is considered demeaning for other occupations, e.g. *docentka* "female associate professor", *inżynierka* "female engineer", *profesorka* "female university professor". The latter term is interesting because *profesor* is also the term used for "high school teacher" and in this case the feminine derivative *profesorka* is very commonly found. All informants agree, however, that it would be quite pejorative applied to a university professor, with whom only the generic (male) term may be used. This points clearly to the higher status accorded male titles, especially in cases where the masculine and feminine forms of a single stem have developed asymmetrically, e.g. *sekretarz- sekretarka*; the male term must be used for the higher status profession.

According to Klemensiewicz (1957:109), phonological constraints also contribute to certain gaps in feminine reference terms. Specifically, *-ka* is not suffixed in circumstances where such suffixation would produce non-euphonic consonant clusters, e.g. **architektka* "female architect", **adjunktka* "female lecturer", **elektka* "female elected represtative", **geometrka* "female surveyor"; *-ka* is also not suffixed to forms in *-olog*, e.g. *geolog* (**geolożka*) "geologist". It is worth noting, however, that all of these forms are clearly borrowed and refer to relatively high status professions. It is true that nouns marked in the lexicon as foreign tend not to undergo palatalization; this fact might account partially for the unacceptability of **geolożka*, **psycholożka*, **filolożka* (<*geolog*, *psycholog*, *filolog* "geologist", "psychologist", "philologist"), but pragmatic factors must also be considered since these feminine derivatives do occur in jocular speech.

As in other languages, the issue of separate terms for female practitioners has generated considerable interest. Language purists have long insisted on the "correctness" of feminine derivatives and the "need" to distinguish male and female professionals. Various social trends in Poland have tended to pull in the opposite direction. Further, in more formal language it is more economical to use a single generic term, e.g. in official regulations, than to specify male and female practicioners separately. Finally, many female practicioners, recognizing the differential valtioann of female and male terms, opted for the masculine/generic rather than the term marked for female-exclusive reference.

Thus, with regard to female occupational terms, one can distinguish three broad classes: 1) terms for professions which are dominated by women; these are the professions that tend not to provide corresponding male terms, 2) terms for professions in which the feminine terms are derived from male terms via suffixation; both male and female terms occur, but there may be a tendency, in certain styles, for the male term to replace the female one, 3) terms for professions in which only the male term is used, "generically"; these tend to be the professions marked for high prestige in the society.

Occupational reference terms are also used as address titles occasionally, usually following *pan* or *pani* e.g. *Pani doktor, Pan docent, Pani sekretarka, Pan konduktor.* When used as full address terms, these forms occur in the Vocative case, and both items decline appropriately, e.g. *Panie docencie* "Mr.) Associate Professor", *Panie konduktorze* "(Mr.) Conductor". An interesting anomaly appears in the treatment of the parallel terms for females. Female titles decline appropriately when the occupational title is sexmarked, e.g. *Pani dyrektorko* "(Ms.) Directoress", *Pani konduktorko* "(Ms.) Conductoress". However, when a generic title is used for a woman, then the title does not decline: *Pani doktor, Pani docent, Pani dyrektor,* etc. In fact, generic titles applied to women as either address terms or terms of reference are indeclinable nouns even though the same forms decline appropriately when they refer to males. The only nouns that are not subject to normal rules of declension in Polish are borrowings. One could thus analyze the use of male titles to refer to females as "intralinguistic borrowings"; that is, although the language tolerates such usage, actual occurrences of such forms are perceived as aberrant in some sense and therefore do not decline according to general principles of Polish morphology. The language conspires in this way to identify female practitioners. Consider:

(48) Byłam u *doktor* Stankiewicz. "I've$_f$ been to Dr.$_f$ Stankiewicz
Dałem to *mecenas* Bielskiej "I gave$_m$ it to Attorney$_f$ Bielska"
Idę na wykład *profesor* Wójcik "I'm going to Professor$_f$ Wójcik's lecture"
Rozmawiałem z *magister* Malinowską "I've$_m$ talked to M. A.$_f$ Malinowska"

(49) Byłam u *doktora* Stankiewicza. "... Dr.$_m$ Stankiewicz"
Dałem to *mecenasowi* Bielskiemu "... Attorney$_m$ Bielski"
Idę na wykład *profesora* Wójcika "... Professor$_m$ Wójcik"
Rozmawiałem z *magistrem* Malinowskim '... M.A.$_m$ Malinowski"

Both (48) and (49) display the so-called generic-reference titles *doktor, mecenas, profesor, magister.* The forms in (49) *doktora* (genitive), *mecenasowi* (dative), *profesora* (genitive), *magistrem* (instrumental) refer to male professionals and therefore decline appropriately according to syntactic context; the forms in (48) refer to female professionals and are therefore indeclinable, i.e. they occur only in citation form.[25]

The situation regarding NP-internal and verbal agreements for such generic professional terms exhibits some variation. On the whole, generic terms used as true generics display the expected masculine concords. Masculine concords can also be used when the title refers to a woman if the focus of the sentence is on her professional capacity rather than on characteristics of her as an individual:

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[25] Klemensiewicz (1957) reported a possibility of declining the female terms (in (48)) as masculine nouns and that some speakers preferred this tendency. He predicted, correctly, that the indeclinable feminines would prevail.

(50) Szpital zatrudnił jeszcze jednego lekarza, dr Zofię Bielską.
"The hospital hired another doctor, Dr. Sophie Bielska."

(51) Nowy$_m$ dyrektor został$_m$ przysłany$_m$ z Ministerstwa.
"A new director was sent from the Ministry."

In (50), the NP *jeszcze jednego lekarza* exhibits masculine agreement and could apply to either a male or female doctor, although the name of the doctor here makes clear that the new doctor is a woman. Sentence (52), on the other hand, specifies that the new employee is female in the form of the professional term *lekarkę* and reads as "another female doctor", i.e. it compares her to the class of female doctors rather than the class of all doctors:

(52) Szpital zatrudnił jeszcze jedną lekarkę, dr Zofię Bielską.

In (51), even if one knows the new director to be a woman, masculine adjectival concord (*nowy, przysłany*) and verbal agreement (*został*) is appropriate since the focus is on a new director's having been sent rather than on the fact that the new director is female. Compare, however,

(53) Nowa$_f$ dyrektor była$_f$ elegancko ubrana$_f$.
"The new director was elegantly dressed."

where both *nowa* and *ubrana* display feminine adjectival concord and the verb *była* is inflected for a female subject since the focus here is on an individual feature of the new director, i.e. her elegant appearance, rather than on her professional role. There are probably other principles governing the use of masculine and feminine concords with generic occupational terms referring to women, but the above principle accounts for some of the variation. There is, however, a wide range of situations between the cases such as (50) and (51) on the one hand and (53) on the other, in which it is difficult to determine whether the focus of a particular sentence is on the professional capacity of the referent or some individual feature of the person. In such instances the agreement is more commonly sex-determined, e.g.

(54) Co ta$_f$ nowa$_f$ lekarz ci powiedziała$_f$?
"What did that new doctor tell you?"

It may be that there is a reanalysis of traditionally masculine terms as common gender substantives, i.e. forms which inflect for either masculine or feminine agreement depending on the sex of the referent: forms without any inherent grammatical gender specification, although they necessarily take masculine agreement when used generically. The authors believe that a detailed sociolinguistic survey would document extensive variation in the acceptability of feminine concords for these "common gender" nouns with features of individual speakers (e.g. younger speakers preferring sex-determined concord) as well as style and context acting as determinants of variation. Such a survey is well beyond the scope of the present work.

3.6 Names and Address

The feminist critique of Western naming tranditions is well-known, i.e. that children, both female and male, receive their father's name at birth and that in traditional European society not to do so was associated frequently with considerable shame. Consider, for example, the social pressure to marry brought to bear on young unmarried couples to "give the child a name". Further, again traditionally, women surrendered their father's name at marriage only to receive that of another male, their husband. This situation, both in terms of attitude and practice, has recently changed considerably in certain societies. Many women now decline to surrender their "birth names" at marriage and either eschew the husband's name or incorporate both names into a hybrid. More radical approaches to combatting the sexism inherent in such a system include rejecting both father's and husband's names, although the problem in such an instance becomes finding a name not "tainted by the brush of male sexism".

This situation is observed in Poland, but there is a more interesting linguistic aspect of the politics of naming. Polish employs two derivational suffixes, *-owa* and *-ówna*, to convert masculine surnames into corresponding feminines. The former is equivalent to the traditional meaning of "Mrs." and the latter to "Miss".[26] *-owa* attaches to a husband's name so that, for example, a woman married to Mr. Wójcik becomes *Wójcikowa* and their daughter would be *Wójcikówna* whereas a son would bear the same name as the father, *Wójcik*, without any derivational suffix.[27] Masculine names in this class decline as regular Masculine nouns whereas the *-owa* and *-ówna* suffixed forms are both adjectivized (although *-ówna*, according to prescriptive grammar, should decline nominally), i.e. the names for wives and daughters are adjectival derivatives of the husband's or father's name. Historically, *-owa* (and the composite *-ówna*<*-ow+ĭn+inflection) is a possessive suffix; this meaning of *-owa* may still be observed in phrases such as *ojcowe pole* "father's field" (lit.: "father+poss. field"), *Zygmuntowy dzwon* "Sigmund's bell". Cf. also the kinship term *bratowa* "sister-in-law" (lit. "brother—poss,") and the word for queen *królowa* (lit. "king+poss.") which is now used for both 1) wife of male sovereign and 2) female sovereign. The less common suffix (cf. note 21) *-ina* also occurs with a possessive meaning, e.g. *Zosina sukienka* "Sophie's dress". Quite apart from the sexism apparent in labelling a woman as a man's possession, there is the interesting consequence that women are thus denied independent nominal existence, i.e. both linguistically and metaphorically they are possessive adjectives, dependent on masculine nouns for existence. It should be pointed out that there is another class of masculine names that is adjectival and also derives from possessives, viz. names in *-ski*, e.g. *Korzeniowski*, *Bukowski*. The possessive meaning of *-ski* is observed in phrases such as *ojcowskie pole* "father's field", *kaplica Zygmuntowska* "Sigmund's chapel". The feminine counterparts of these names are also adjectival. Pairs such as *Korzeniowski-Korzeniowska* serve for husbands/sons and wives/daughters respectively.

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[26] These are the two most common suffixes, but others are heard dialectally, especially *-icha* and *-ina* (both equivalent to *-owa*) and *-anka* (equivalent to *-ówna*). The latter also appears in Standard Polish in certain contexts, e.g. with male names in final *-a*. The destribution of forms is not relevant here.

[27] There is an archaic Masculine derivational suffix *-ic*/*-icz* that functioned as a masculine equivalent of *-ówna* or *-anka*, i.e. "son of X". E.g. *starosta* "district governor", *starościc* "governor's son", *starościanka* "governor's daughter", *starościna* "governor's wife"; *król* "king", *królewicz* "prince (king's son)", *królewna* "princess", *królowa* "queen". Cf. Satkiewicz (1981: 152—53). Some family names also display the incorporated reflex of this suffix, e.g. *Staszyc*, *Wójtowicz*. However, the essential point is that the masculine suffix is now obsolete, i.e. sons and fathers are like-named whereas the two (or more) feminine derivational suffixes continue to be employed, although some younger informants claim that these suffixes are heard less frequently in major urban centers.

Several other interesting facets of the naming situation deserve mention.[28] The *-owa* (and to a much lesser extent *-ówna*) suffix is used to form female derivatives from male professional terms. The semantics of such derivation are as above, i.e. the derived terms refer to wives (and daughters). Thus, *Pani profesorowa* is the wife of *Pan profesor* "professor", *generalowa* "the general's wife", *kowalowa* "the blacksmith's wife", *mlynarzowa* "the miller's wife", etc. This situation is quite unlike that found in Romance languages, for example, where a single suffix is used for feminine derivatives of this type and for female professional terms, e.g. French *Mme la doctoresse* traditionally referred to the doctor's wife, but, in the absence of a separate derivational suffix, this form now serves as one possible reference for female doctors. This ambiguity is one reason cited by feminists to reject the use of feminine derivatives in these languages. Polish, on the other hand, employs separate derivational suffixes for these two functions, e.g. *-ka* "female practicioner" and *-owa* "wife of". As mentioned earlier, the *-ka* derivatives may be weakening as more and more masculine terms develop features of common gender nouns, but no such weakening is observed for *-owa*.

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[28] First names exhibit the same derivational asymmetry in Polish as in other European languages, i.e. female names are derived from male names, e.g. *Stanislawa* from *Stanislaw*, *Janina* from *Jan*, *Bogumila* from *Bogumil*, *Romana* from *Roman*, *Józefa* from *Józef*. The only exception to this generalization is the male name *Marian*, derived from the female *Maria*; this exception relates to the special status of the Virgin Mary in Christian Poland. (Cf. Spanish *Mario*, French *Jean-Marie*, etc.)

[29] The suffix *-owa* occurs rarely in terms for female professionals, usually in counterparts for male terms in *-owy*, e.g. *aparatowa*$_{\text{f}}$ — *aparatowy*$_{\text{m}}$ "machine operator" (*aparat* "machine"), *bufetowa*$_{\text{f}}$ — *bufetowy*$_{\text{m}}$ "bar/counter attendant" (*bufet* "bar"). Note that these feminine forms cannot be interpreted as "wife of X" since X in these cases is not a male human referent. Additionally, there are very few nouns which are potentially ambiguous between the two meanings "wife of X" and "female practicioner", e.g. *szewcowa* "female shoemaker/wife of shoemaker", *krawcowa* "female dressmaker/wife of tailor", *szefowa* "female boss/wife of boss".

Perhaps the most indicating use of the *-owa* suffix occurs in its use with male personal names. That is, as with (male) family and professional names, *-owa* may be added to a man's given name or nickname in order to derive a term for female reference or address, e.g. *Jurkowa* "wife of Jurek", *Andrzejowa* "wife of Andrzej (Andrew)", *Mietkowa* "wife of Mietek (Mieczysław)". Such patterns seem particularly strong in rural areas, but they are very frequently heard in major cities as well. Thus, the naming situation in Polish, at least from a feminist perspective, is worse than that observed in other European languages where the predominant sexist pattern is observed in surnaming. In Polish, however, a woman may lose her entire identity, being referred to with male names not only as (Mrs.)+Last Name but also (Mrs.)+First Name. In either pattern she is merely a possession: if she is not "(Mr.) Wójcik's wife", then she is "Andrew's wife". This particularly odious pattern, surpressing a woman's birth identity, also occurs with the collective suffix *-owie* used to refer to married couples, e.g. *Wójcikowie* means "Mr. and Mrs. Wójcik; the Wójcik's"; *Andrzejowie* "Mr. and Mrs. Andrew (i.e. Andrew and wife)".[30] The counterpart reference derived from a woman's name is impossible, e.g. **Elżbietowie* "Mrs. and Mr. Elizabeth (i.e. Elizabeth and husband)", **Ankowie* "Annie and husband", even when the man's name is unknown to the speaker. In such cases, the necessary references are *Elżbieta z mężem, Anka z mężem* ("Elizabeth and husband", "Annie and husband"). That is, it is impossible for a man's identity to be subsumed by that of a woman.[31] Similarly, the suffix *-ostwo* attaches to professional titles to form collectives (like *-owie* with names),[32] e.g. Professor and Mrs. Wójcik are referred to as *Profesorostwo Wójcikowie*. However, in the situation where the prestige title belongs to the woman, collective reference is impossible, i.e. the above cannot mean "Professor and Mr. Wójcik". The only possible forms in such cases are *Professor Wójcik z mężem*, or *Państwo Wójcikowie* "Mr. and Mrs. Wójcik" in which the embarrassing reference to the woman's achievement is surpressed.

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[30] In certain cases the male name is treated as a regular noun and pluralized to include a wife in the reference. Part of the conditioning here may be phonological, e.g. names with final *o+labial* sequences avoid *-owie* for haplological reasons; there is also stylistic conditioning, e.g. *Boby* (*Bob*+masc. pl.) has been used by colleagues to refer to the present authors, but such forms are rather colloquial.

[31] Some speakers allow that such forms employing a woman's name as base for collective reference are occasionally heard. The pragmatics such of usage may be complex. One such use has clearly jocular connotations, deriving from the innappropriateness of the collective base. In certain other instances the jocular connotation may be absent, but such usage is situationally marked. Further research on this point is required.

[32] The *-ostwo* suffix seems to be disappearing in urban speech.

3.7 Conclusion

The above survey of sexism in Polish is certainly neither exhaustive nor comprehensive. The findings and analysis are preliminary, but we believe that it is representative of the variety of forms which linguistic sexism can assume. There is some variation in actual usage, as noted above, particularly in terms of concord and in the use of generic occupational terms to refer to women who fill these roles. Other taxonomic features seem more stable, e.g. the various gender distinctions within the singular and plural. Szober (1967:119—120) noted that the tripartite system of singular noun classification, Masculine/Feminine/Neuter, derived from an animistic system of world classification whereas the twofold distinction in the plural, Virile/Nonvirile, corresponds to an evaluative system in which one category (men) is more highly valued than others (women, animals, inanimates). Modern Poland, according to Szober, does not subscribe to such a world view and he points out that language systems usually lag behind changes in social organization. While this observation is no doubt correct (cf. Lakoff 1973), one must not neglect the effect of such linguistic encoding in the acquisition of sociocultural competence by young children. Feminists have long claimed that sexist language patterns serve to institutionalize and perpetuate (male) sexist views. The evidence is accumulating in support of their claim. The question then arises, as it has in the past, as to how one combats linguistic sexism. The lexicon is, of course, the most conducive to manipulation and change, and many individuals would point with approval to the tendency for unmarked rather than sexspecific occupational reference. On the other hand, the stability of the derivational suffix *-owa* was noted, and the labelling of women by reference to men is a thoroughly set pattern of classification; tradition is very strong on this point. Popular (Western-style) feminism is not very strong in Poland, and its advent may bring pressure to bear upon this system. Other areas of language are even less conducive to change although certain possible developments might serve to reduce sex-differentiation in the future, e.g. sex-determined concord with sex-indefinite reference terms applied to either women or men. Within the plural category, the Virile/Nonvirile distinction is so ingrained that it would no doubt resist any deliberate tampering.[25] What seems clear at this point is that languages do indeed differ in their potential for nonsexist usage and that, in part, this difference can be accounted for by reference to inherent differences in systems of grammatical organization and structure. In the following section of this paper, one aspect of linguistic sexism discussed above will be examined in a related language. The language providing the data is Russian, another Slavic language, and the interest is in a comparison of the ways in which two similarly-structured languages have dealt linguistically with changes in social roles and organization.

4. Russian

Russian, like Polish, classifies nouns according to grammatical gender, although there is again a significant overlap between natural and grammatical genders in the case of substantives referring to human beings. As in Polish, there is an extensive system of concord by which adjectives and verb agree with the gender of relevant nouns. The focus of the present section is on the issue of changes in the inventory of occupational titles caused by the opening of professions to women in this century and on the question of how the language has accommodated (in terms of concord) such changes. The relevant data are discussed in a frequently-cited article by Rothstein (1973) and in somewhat fuller detail in Comrie and Stone (1978). The main point of Rothstein's presentation concerned a theoretical issue of lexical representation, rather than the issue of linguistic sexism, and certain important facts are therefore not apparent in his discussion. The following discussion is couched in very general terms; for the actual data upon which the discussion is based, the reader is referred to Panov (1968) and (Mučnik 1963) as well as the sources named above.

As noted in Section 3, there is a tendency in Polish to use generic professional terms in occupations where a female practitioner form did not traditionally exist. These are mainly prestige occupations, closed to women until this century, and although the language has derivational devices by which feminine terms could be derived, such derivations are avoided and considered demeaning by some, especially the actual referents. These generic nouns are grammatically Masculine and concord may be grammatical when the focus is on professional role or sex-determined when on the individual practicioner. NP-internal and verbal agreement generally coincide.

Panov (1968) reports that pressure on the system of occupational terms in Russian first developed late in the 19th century (about the same time as in Poland) as women began to enter professional life. This was a restricted phenomenon, and the number of women involved as well as the professions entered was quite small, e.g. prestige professions such as medicine and certain social functions. There was, however, a need, particularly among the intelligentsia (from whom these female professionals were drawn), to refer to female professionals. The initial tendency was to use the pre-existing male term to apply to practitioners of either sex.

The World War and subsequent October Revolution of 1917 brought significant changes in the make-up of the Russian work force. Many occupational roles were now filled by women and it was therefore necessary for all levels of society to be able to refer to the vast array of female professionals. The initial post-Revolution tendency countered the single-term approach of the pre-Revolutionary intelligentsia; official policy was for separate male and female practicioner forms, a policy motivated by notions of sexual equality, i.e. women are entitled to their own professional titles. It is worth noting that in addition to official support this policy was endorsed by various post-Revolutionary women's groups. The need to create large numbers of occupational terms for women strained the morphological system as individual speakers found themselves referring daily to women professionals. Several derivational suffixes were employed, including at least one rescued from obsolescence, and it was not uncommon for a single masculine term to coexist with multiple feminine derivatives, e.g.

(55)	*masculine*	*feminine*	
	sanitar	sanitarka sanitarnitsa	"hospital orderly"
	kontroler	kontrolerka kontolerša	"controller"
	nepman	nepmanka nepmanša nepačixa	"follower of a certain economic policy known as *nep*"

The creation of these parallel terms for women was seen, both popularly and officially, as a way of ensuring sexual equality.

At about the same time, there were changes in the sociopolitical organization and vocabulary, e.g. the introduction of terms such as *tovarišč* "comrade", *organizator* "organizer", *predsedatel'* "chairman". These terms lacked feminine counterparts and the masculine term was applied to both sexes. These words were of very high frequency and are credited, in part, with reversing the tendency for sex-specific occupational terms. Second, there was a linguistic vogue for abbreviations as terms of reference:

(56)	domxoz	domašnaja xozajka	"housewife"
	ženkor	ženskij korespondent	"women's correspondent"
	upravdom	upravlajuščij domom	"building administrator"

These abbreviations were initially subject to morphological processes and were derivationally marked for female reference. Perhaps because they were perceived as abbreviations, however, they soon become unmarked for sex reference, and this fact also contributed to the general return to single occupational terms for both sexes. Thus, in the 1920s and 1930s there was enormous variation in the actual reference terms for female professionals. Some speakers continued to employ any of the several derivational types available, but other speakers employed a single term generically. Eventually, this latter tendency triumphed linguistically and even traditional female reference titles were replaced by sex-neutral terms. This situation contrasts with that in Poland, where sex-neutral terms are strong only in prestige occupations and derivational forms in other spheres, especially in colloquial speech.

It is interesting to note that proponents of both naming tendencies (feminine derivatives, sex-neutral terms) cited concerns of sexual equality in their support. Most modern feminists point to current Russian with some approval as a language that has eliminated/reduced sexism in its professional vocabulary. The issue of concord for sex neutral terms is therefore of some interest. Presumably, the feminist preference is for the elimination of all sex-marking in language. Since adjectival concord and verbal agreement are such core aspects of the grammar otherwise, arguments could be advanced in support of either sex-determined or grammatical concord — in the same way that some feminists exhibit a preference for sex-marked rather than sex-neutral terminology.

Initially, the tendency in Russian was for generic terms to be treated grammatically as invariable Masculines and they therefore generated masculine concords and agreements. However, this treatment apparently caused speakers some discomfort and verbs began to inflect for sex-determined agreement in past tense forms where gender distinctions were traditionally marked. Note that this sex-determined verbal marking thus served to distinguish between female and male practitioners in the way the separate reference terms had done so previously. That is, whether a *vrač* "doctor" was male or female was now marked verbally rather than by distinct occupational terms, although marking was possible only in past tense sentences. Similarly, however, the nonconcord between feminine verb forms and masculine adjectives also generated discomfort, and there is some tendency to use sex-determined concord here as well. This tendency is weaker than that for sex-determined verbal inflection, but both are strongest among younger speakers, suggesting that both tendencies will increase over time. The weaker tendency for sex-determined adjectival concord follows from Greenberg's previously cited Universal 31 that gender within a NP is more resistant to change than gender marking in the predicate (1963:74). The growing tendency for a general principle of sex-determined concord in both NP-internal and predicate positions would ensure maximum syntactic differentiation of sentences referring to female and male professionals, i.e. while verb marking restricts this distinction to past tense sentences, NP-internal sex concord allows for such differentiation in any sentence. Prescriptivists still tend to require grammatical concord and although they admit that it seems inappropriate to refer to a female subject with a masculine verb form, they point out that "correctness" allows no other treatment. This view is clearly expressed by V. D. Kudrjavcev: "Grammar has come into conflict with life, but I am still on the side of grammar." (Cited in Panov 1968, volume 3, p. 29).

Panov (1968) and Mučnik (1963) report a rather detailed sociolinguistic survey of concord usage among Russian speakers. As expected, older speakers are more conservative and prefer grammatical concord; the tendency for sex-determined verbal agreement is strongest among younger speakers although the youngest age group surveyed showed slightly less strong tendencies than the preceding age group, perhaps as a lingering influence of school prescriptive grammar. Insofar as adjectival concord is concerned, the masculine adjective is still preferred by all age groups, although here too younger speakers display an increased preference for sex-determined concord. The survey upon which the present discussion (as well as those of Rothstein (1973) and Comrie and Stone (1978)) is based is now more than 25 years old, and it would be instructive to have more current information on this topic. In any event, the contrasts with the Polish situation discussed in §3 are quite obvious, ranging from the differential use of sex-neutral professional titles in the two languages to the treatment of such terms as regard verbal and adjectival concord. The distinction between generic nouns and common gender nouns is blurred in the Slavic data, precisely because of the agreement question, and we have therefore tried to avoid the term "common gender" in this paper.

5. *Conclusion*

The issue of sexism in language is a complex one, in part because one tends to view the structure of any given language as an arbitrary collection of principles that are only remotely (if at all) tied to real world attitudes and values. In the comparison of English, Polish, and Russian data, we have tried to exemplify the various ways in which sexist values can be encoded into a language and, to a limited extent, some ways in which sexist values have been/could be eliminated. Apart from lexicon, which has been noted to change in response to social pressure, languages vary considerably in the degree to which nonsexist usage is possible. The most difficult problem for English seems to be that of a sex-neutral 3rd person singular pronoun. Other problems will not be easily resolved, e.g. generic reference *man*, but they do not involve core areas of grammatical structure. Polish, on the other hand, provides several interesting examples where sexism is highly encoded directly into the language structure itself, deriving from the system of grammatical sex-gender in the singular and the Virile/Nonvirile opposition in the plural. The problem of a sex-neutral 3rd personal singular pronoun also arises in Polish, but only to a limited extent since some indefinite reference nouns are specified with a particular grammatical gender. True indefinites always generate a masculine pronoun; rules of grammar can be cited to support this usage, but it must be borne in mind that rules of grammar can reflect values and attitudes as well (Bodine 1975).[33]

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[33] In certain dialects, however, it seems that the Virile has been reanalyzed as Masculine and now includes male human beings and animals. Females, of course, are still classed with inanimates.

It is relatively easy to document potential cases of sexist bias in a language, but it is far more difficult to determine the ultimate significance of such bias. We believe that certain grammatical tendencies observed in Polish, e.g. the concord whereas female referent nouns accept masculine concord, the tendency for divirilization in the plural to equate with semantic pejoration, etc. can easily been viewed as potentially affecting the world view of a young child who has embarked upon the (related) tasks of linguistic and sociocultural development. While it is certainly true that the amount of sexism in a language is not indexical of the degree of sexism in a society, feminist critics may well be correct in claiming that linguistic sexism serves to ensure the perpetuation of sexist social patterns. Gregersen (1979) is suspicious, perhaps rightly so, of the significance of feminist findings in this area to date. For example, he noted that the spread of nonderrogatory terms for homosexuals and blacks in American society has not in itself resulted in significant attitude shift. He cites the example of bathroom graffiti and notes that in place of "Kill all faggots" and "Kill all niggers" one now finds "Kill all gays" and "Kill all blacks", and he finds these latter even more disturbing.[34]

The coming of popular feminism to Poland will no doubt result in an increased awareness of the sexist bias in the language system. It is impossible to predict at this time how sexist grammar will fare in the long run. Tendencies already operative in the language as well as some similar to those reported in the 1960s for Russian suggest that changes are already underway. We do not doubt that other linguists will dispute some of our analysis of Polish, especially the interpretations that we have assigned to the phenomena observed. Also, we recognize that detailed sociolinguistic studies must document the extent of variation in such phenomena and its determinants.

Given the very intimate links between social organization and language, true nonsexist language may be an impossibility in Western (or any) society. Attention to concerns such as those discussed herein may result in proposals for modification in language structure/usage. We are personally not optimistic about the success of some language changes which have been proposed precisely because they have been generated in a (largely) unchanging social context. Language change follows social change rather than being causative of it (Lakoff 1973), and the gap between the two may be very considerable. Nevertheless, the study of sexism in language, interesting in its own right, may also serve to heighten social consciousness and thereby to generate attention to broader social issues. This result is surely a worthwhile aspect of sociolinguistic scholarship, one which testifies to the real world value of studying language in the context of culture and society.

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[34] The correlation between male social dominance and sexist bias in language structure, e.g. generic "he", would be most clearly tested in languages spoken within female-dominated societies. An interesting case, discussed by Beatty (1979) and Gregersen (1979), is that of Iroquois languages, e.g. Mohawk, which are spoken by groups that are matrilocal and matrilineal (although power is still wielded by men). Mohawk distinguishes three genders in the 3rd person singular: Masculine, Neuter-zoic, and Feminine-indefinite. The Masculine is used largely for human males and occasionally for animals if the speaker wishes to stress the animal's maleness. The Neuter-zoic is used for inanimates, nonhuman animals, and certain women, generally nondiminutive women and women of child-bearing age not related to the speaker, i.e. marriageable women. Finally, the Feminine-indefinite category includes small children, diminutive women including those past childbearing age, and female relatives, i.e. unmarriageable women, on the basis of age or kinship. This latter form is also used generically for "one". However, the female sexism does not prevail elsewhere in the grammar, e.g. the dual and plural pronouns for mixed-sex groups are the masculine forms. Other language structures also reveal the more common pattern of male dominance.

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CYCLICITY AND PHONOSTYLISTIC INTERFERENCE

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The present paper deals with the application of the principles of cyclic phonology to the theory of interference. In particular, it is an attempt to establish the status of interfering phonostylistic rules in terms of cyclicity principle. This attempt was prompted by a claim made by Rubach (1980) about postcyclic status of interfering rules. The claim was proved valid with reference to slow speech rules. Its verification within the block of rapid speech rules has yet been left undone. In this paper, therefore, we will try to investigate this problem, any possible conclusions being still open to evaluation.

1. In the experiment designed to examine the interference of some phonostylistic nasal assimilation rules from Polish into English, the following Polish rules have been demonstrated to interfere:

(A)[1]

$$\begin{bmatrix} +\text{coron} \\ +\text{nas} \\ -\text{high} \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} \alpha\ \text{coron} \\ \beta\ \text{anter} \end{bmatrix} \Big/ \quad \text{V} \ — \ ([-\text{seg}]) \begin{bmatrix} \alpha\ \text{coron} \\ +\text{cons} \\ \beta\ \text{anter} \end{bmatrix}$$

Examples: *Pan Bóg, on ciągnie, on go uderzył, on ma, konwencja*;

(B)[2]

$$\begin{bmatrix} +\text{nas} \\ \alpha\ \text{anter} \\ \langle +\text{lab} \rangle \end{bmatrix} \rightarrow \begin{bmatrix} -\text{cons} \\ \alpha\ \text{back} \\ -\text{syll} \end{bmatrix} \Big/ \quad \text{V} \ — \ ([-\text{seg}]) \begin{bmatrix} +\text{obstr} \\ +\text{contin} \\ \langle +\text{lab} \rangle \end{bmatrix}$$

Examples: *kunszt, szansa, instynkt, precedens*; *informacja, konwój, nimfa, tam walą*;[3]

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[1] Rule (43) in Rubach 1974.

[2] Rule (51) in Rubach 1974.

[3] In the expansion including angle brackets the environment is derived by the prior application of Nasal Assimilation (A) and Detail Assimilation, e.g.

(C)[4] $$V \rightarrow [+\text{nas}] \;/\; \underline{\quad} \begin{bmatrix} -\text{cons} \\ -\text{syll} \\ +\text{nas} \end{bmatrix} C$$

Rule (C) is the obligatory rule of Vowel Nasalization which reapplies phonostylistically whenever the proper environment is created.

2. The next step is to discuss a possible status of the above rules with reference to cyclicity. First, the representation which constitutes a starting point for the operation of phonostylistic rules has to be established. Do rapid speech rules apply to the so called underlying representation UR, in the same manner as phonological rules do? This does not sound very convincing when we consider the fact of phonostylistic rules applying in completely different circumstances than phonological ones—it is the tempo of speech that determines their application. Thus they are optional from the point of view of the block of phonological processes, which are obligatory. Therefore, the speaker, increasing the tempo of his speech, chooses a given output or, more precisely, applies a given phonostylistic rule to the output (already derived) of slow speech processes.

From what has been said follows that it is the output of all the obligatory phonological rules, the output which occurs in slow, monitored and articulate speech, that feeds phonostylistic rules. The representation consisting of such outputs was called a Generalized Phonetic Representation GPR.

GPR as the input to phonostylistic rules is valid as long as one is consistent in deriving all phonostylistic outputs from it exclusively and in explaining all the possible exceptions and deviations by means of this derivation only. Once we go back to the former, obligatory, derivation GPR's reliability lessens.

2.1. We will take a risk of claiming the postcyclic status of interefering phonostylistic rules on purely theoretical grounds first.

A second language learner does not internalize the complete morpheme structure of a second language in the process of learning it. He manages to internalize only part of it, e.g. tense or plural markers, inflectional endings, word boundaries. A complete internalization takes place only in specific circumstances i.e. in case of a child acquiring two languages (native one and second one) at a time and in case of a foreign language learner whose conditions of learning are similar to those of a first language acquisition — foreign language is the only medium he can communicate with.

GPR	*informacja*	
	inf	
	imf	(A)
	iɱf	Detail (A)
	iw̃f	(B)

[4] Rule (49) in Rubach 1974.

A second language learner. however, learns directly what is presented to him i.e. the surface structure of a second language. He learns the output without having the inner mechanism of generating it. Therefore, the interference of his native language cyclic rules is prevented. as they would have to interact with the rules of a second language cycle which is not "known" to him (not internalized by him).

On the other hand, postcyclic rules of a native language are perfectly free to interfere because they apply to nonderived forms and thus do not require any knowledge of a morpheme structure of a second language (except for word boundary recognition).

Therefore, if we assume that native language interference occurs, or is ordered, after the application of all second language rules, we will be able to explain the lack of Polish rule interference in the word *essential* as opposed to *essence* where interference takes place. In the word *essence* the environment for the application of Polish phonostylistic gliding is met; in *essential*, which is the output of English Palatalization rule changing /s/ → /ʃ/, Polish rule does not interfere. This proves that Polish speaker does not know the morpheme structure of *essential* (is ignorant of its dervation) and lets Polish rule apply only to the output of English rules (GPR).[5]

Having in mind what has been said above, one may posit a simple graphic model of rule application and interference (on the example of Polish and English):

1.



2.[6]



2.2. The notion of "derived environment" (cf. Rubach 1981) refers either to the presence of a morpheme boundary or the result of the application of an earlier rule on the same cycle. There seems to be no evidence, however, on the application of Polish phonostylistic nasal assimilation rules to derived environment (see below).

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[5] The fact that Polish phonostylistic gliding applies to the output of English Palatalization, which is postcyclic, is in itself not relevant for establishing the postcyclic status of a Polish rule.

[6] One could mention here the possibility of iterative application of obligatory rules in rapid speech, like that of Polish Vowel Nasalization, whenever a feeding environment is formed.

Since the status of phonostylistic rules has not yet been investigated, we have no data with which to compare our rules so that we could decide about their status on the basis of "block application" principle. The comparison with obligatory (phonological) rules, whose status has already been determined, proves the lack of any interaction or interdependence (in other words the optionality of ordering) between them and the phonostylistic rules concerned. This may be confirmed by examples like the derivation of *kunszcik* (a diminutive of *kunszt*):

	kunszcik	
UR	//—unšt+ik//	
	unšt+ik	
	unštç+ik	Anterior Palatalization
GPR	unštçik	
	uw̃š	Phonostylistic Nasal Gliding
	ũw̃š	Vowel Nasalization

As the above example shows, the application of Anterior Palatalization, which is cyclic, does not have any influence on the application of the last two rules. The ordering of the above rules seems to be dictated by two factors:

— first, it follows our earlier assumption about GPR being the input to phonostylistic rules;

— second, it is consistent with the principle of Strict Cyclicity where it says that rules applying to nonderived forms (here morpheme internally) are postcyclic.

The second statement is reaffirmed by many examples where Polish phonostylistic rules (A), (B) and (C) keep applying morpheme internally or across word boundary:

a. rule(A) — phonostylistic Nasal Assimilation — in words like:

anglistyka,	*kongijski*,	*konwencja*
GPR	konwencja	
	-nv-	
	-mv-	rule (A)
	-ŋv-	detailed rule (A)

and across word boundary like in:

	on gimnastykuje się[7]	
GPR	-n # # gi-	
	n # # g′	Surface Palatalization
	ŋ # # g′	rule (A)
	ŋ′ # # g′	detailed (A)

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[7] The order of Surface Palatalization, which is postcyclic, and rule (A) is irrelevant — the output will not change.

b. rules (B) and (C) — in words like the above *kunszt* or *szansa, instynkt, czynsz, precedens*, and across word boundary in: *pan sam, w ten sposób* etc.
c. all three rules in the order: (A), (B), (C) e.g.

	konferencja		*kanwa*
GPR	konf-		kanv-
	komf	(A)	kamv
	koɱf	detailed (A)	kaɱv
	kow̃f	(B)	kaw̃v
	kõw̃f	(C)	kãw̃v

3.5. The last argument for the postcylic status of the discussed rules comes from the observation of borrowings. Obligatory gliding does not apply to borrowings, e.g. *sensacja, konsul, konflikt, cenzura*; phonostylistic gliding, however, covers all cases excluded from the former rule. This cannot be explained unless phonostylistic gliding is postcyclic and thus is allowed to apply morpheme internally, contrary to the obligatory rule.[8]

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[8] This claim, however, being a very strong one, still needs confirmation in more detailed studies.

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SUBJECT INVERSION IN ENGLISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN AND DUTCH AND EMPTY SUBJECTS IN GERMAN

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0. This paper is concerned with certain constructions in German where the structural subject position appears to be empty at surface structure. It is argued that rather than presenting evidence for the non-configurationality of German (ie. that the subject is not represented structurally, outside the VP) the structures concerned resemble Inversion structures in English, French, Italian and Dutch, and might be susceptible to an account similar to that proposed for these constructions. This involves the assumption that German, to a limited extent, participates in PRO-Drop strategies. In this way, the German facts can be shown to be compatible with the Extended Projection Principle requirement that all clauses have subjects at every level of representation.

1. A number of constructions have been described in the literature (cf. Chomsky 1981, 1982, Reuland 1983a, b) where the structural subject position is apparently empty or occupied by a pleonastic element. The thematic subject is "post-verbal" in SVO languages and seems likely to be in the VP in the case of an SOV language. The situation can be illustrated by the following:

1. *English Presentationals*
   There walked into the room a well-known linguist.
2. *French Presentationals*
   Il est arrivé quelqu'un
   (There arrived somebody)
3. *Italian subject Inversion*

a. È arrivato Gianni.
   (Arrived John)

b. Ha telefonato Gianni.
(Telephoned John)
4. *Dutch Presentationals*
... dat er een man in de kamer liep
(that there a man into the room walked)

The question arises whether the analysis that accounts for constructions of this kind might also account for certain constructions in German where the structural subject position appears to be empty. These constructions are of the following kind:

5. *Passive*
... weil dem Kind das Fahrrad geschenkt wurde.
(since to the child the bicycle given was)
6. *"Raising"*
a. ... weil dem Eckhard sein Sohn ein kluger Junge zu sein scheint.
(since to Eckhard his son appears to be a bright boy)
7. *FLIP*
... weil mir die Sache gefällt.
(since to me the thing pleases)
8. *Impersonal Passive*
... weil getanzt wurde.
(since was danced)
... since there was dancing.
9. *Impersonal Active*
a. ... weil mich friert.
(since me freezes)
... since I am cold.
b. ... weil mir vor euch graust.
(since to me before you shudder)
... since you make me shudder.

Note that these sentences, with the exception of 6.a, lack thematic subjects altogether. The same occurs in Dutch impersonal passives:

10. Ik zag dat er gedanst werd.
(I saw that there danced was)

In contrast to French, Dutch and English, German also lacks an overt pleonastic element, since *es*, whatever other functions it might serve (cf. Pütz 1975), certainly cannot appear in such contexts as those of the Dutch *er* illustrated in 4. and 10.a. above:

11. *... daß es ein Mann in das Zimmer ging.
(that there a man into the room walked)
12. *... weil es getantzt wurde.
... since there was dancing.

Sentence initial *es* is restricted to root sentences, as illustrated in the following:

13.a. Es kommen viele Leute.
There are a lot of people coming.
b. *... weil es viele Leute kommen.
... since there are a lot of people coming.

This has led Lenerz (1981) to suggest that sentence initial *es* is simply a lexical realisation of the COMP expansion $\bar{\bar{X}}$ if this position is not filled via movement[1]

14. COMP $\dashrightarrow \bar{\bar{X}}, \pm$WH

The problem, then, is to account for the surface structures in 5. to 9. and to see if they can be related to those in 1. to 4.

Notice that example 6. is headed *Raising*. This is because NP Movement is possible in this example, just as it is possible in the case of the passive:

15.a. weil sein Sohn$_i$ dem Eckhard $[_S$ t_i ein kluger Junge zu sein scheint]
(since his son to Eckhard a bright boy to be appears)
b. ... weil $[_S$ das Fahrrad$_i$ $[_{VP}$ dem Kind t_i geschenkt wurde]]
(since the bicycle to the boy given was)

In fact, there are cases where NP Movement is obligatory in German: otherwise passives embedded under control verbs would violate B of the Binding Theory (cf. Chomsky 1981) by having a governed PRO:

16. ... weil er$_i$ riskierte $[_S$ PRO$_i$ $[_{VP}$ t_i totgeschlagen zu werden]]
... since he risked being beaten to death.

Also in the case of FLIP verbs such as in example 7. the nominative NP may appear in the structural subject position:

17. ... weil die Sache mir gefällt
(since the thing to me pleases)

The question is, then, whether sentences such as 5, 6.a. and 7. are derived from 15. and 16. or whether 15. and 16. are derived from 5, 6.a. and 7.

It seems fairly clear from 16. above that NP Movement exists in German and that Case assignment in the Raising and passive examples in 15. is also via movement to the structural subject position. If, as seems highly plausible, *gefallen* in 17. is an ergative verb (cf. Chomsky 1981), assigning a θ-role but not Case in the VP, the same analysis can apply. The result is a uniform and familiar account for Passive, Raising and ergatives, where the structural subject position is a non-argument ($\bar{A}$) position, where (nominative) Case is assigned, and is part of a chain formed via coindexing with a θ-marked position in the VP, respectively S.

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[1] For the derivation of root S's and Finite Verb Placement cf. Thiersch (1978), also for SOV vs. SVO arguments.

It does not seem plausible, however, that examples such as 5, 6.a and 7. above can be derived from the output of NP Movement as in 15. and 17. This would result in the nominative NP's either returning to their original deep structure positions or to positions adjoined to these, such as in the following:

18. $[_S\ t_i\ [_{VP}$dem Kind $[_{\bar{V}}$ das Fahrrad$_i$ $[_{\bar{V}}[_{[V\pm]}\ t_i$ geschenkt] wurde]]]]

Such a movement would, in any case, result in an improperly bound trace in the structural subject position. It would seem, then, that in Passive, Raising and FLIP German has both movement and non-movement strategies for nominative Case assignment. If Case may be assigned in situ, however, the question is how?

One possibility for in situ Case assignment has been suggested by Den Besten (1981, 1982), where the VP internal NP receives Case via *Chain-Government* from the next available Case assigner (namely INFL) if there is no Case assigner in the VP. The structural subject position is either filled by the dative NP or it is not generated (in Dutch it is filled by *er*). The problem with the latter solution, of course, is that it violates the *Extended Projection Principle* (cf. Chomsky 1982), which requires that a clause have a subject at every level of representation. The first solution, equally, does not seem to be very well motivated.

A second possibility for in situ Case assignment might follow from the conventions suggested for the constructions in 1. to 4. at the beginning of this paper. Thus, under the analysis given in Chomsky (1981) the post-verbal NP in the English, French and Italian examples is co-superscripted with the structural subject position. The chains thus formed will contain both θ-roles and Case. It seems possible that this general approach might also account for the German constructions in 5. to 9. In this case, however, it will be necessary to establish what kind of element the structural subject position contains.

Under the analysis of the PRO-Drop parameter in Chomsky (1981) a functional definition of empty categories was employed that derived the PRO subject in examples such as 3.a. and b. via the rule R in the syntax. This affixation rule, which joins Agreement (AGR) to the verb, was said to optionally apply in the syntax for Italian but only in the phonology (PF) for English and other non-PRO-Drop languages. The result of R in the syntax was that the empty category in structural subject position was ungoverned and hence must be PRO. Under this analysis the empty category in structural subject position in the German examples 5. to 9. could not be PRO as in Italian, since passives and FLIP constructions can be embedded in Accusative and Infinitive (AcI) constructions. Via $\bar{S}$ Deletion for Exceptional Case Marking (ECM), PRO would then be governed:

19.a. Er ließ [PRO dem Kind das Fahrrad schenken]

(He had to the child the bicycle give)
He had somebody give the child the bicycle.
b. Er ließ [PRO sich die Suppe schmecken]
(He had to himself the soup taste)
He ate the soup with relish.

In Chomsky (1982), however, the analysis of the "missing subject" in Italian as PRO is abandoned, because unlike the PRO found in control constructions, the "PRO" in Italian is not anaphoric; in other words, it has independent reference. Chomsky thus introduces *pro* (small PRO), which, with the features [— anaphor,+pronominal], fills the gap in the paradigm of empty categories formed by NP-trace ([+anaphor,—pronominal]), PRO([+anaphor, +pronominal]) and variable ([—anaphor,—pronominal]).

Unlike PRO, *pro* holds an exclusively governed position, namely that governed by ARG. Since *pro* is governed, the AcI argument against interpreting the empty subject position in German as the same as in Italian no longer holds. It thus seems possible that German might have a limited occurence of *pro*, though not to the same extent as PRO-Drop languages such as Italian. If, then, the structural subject position in examples 5. to 9. contains *pro*, the question arises of what the argument status of this *pro* might be.

Chomsky (1981) distinguishes three kinds of argument status for NP's in English, which have their PRO counterparts in Italian. This can be illustrated as follows:

20. *True Argument*
a. PRO^{1} AGR^{1} va.
b. He goes.
21. *Quasi Argument*
a. PRO^{1} AGR^{1} piove.
b. It is raining.
22. *Non-Argument*
a. PRO^{1} AGR^{1} ha telefonato Gianni^{1}.
b. There^{1} walked into the room a famous linguist^{1}.

Replacing PRO^{1} by *pro*^{1} in the examples 20. to 22., it is clear that German does not have true argument *pro*:

23. a. *pro*^{1} AGR^{1} *va*.
(goes)
b. *_pro_^{1} geht AGR^{1}.
(goes)

Nevertheless, there seems to be no reason not to assume that the relationship between the structural subject position and the VP-internal nominative NP's in the German examples 5. and 7. (Passive and FLIP) and S-internal nominative in 6.a. (Raising) is the same as in the ergative sentence 3.a. In other words, the structural subject position contains a non-argument *pro* that is co-superscripted with the VP-internal NP, respectively S-internal NP, thus forming a θ-chain that has Case:

24.a. ... weil *pro*^{1} dem Kind das Fahrrad^1 geschenkt wurde
(since to the child the bicycle was given)
b. ... weil *pro*^{1} mir die Sache^1 gefällt
(since to me the thing pleases)
c. ... weil *pro*^{1} dem Eckhard sein Sohn^1 ein kluger Junge zu sein scheint
(since to Eckhard his son a bright boy to be appears)

Note that this analysis of (non) Raising is not possible for English and Italian:

25.a. *There seem several new people to have arrived.
b. *Sembra Gianni aver telefonato.
(Seems John to have telephoned)

where either the subject or the embedded pleonastic element must be raised:

26.a. Several new people seem to have arrived.
b. There seem to have arrived several new people.
27.a. Gianni sembra aver telefonato.
John seems to have telephoned.
b. Sembra aver telefonato Gianni.
(Seems to have telephoned John)

This parallels the movement analysis required for Passive in these languages. So far, then, the *pro*^{1} subject postulated for the structural subject position in 5., 6.a and 7. is a non-argument in a non-argument position.

It seems that apart from expletive *pro* German has a few limited examples of quasi-argument *pro*, involving selection by the verb, analogous to the selection of *es*, *it*, *il* or *pro* for weather verbs in German, English, French and Italian respectively. In fact, for the impersonal actives in 9 above there are alternative variants with *es*:

28.a. ... weil es mich friert.
... since I am cold.
b. ... weil es mir vor euch graust
... since you make me shudder

As in the case of weather verbs, *es* or *pro* can act as controllers:

29.a. ... weil (es) mir vor euch PRO zu grauen anfing
(since (it) to me before you to shudder began)
b. ... weil (es) mich PRO zu frieren anfing
(since (it) me to freeze began)

pro in these cases thus demonstrates the properties of a quasi-argument (cf.

Chomsky 1981) and is susceptible to the same analysis as for weather verbs in Italian:

30.a. ... weil *pro*$_i$ mich friert AGR^i
(since me freezes)
b. ... weil *pro*^{i} mir vor euch graust AGR^i
(since to me before you shudders)

For the remaining case of the Impersonal Passive given in 8. above it seems plausible that a quasi-argument is also involved here. A possibility would be that *pro* in structural subject position is coindexed with an NP position in the VP, to which the verb assigns the θ-role of a quasi-argument:

31. ... weil pro$_i^i$ [$_{VP}$ t$_i$ getanzt wurde] AGR^i
(since danced was)

The Chain thus formed "externalizes" the (quasi-argument) θ-role, this being, perhaps, as proposed by Reuland (1983b), a requirement of passive morphology, also in the cases of intransitive verbs as in German and Dutch. Note that cosuperscripting in this case would be tantamount to introducing a fifth empty category. As it stands, the empty category in the VP is functionally defined as trace, thus diverging from the account for *pro* in Italian given in Chomsky (1982). There, the properties of *pro* are defined by its adjacency to INFL in deep structure. Such an adjacency is not possible anyway in German, due to its verb-final structure. Note also that *pro* is not governed by AGR in AcI constructions such as in 19. above.

2. The fact that *pro* can be coindexed with a position in VP and the fact that it can be governed by the matrix verb in AcI constructions suggest that it cannot be identified via Deep Structure adjacency to INFL as claimed by Chomsky (1982) for the Italian examples. It would seem that Case and the structural position at S-Structure identify *pro* in German. Borrowing a notion from Haider (1983), the following stipulation can apply:

32. The Case index of *pro* must be realised externally.

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POSTPOSITIONS, "PART-OF-SPEECHNESS", NEGATION, AND OTHER MATTERS

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The present paper is a by-product of an enquiry into the functions of Hungarian postpositions. Since English is an international language and Hungarian is not, the description is based on English, though the organizing principle in the paper is the Hungarian postpositional system. The material has been assembled from the novel *Point counter point* by A. Huxley and its Hungarian translation by A. Látó. Examples taken from other sources are also used.

General considerations

Postpositions, together with the inflected or uninflected forms of a noun serve to denote the circumstances of an event or the state of an action. The postpoistion as a rule follows the noun the meaning of which it modifies: *a tölgyek alatt* "under the oaks", *a Tiszán túl* "beyond the Tisza". The syntagmatic relationship can be generalized like this:



With nouns having a case inflexion the postposition may precede: *kivül a kerten* "outside the garden".

In Hungarian as well as in other languages postpositions have similar functions as case inflexions. They differ from case inflexions in their morphological characteristics: their connection with the modified noun is looser, they do not take part in vowel harmony (this applies only to languages in which there is vowel harmony), and are not shortened in their phonetic structure to an extent case inflexions are.

The Hungarian language had postpositions as early as the ancient Hungarian period. Many of these postpositions, however, had developed into case inflexions by the time of the appearance of the first Hungarian linguistic records. In the *Tihanyi Alapitólevél* (approx. deed of the foundation of Tihany) dating from 1055, for example, the sublative case-inflexion variants *-ra*~*-re* are still to be found in the form of a postposition *reá* "onto the surface of something".

On the other hand, postpositions as a rule develop from inflexional forms of nouns. According to Gheno (1975:48) the majority of the Finno-Ugrian postpositions consist of "petrified" inflexional forms of nouns. The process can be described the following way: the lexical meaning of the noun fades away, becomes functional; notional and adverbial meanings get fused; the syntactic link between modifier and the word modified gets looser and looser, and — at the final stage — the adverbial turns into a postposition (Sebestyén1965: 192).

In Greenberg's analysis (1963:76—9) certain languages tend to put modifying elements before those modified. Turkish, for example, "puts adjectives before the nouns they modify, places the object of the verb before the verb, the dependent genitive before the governing noun, adverbs before adjectives which they modify". Such languages have postpositions for concepts expressed by prepositions in English. "A language of the opposite type is Thai, in which adjectives follow the noun, the object follows the verb, the genitive follows the governing noun, and there are prepositions".

Most languages, however, are not as well marked in this respect. Hungarian resembles the first type. In Hungarian a) the adjective precedes the noun (*szép ház* "a nice house"; b) the genitive precedes the governing noun (*Péter háza* "Peter 's house"); and Hungarian c) has both case inflexions and postpositions. At the same time in Hungarian the object as a rule follows the verb.

The most ancient layer of Hungarian postpositions, and the bulk of those of later origin, developed from the possessive construction: *a ház elött* "in front of the house", the second member of which, *elött*, is compounded of the noun *elö* approx. "foreground" and the locative suffix *-t*. Configurations like *elött* "in front of" had gradually lost their independence, their lexical meaning faded away and became more general. The syntactic relationship between the two nouns became obscure, and as a consequence the second noun assumed a relational function. The process was accelereted by the circumstance that in Proto-Finno-Ugrian the adjective preceded the noun; the genitive preceded the governing noun and the genitive was uninflected.

There are, however, other ways for the formation of postpositions. Some of the postpositions denoting spatial relationship are attached to the inflected forms of nouns: *az ablakon belül* "inside the window", *az ajtón kivül* "outside the door", *az utcán át* "across the street". Postpositions belonging to this group are more independent; they may precede the noun (*túl a Dunán* "beyond the Danube"), what is more, they can be used as independent adverbials: *belül* "inside", *kivül* "outside", *innen* "from here" (Bárczi et al. 1967:396).

"Part-of-speechness"

Adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections as a rule are treated as four distinct parts of speech. In Jespersen's opinion (1924:87) in this way "the dissimilarities between these words are grossly exaggerated, and their evident similarities correspondingly obscured". Many words are subject to a distinction which is designated by different names and therefore not perceived as essentially the same phenomenon. "Thus we have the complete verb in *he sings, he plays, he begins*; and the same verb followed by a complement in *he sings a song, he plays the piano, he begins work*". In this case the complement is termed object. In other verbs the distinction is really the same: *he can* is complete; in *he can sing* the verb *can* is completed by the addition of an infinitive. "A further case in point is seen in *he grows*, where the verb is complete, and *he grows bigger*, where it is complemented by a "predicative" ... Yet in spite of these differences in verbs no one thinks of assigning them to different parts of speech".

In Jespersen's analysis (1924:88) words such as *on* and *in* present an exact parallel to the instances mentioned above:

1. a. put the cap on;
   b. put your cap on your head;
2. a. he was in;
   b. he was in the house.

On and *in* in the a. sentences are termed adverbs, and in b. prepositions. Jespersen concludes: "Would it not be more natural to include them in one class and to say that *on* and *in* are sometimes complete in themselves and sometimes followed by a complement (or object)?" (1924:88).

Sebestyén (1965:13) also admits that there is similarity in the functions of adverbs and postpositions: both adverbs and postpositions express modal and relational notions. At the same time it is not difficult to see that in the configuration *este, vacsora után érkezik* "he is coming in the evening, after dinner" the time adverbial *este* "in the evening" is equivalent to the whole postpositional construction *vacsora után* "after dinner" and not to the postposition *után* "after". Accordingly, the adverb is an independently functioning unit whereas the postposition is a bound form, a relational particle. Though — Sebestyén admits — some adverbs and adverbial participles can be used independently and together with notional words. In similar instances it is difficult to mark off an adverbial from a postposition.

The postposition *kivéve* "except" may serve as an example. According to the data given by Sebestyén (1965:20) *kivéve* is included in the class of postpositions only in the grammar written by Verseghy in 1818 and in the *Mai Magyar nyelv rendszere* (The system of present-day Hungarian) (1962), which means that *kivéve* used to be and is even today in the state of transition between adverb and postposition. Consider the following examples:

a. "Ő ... minden emberrel a maga nyelvén beszélt. Mindenféle emberrel, *kivéve* talan a férjét".
"She knew ... just what to say to every type of person — to every type *except*, perhaps, her husband's".
b. Apádat *kivéve*, Walter.
"*Except* your father, Walter".
c. *Kivéve* persze a Walter apjàt.
"*Except*, of course, Walter's father".
d. *Kivéve* azt a néhány kínosan feszült percet a taxiban, egész este nem maradt kettesben Lucyval.
"... *except* for those painful exasperating moments in the taxi, he had not been alone with Lucy the whole evening".
e. *Kivéve* azt az egy rövid kérdést az ebédnél, soha még csak nem is célzott a gyerekre ...
"Except for that single brief inquiry at lunch-time, he never alluded to him ..."

Kivéve "except" follows the noun (having the accusative *-t*) only in sentence (b). In the other instances it has a conjunction-like function. If we shift sentence stress according to a certain strategem, and rearrange the above sentences accordingly, we get "clear-cut" postpositions:

a. ... talan a *férjét kivéve.*
c. Persze Walter *apját kivéve.*
d. Azt a néhány kínosan feszült *percet kivéve* ...
e. Azt az egy rövid *kérdést kivéve* ...

Palmer (1974:215) takes a similar view of the question. In his opinion "it might be plausible to argue that English does not, in fact, have two word classes adverb and preposition, but a single class 'particle' or, perhaps, 'prepositional adverb". For there is considerable similarity in their function. Often the adverb can be replaced, with little or no change of meaning, by the preposition plus a noun phrase:

He got across.
He got across the river.
He came down.
He came down the hill".

If we translate the first couple of sentences, we get:

Átjutott. "He got across".
Átjutott a folyón. "He got across the river".

In the first sentence all the possible case categories are incorportated (or are partly expressed) in the verb:



where *term* stands for the terminative, realized as *-ig* "as far as" in Hungarian.

In Hungarian the *át* "across" may be a. a postposition, b. an adverb, and c. a pre-verb:

a. Mintha fordított *távcsövön át* nézném.
"As though one were looking at it *through* the wrong end of *field-glasses*".
b. Gyere *át*!
"Come *over*".
c. Átsétált az úton.
"He walked *across* the road".

In Bolinger's analysis (1971:31) prepositions such as *across, beyond, over,* etc., are "portmanteau words, fusions of elements that are syntactically distinct but semantically identical. Syntactically they resemble compound prepositions: *He walked across the road=He walked across across the road.* The separation occurs when an object noun is inserted — the second element undergoes a stylistic change: **They pushed over the pram over the road — They pushed over the pram across the road.*

Negation

In the *The grammar of case* (1971:218–9) John Anderson argues that there is a correspondence between the respresentation of the ablative, and indirectly, of negation:

1. a. He is not at the meeting.
   b. He is absent from the meeting.
   c. He has gone (away) from the meeting.
2. a. He has come (here) from London.
   b. He is not in London.
3. a. He has gone from here to London.
   b. He is not here.
4. a. He compelled me to leave.
   b. He prevented me from leaving.

Accordingly, locative can be regarded as a cover-symbol for $\begin{bmatrix}+\text{loc}\\-\text{neg}\end{bmatrix}$ and ablative for $\begin{bmatrix}-\text{loc}\\+\text{neg}\end{bmatrix}$. Bennett (1975:23) also observes that the preposition *out of* is used in dynamic (*He went out of the office*) and static clauses (*He is out of the office*) alike. The latter (static) clause is the synonymic variant of *He is not in the office*. The corresponding Hungarian sentences are:

a. Kiment a hivatalból. "He went out of the office".
b. Hazon (hivatalon?) kívül van. "He is out of the office".

Clause b. can be diagrammed like this:



where *van* is "is", *-on* is the case inflexion of the superessive, and *kívül* is a postposition with the meaning "outside", and having the ablative *-l*.

In this paper I am concerned only with the postposition *nélkül* "without" and its English equivalents. The postposition *nélkül* developed in the separate life of the Hungarian language. It is compounded of the adessive inflexion

-*nél* + the variant *kül* of the adverbial postposition *kivül* "outside". In the sentence it may have a state or manner-adverbial as well as a (negative) comitative function (Sebestyén 1965:80). The data from *Point counter point* are:

without	69
0	17
un-, in-,	19
no, not	9
-less	9
but for	1
Total:	124

As can be seen from the table the most frequently used preposition as an equivalent of *nélkül* is *without*. The English preposition again is a complex one. The first component is a shortened form of Old English *wither* "against" (cf. German *wider* "against"). In the course of the development of the English language *with* had taken over the functions of the Old English preposition *mid* "with" (cf. German *mit* "with"). The second element is *out* (<OE útan), which has or used to have the same meaning as *kül* "the outer side of something, the outside of something", the second component of the Hungarian postposition. What follows may seem a bit far-fetched, viz. that both the Hungarian postposition and the English preposition contain an ablative element: the Hungarian first component *nél* has an ablative *-l-* and the English preposition can also have an ablative function as in *I was impatient with indecision*.

In Quirk et al's analysis (1972:324) for "most senses of *with*, including that of instrument, *without* expresses the equivalent negative meaning ..." The main functions of *with* are:

a. instrumental.
   I drew it with a ruler.
   She shifted a pebble with her shoe.
b. comitative:
   I had lunch with Miss Spenser.
   I spent a last two days with my parents.
c. manner-adverbial:
   She walked slowly, slimly, with elegance.
   His head turned on me with a snake-like swiftness.
d. part: whole relationship:
   There was a closed door with an iron knocker.
   It was lit by one tall lamp with a dark shade.

In the latter function the meaning of *with* comes near to the meaning of *have*. Negative constructions are:

a. I drew it without a ruler (i.e. I didn't use a ruler to draw it.)
b. She might have reminded him of the time when he never went out in the evening without her.
"Marjorie emlékeztethette volna azokra az időkre, amikor *nélküle* soha sem ment el este".
c. At the same time he wasn't going to obey tamely and without protest.
"De azt sem vállahatja, hogy ellentmondás *nélkül*, gyáván megadja magát".
d. Man can't live without a heart.
"Az ember nem élhet szív *nélkül*".

On the basis of the statistical data to be found on page 107 it can be established that the most important equivalent of the Hungarian postposition *nélkül* is *without*. It must, however, be noted that there are other, mainly lexical means to express a meaning similar to [nélkül]. According to the table presented on page 107, first of all the prefixes *un-*, the negative particles *no, not* as well as the privative *-less* can be taken into consideration. Of the derivatives having the prefix *un-*, two main groups can be set up: a) derivatives having the suffix *-ly*, and b) negative past participle forms. Examples are:

a. He felt annoyed with himself and also, unreasonably, with the Old Man.
"Bosszankodott magára, s bár ok *nélkül*, az öregre is".
Lucy shut her eyes and abandoned herself unresistingly, limply.
"Lucy behunyta szemét, ée ellenállás *nélkul*, ernyedten türte csókjait".
b. It was unprecedented.
"Példa *nélkül* való kívánság volt".
She left him unjustified, his guiltiness unpalliated.
"... otthagyta őt csillapítatlan büntudatával, mentseg *nélkuli* büneivel".

The same applies to derivatives with the prefix *in-*, with the exception that instead of the past participle forms in group b. we find adjectives. Examples are:

a. The rain went sliding incessantly down the dirty glass of the window ...
"A piszkos ablaküvegen szünet *nélkül* csorgott az eső".
... you could go on, almost indefinitely.
"... igen, az ember szinte vég *nélkül* dolgozhat".
b. It was like the labouring of Sisyphus and the Danaids, hopeless and interminable ...
"Vesződött, mint Sziszifusz és a danaidák, reménytelenül és vég *nélkül*".
... his helplessness would have rendered her indispensable to his happiness.
"... John tehetetlen lett volna a feleség szeretete *nélkül*".

In the following five sentences the meaning [nélkül] is expressed by the negative particles *not* and *no* or a negative element of another kind. In the corresponding Hungarian sentences the postposition *nélkül* "without" having an ablative element is used:

a. — Ten rounds, — Rampion went on. — No gloves.
"Tiz menet, "folytatta Rampion. "Bandázs *nélkül*".
b. But think how miserable you'd be if we didn't cluck!
"Képzelje csak el, hogy maguk viszont milyen szerencsétlenek lennének a mi kotkodácsolásunk *nélkül*."
c. What business had she to do subediting and Shorter.
Notices for nothing?
"Ingyen vállalja a szerkesztőségi munkát. Rövid recenziókat ír fizetés *nélkül*".
d. Thy navel is like round goblet that wanteth not liquor …
"A te köldököd, mint a kerekded csésze, nem szükölködik nedvesség nélkül …"
e. Gladys … thought of making a comment, and again said nothing, but sat down in silence before the typewriter.
"Valami megjegyzésen gondolkozott, de aztán szó *nélkül* leült az írógép mellé".

In sentence e. the meanings *said nothing* and *in silence* are contracted and rendered by the single expression *szó nélkül* "without (uttering) a word".

Goal and source

In "A case of dissymmetry in linguistic orientation" Yoshihiko Ikegami argues that, though, from a logical point of view, the source and the goal are on an equal footing, language seems to manifest a dissymmetry in this respect, goal encroaching on the sphere of source. Ikegami bases his statement on the following linguistic facts:

a. In phrases like *averse from/to, different from/to* the use of *to* is gradually in the increase at the sacrifice of *from*.

b. In English, for example, the location adverbs *here* and *there* and the goal adverbs *hither* and *thither* have been neutralized as *here* and *there*, but the source adverbs *hence* and *thence*, on the other hand, have been changed into marked forms, *from here* and *from there*, respectively.

c. With the goal-oriented verbs, such as *arrive* and *reach*, the source is very often treated as goal. For example, in the expression *ask a question of a person* the person is treated as a source whereas in *ask a person a question* the person is represented as a goal.

d. If we hear the clause *because he is tired*, we will want to hear the consequence, but if we hear *he is in bed*, we will not necessarily want to hear why he is in bed. In a more general way, if we hear that something has started.

there remains the expection to be told that it has arrived at a certain point, On the other hand, if we hear that something has arrived at some place and ended its motion there, we feel quite satisfied with the description in spite of the fact that we are not told about the start of the motion.

The data assembled from *A magyar nyelv névutórendszere* (The system of Hungarian postpositions) by A. Sebestyén (1965:242–7) back up Ikegami's claim. The following table shows the number of occurrences of sixteen postpositions:

SOURCE		GOAL	
felől "from"	232	felé "towards"	1371
elöl "from before"	213	elé "before"	554
alól "from under"	227	alá "under"	419
közül "from among, out of"	592	közé "in between"	415
mellől "from beside"	72	mellé "to him, beside"	326
fölől "from above"	8	fölé "over, above"	121
mögül "from behind"	67	mögé "behind"	97
körül "around"	461	köré "around"	69

The data presented confirm Ikegami's claim in spite of the fact that in the cases of *közül* "from among, out of" and *körül* "around" we are faced with a reversed situation. But this contradiction is illusive; the most important function of *közül* "from among, out of" in Hungarian is the partitive. Consider the following:

> Igen, nagy művész ... de nem a legnagyobbak *közül* való.
> "Yes, a great artist ... but not one of the greatest".
> Egy a kevés *közül*: elviselhető öregember.
> "One of the few possible old men".
> Talán minden férfi közül a leglehetetlenebb.
> "The most impossible of them all, really".

According to the data to be found in the *Hungarian Etymological Dictionary* (II:623) the postposition *körül* "around" used to be an adverbial with an ablative function, answering the question *honnan*? "from where, whence". Its ablative function, however, had been repressed in a very early period of the development of the Hungarian language, and even in the earliest linguistic records it had a locative function. Some examples from *Point counter point* are:

> Szája sarkában és szeme *körül* ráncok.
> "There were lines round the eyes and at the corner of his lips".
> Másfél stone arany az ágyéka *körül*.
> "A stone and a half of gold round his loins".

Semantic islands

Lyons (1968:304) directs attention to the fact that, although the difference between inflexional variation and the use of prepositions (and we may add: or postpositions) is unimportant, there is "some empirical reason to suggest that, if a language has both inflexional distinctions and prepositions, the former will tend to have a more 'abstract' and the latter a more 'concrete' function ..." Furthermore, "word-order may be a more typically 'grammatical' device than inflexion, and inflexion more typically 'grammatical' than the use of prepositions".

I wish to illustrate Lyons's statement, according to which grammatical relations expressed by case inflexions are more abstract than those expressed by prepositions (and postpositions), by comparing the use of the English preposition *for* with that of some of its Hungarian equivalents.

Quirk et al. (1972:322) distinguish between actual and intended recipient. When the preposition *to* is followed by noun phrases denoting persons or animals, the meaning is actual recipient: *He sold the car to his next-door neighbour*. In similar Hungarian constructions as a rule the case inflexion variants *-nek* ~ *-nak* are used: "Eladta a kocsit a közvetlen szomszédjá*nak*". In contrast to the notion of actual recipient in sentences such as *He made a doll for his daughter*. In similar Hungarian construction either the postposition *számára* "for" or the case inflexion *-nak* "for" is used: "Készített egy babát a lányá*nak*/a lánya *számára*". In both instances the English prepositional phrase can be equated with an indirect object: *He sold the car to his next-door neighbour* ↔ *He sold his next-door neighbour the car* and *He made a beautiful doll for his daughter* ↔ *He made his daughter a beautiful doll*. In Hungarian approximately the same meaning can be expressed by simply changing the order of the nominal phrases.

It must, however, be noted that grammarians, Allerton (1978:26—30), for example, are rather sceptical as to the status of transformations. I quote: "It is a common experience in language study (and elsewhere) that a consideration of a few carefully chosen examples can allow us a neat, simple, even elegant solution; but that the more data we examine, the more complex the whole question becomes" (Allerton 1978:21). For example, sentences such as *Uncle Jim watched a television programme for Margaret* (Allerton's fourth *for* pattern) do not allow the prepositionless construction.

In the following section of the paper I am concerned with the three Hungarian equivalents of the English *for* marking the so-called "intended recipient". These are:

for ↔ | ↔ számára
| ↔ helyett
| ↔ iránt

Számára

The postposition *számára* "for" is the sublative form of the noun *szám* "number". In Sebestyén's opinion (1965:160) the meaning of *számára* contains the feature [indirectness], which harmonizes with Quirk et al.'s analysis, viz. "intended recipient". The following are data from *Point counter point*:

for	28
to	18
ϕ	18
miscellaneous	2
Total:	66

The comparatively high proportion of the preposition *to* as an equivalent of *számára* is surprising. One would have expected the predominance of *for*. It must, however, be noted that adjectives are more "conservative" than verbs, and *to* is mainly used with adjectives. Examples are:

> But isn't the indifference natural to him? "De hát nem természetes állapot-e *számára* a közöny?"
>
> Lots of my childhood is more real to me than Ludgate Hill here. "Gyermekkoromból sok minden valóságosabb *számomra*, mint itt a Ludgate Hill."

The constructional type with *számára* can roughly be indentified with Allerton's second group (1978:27–8), which he characterizes the following way:

> Verb: act of making;
> Direct object: entity made;
> Indirect object: eventual recipient = intended first owner.

Examples are:

> Otherwise they wouldn't be able to pay the workers what they demand and make a profit for themselves. "... különben képtelenek lennének a munkások követeléseit teljesíteni, és a profitot is beztosítani a maguk *számára*."
>
> ... this was the state of being which nature and second nature had made normal for him. "Ennyit szabott meg *számára* a természet és a második természet."

It must, however, be noted that constructions having *for* in *Point counter point* rendered as *számára* have a structure differing from those treated by Allerton. In the majority of cases the predicate is: *be* + A/N, whereas Allerton's constructional type has a change-of-state verb as a predicate. The *for*-phrases as a rule are attached to a noun:

> Lucy'd be rather a disaster for any man. "Lucy minden férfi *számára* katasztrófa."

... one after another, all lost their charm for him. "... egyik a másik után veszítette el *számára* vonzerejét."

Not a pleasant outlook for our children. "Nem túl kellemes kilátás a gyermekeink számára."

The following construction:

For him, she was still about seventeen. "*Számára* ma is tizenhét éves volt." contains an additional feature, viz. [think, suppose].

In many instances the intended recipient is not overtly expressed:

Pain and discomfort — that was all the future held. "Fájdalom és bánat — egyebet nem tartogat *számára* a jövő."

Justice for India had meant one thing before he visited the country. "Igazságot Indiának — valami egészen mást jelentett *számára*, mielőtt az országot megismerte volna."

His averted eyes left her a kind of spiritual privacy.
"Lesütött szeme legalább valamelyes szellemi magányt biztosít *számára*."

Almost everybody was in this respect s stranger. "E tekintetben csaknem mindenki idegen maradt *számára*."

Helyett

Allerton's fourth *for* group (1978:29—31) is the one in which the verbs take an affected object, and the person denoted by the indirect object benefits from the verbal activity in the sense that she or he is relieved of the need to undertake the activity herself (or himself). Allerton's examples are:

Uncle Jim answered some letters for Margaret.
Uncle Jim opened a window for Margaret.
Uncle Jim taught a class for Margaret.
Uncle Jim watched a television programme for Margaret.

In Hungarian this meaning is frequently rendered as *helyett* "instead of". The following table shows the number of occurrences of the English equivalents of the postposition *helyett* in *Point counter point*:

instead of	14
for	10
Ø	7
Total:	31

The constructional types having *instead of* and *for* can be separated quite easily. Consider the following:

a. And so you grew a tail and hoofs instead of a halo and a pair of wings. "És ezért patát és farkat növesztettél dicsfény és szárnyak *helyett*."

America with government departments taking the place of trusts and state

officials instead of rich men. "Amerika, csak trösztök *helyett* kormányszervekkel, gazdag emberek *helyett* állami hivatalnokokkal."
b. Hilda talked for two and was discreetly bold. "Hilda kettejük *helyett* beszélt, és tapintatos elszántsággal cselekedett."
And you can rebel enough for two. "Maga pedig kettő *helyett* is eleget lázadozik."
She had confidence for both. "Mary kettejük *helyett* bizakodott."

In Quirk et al.'s analysis (1972:673) *instead of* "involves a contrast, though it also indicates a replacement". *Instead of* as a rule is followed by a gerundial construction expressing an unrealized possibility.

In type b. the three-place predicate construction such as *Afraid I must ask you to do a little arithmetic for me* can be considered to be typical. The transitional type is: *The choice had been made for her*, in which the person who makes the choice is not expressed. In the other instances the semantic object is incorporated in the predicate: (*talk*: *have a talk*, *eat*: *do the eating*, *answer*: *give an answer*, *rebel*: *make a rebellion*, *confide*: *have a confidence*, *work*: *do* (*some*) *work*, *speak*: *give a speech*. Additional examples are:

I'll do the eating ... Enough for two. "Majd én kettőnk *helyett* eszem."
Mary answered for the others. "... válaszolta Mary a többiek *helyett* is."
It's the substitution of simple intellectual schemata for the complexities of reality; of still and formal death for the bewildering movements of life. "Sokrétű valóság *helyett* egyszerű intellektuális sémák; az élet ijesztő mozgalmassága *helyett* a csöndes, formákba dermedt halál."

Iránt

The postposition *iránt* "for" is a set of configurations of the root *ir-* /∼*ar-*/ to be found in the words *irány* "direction" and *arány* "proportion"+locative *-n-* and the locative *-t*. *Iránt* used to be a spatial postposition but in present-day Hungarian — after the fading of its original meaning — it is mainly used as an adverb of "accompanying circumstances" (Sebestyén 1965:58). The data from *Point counter point* are:

for	26
to	11
in	8
Ø	7
miscellaneous	12
Total:	64

Some of the examples are:

There were moments when his love for his mother turned almost hatred.

"Voltak pillanatok, amikor anyja *iránti* szeretete már-már gyűlöletbe csapott át."

The prolonged effort of writing blunted his enthusiasm for philosophical authorship. "De az írással járó hosszas erőfeszítés hamarosan lehűtötte lelkesedését a filozófiai alkotómunka *iránt*."

At the same time all felt a kind of gloating pity for the old man. "Mindnyájan pedig enyhe kárörömmel vegyes szánalmat éreztek az öregúr *iránt*."

The nouns occurring in the *for*-phrases in decreasing frequency are: *love* (6), *passion* (4), *affection* (2), *contempt* (2), *feeling* (2), *sympathy* (2). The folowing nouns occur only once: *ardour(s)*, *consideration*, *demand*, *dislike*, *enthusiasm*, *hatred*, *pity*, and *sentiment*.

Danes (1968) and Kirkwood (1973) argue that the object of *like* (one of the synonyms of *love*) is objective whereas the subject of *please* is a source (ablative). Kirkwood points to ablative *please-* paraphrases like those in the following:

The work pleases John.
The work gives John pleasure.
John derives pleasure from the work.

and non-ablative *like*-paraphrases such as:

He likes the work.
He has a liking for the work.

Kirkwood argues that in *I liked the play immensely* the adverbial *immensely* refers to the manner in which I reacted to the play, as opposed to *The play pleased me immensely*, which refers to the manner in which the play affects me.

In Sebestyén's analysis (1965:57) the original function of *iránt* was locative. In spite of all this in the ancient linguistic records there are a lot of data pointing to ablative orientation. What is more, the two directions are merged on the more abstract level: *érdeklődik valamiről, felől, iránt, után* "be interested in, be concerned with, make inquiries about, inquire after". The English examples point to bidirectionality. With the development of the system of abstract meanings, the original "concrete" meaning has eased so much so that in present-day English in some *for*-phrases a merging of course and purpose can be observed as in the following sentence: *It was a lame excuse for doing nothing* (Aksenenko 1956:116—20).

This double-facedness can be observed in *There were moments when his love for his mother turned almost to hatred* — the configuration *his love for his mother* refers to the fact that the person in question loves his mother but love is an emotion brought about by an outer stimulus, which in this case is the mother. The construction *That's why ... there's such a demand for higher education* differs slightly from this since the volitional feature of *demand* defines the orientation of the *for*-phrase.

The data presented seem to confirm Lyons's statement, according to which inflexions tend to have a more abstract and prepositions and postpositions a more concrete function. And, as we have seen, in Hungarian there are at least three postpositions to mark grammatical relations marked by *for* in English:

a. Lucy'd be rather a disaster *for* any man. "Lucy minden férfi *számára* katasztrófa."
b. Hilda talked *for* two and was discreetly bold. "Hilda kettejük *helyett* beszélt, és tapintatos elszántsággal cselekedett."
c. At the same time all felt a gloating pity *for* the old man. "Mindnyájan pedig enyhe kárörömmel vegyes szánalmat éreztek az öregúr *iránt*."

In a. the verb *be*, in b. the verb *talk*, in c. the verb *feel* (in combination with the emotive noun *pity*) belonging to different semantic classes are used. In Hungarian as a rule the present tense form of the verb *van*(*ni*) "be" has no surface structure realization but in the past tense its use is compulsory: *Lucy minden férfi számára katasztrófa volt* (the past tense form of the verb *van* "be"). In b. *talk* and *beszél* incorporate an absolutive (a semantic object): *give a talk* "beszédet tart". The configuration can be diagrammed something like this:



which resembles the configuration in c.:



with the exception that *feel* is stative whereas *talk* is a communicative verb.

The generalizations that present themselves are: a) the *for*- phrases contain a noun denoting a person (the intended recipient), b) the differences in the ways of expression are matched with semantic differences, and last but not least c) the nouns in the *for*-phrases and the three classes of verbs attached to them form small semantic islands in the vocabulary.

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A COMPARISON OF SOME ENGLISH AND HUNGARIAN FREEZES

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In this analysis, which is partly a preliminary report and partly a detailed summary of a somewhat lengthier study in progress, I compare English and Hungarian examples of what have variously been called "fixed-order conjuncts", "fixed order coordinates", "irreversible binomials" and other "binary pairs" or "compounds", and more recently, "freezes".

In examining the freezing process and in trying to identify the rules operating in it, one can largely disregard certain distinctions that are for other purposes made between various sub-types of word pairs, as e.g. the distinction between "irreversible binomials proper" like *war and peace*, *fish and chips*, or *father and son* on the one hand, and various "reduplicative word pairs", whether actually forming one word, as *mishmash*, hyphenated like *fiddle-faddle*, or otherwise linked as e.g. *tit for tat* on the other, and one can also include examples of what are called "verbal binomials", like *wheelings and dealings* or *come and go*, as in "easy come, easy go"; and eventually, perhaps even much more complex units. Much in accordance with this, relatively little attention is paid, for the time being, to "the strength of the irreversibility", or, to the fact that the degree of fixedness in word order is often variable.

Diachronic considerations have not, or at least not yet, been entered into the analysis, I must therefore entirely disregard at this point for instance the interesting-looking and potentially significant fact that *cats and dogs* used to be "dogs and cats", or that Standard Hungarian *kanadai francia* (lit.: "Canadian French") has recently shown signs of reversing its order, and thus appears to be becoming a mirror, as it were, of *French Canadian*. However, diachronic factors, wherever suspected to have operated, should eventually be included in any thorough analysis, otherwise we remain in danger of never being able to give satisfactory answers to even the basic questions about freezing and freezes; the most important ones involving the problems 1) of the determining

factors of *the sequence of the elements*, and 2) *whether and to what extent these factors operate cross-linguistically*.

The aim of the present paper is to take a step in this direction by confronting and extending to Hungarian certain rules established earlier for English, the language which therefore functions in this confrontation as the "source language" — to borrow a term from translation theory.

As it has been observed and pointed out by some authors before, the ordering in freezes is to a remarkable degree *phonologically determined*. The phonological rules that act and interact in freezing have so far been most thoroughly and relatively most accurately described for English by William E. Cooper and John Robert Ross (1975), who identify altogether seven phonological rules that operate in freezing with various amounts of strength. Some of these are somewhat tentative, but there are three basic ones that are clearly convincing; they can be briefly summed up as follows:

— *Rule No. 1* — (also called Panini's law) says that, other factors being more or less equal, the number of syllables in the second element exceeds that in the first, or, to put it in a "weaker" version, the first element should not contain more syllables than the second. Other authors, as e.g. Gustafsson (1975), call this the "*short+long*" rule.

According to ***Rule No. 2.***, or ***the consonant rule***, the second element, other factors being equal, contains more initial consonants than the lst,

and ***Rule No. 3*** — (also called ***F2***) says that the second element in the freeze contains a vowel with, to use acoustics phonetics terminology, a lower second formant frequency, lower, that is, than for the vowel in the first element.

This means in practice that the sequence of vowels for American English should be something like this:

$\underbrace{i>I>}$ $\underbrace{\varepsilon>æ>}$a (hot)>ɔ (hall)>u

which, in a loose approximation corresponds to Hungarian

i, í (ü) (ë), (ö)e á >a (o)>u

Now, the rules having been applied to a relatively large Hungarian corpus — nearly a hundred word pairs in each case — the following picture emerges:

1. For Panini's law (the syllable law):

The common 1+2 pattern as we have it in English — as e.g.

— hot and heavy

— free and easy

— bread and butter etc., is not a firm ground for direct comparison, given the fact that, contrary to English, monosyllabic elements occur only in a small minority of the cases in Hungarian. A frequent pattern, however, is 2+3, as e.g. in:

— béke és barátság

— irni — olvasni
— sirás — nevetés
— szivvel — lélekkel
— foggal — körömmel
— sarló és kalapács, and so forth.

A large group, containing most reduplicatives, minimal pairs and near-minimal pairs, shows a 2+2 pattern:

— illeg — billeg
— ázva-fázva, — izeg-mozog
— ütött — kopott
— ide — oda
— oda — vissza
— eszem — iszom etc.,

and there is a group with a 1+1 pattern, with again numerous examples, as e.g.:

— le — föl,
— lim — lom,
— rissz — rossz,
— kip — kop,
— itt — ott, and so forth.

There *are* a few examples of the 1+2 pattern, and also of a 1+3 type:

— ló és lovas
— csür — csavar
— fur — farag
— bús — keserü
— férj — feleség
— Góg és Magóg and
— bús — borongós, respectively.

The syllable law can be extended to trinomials and multinomials, an area where it seems to operate with an even greater force. The ones I have found — and they are quite numerous in Hungarian — invariably show either a partial or a gradual linear increase in the number of syllables:

— huj-huj, hajrá (hip-hip, hurrah)
— zsip-zsup, kenderzsup
— itt-ott, amott (here, there, everywhere)
or — bort-búzát, békességet, respectively.

One partial counterexample I found is

— jelen, múlt, jövő, (lit.: present, past, future),but this is a type of chronological ordering, another matter that will be touched upon below.

The last three days of the Hungarian week are

— *péntek, szombat, vasárnap* ("Friday, Saturday, Sunday"), which, in terms of syllable pattern, corresponds precisely with more usual

— Thursday, Friday, Saturday.

The four strokes in competitive swimming are

— mell, hát, gyors, *pillangó* (breast, back, free, butterfly — in that order),

and although there is some disagreement among native speakers as to the ordering of the first three strokes (some say there is *no* ordering), they almost invariably put *pillangó* in the 4th place.

All in all, it seems that Hungarian can safely be added to the list of languages that clearly confirm Panini's syllable law; in fact, Hungarian seems to be the clearer case the two, as one does not have to worry much about cases like

— hippity-hop
— flickety-flack or
— hickory-discory dock;

examples of something like a reversed Panini's law.

The counterexamples I have found for Hungarian are very low in number, and with one or two exceptions they are governed by chronological or other forceful semantic factors, as

— kezdet és vég ("beginning and end")
or — észak-dél ("North-South").

One counterexample for which there is no apparent explanation — phonological or semantic — is

— háború és béke ("war and peace" all one can do for the time being is put the blame on Tolstoy)

(cp. Russian Война и мир).

Rule No. 2, the consonant rule, like P's law, can be rephrased into a more modest version by saying that the number of initial consonants in place 1 elements should not exceed that in place 2 elements, which at the same time allows for an infinitely larger number in place 2 elements, with special regard to the fact that there is a large group of freezes in Hungarian — probably forming a majority — in which the first element begins with a vowel. This goes especially for many reduplicatives, as

A) — *á*kom-bákom
or — *i*lleg-billeg, etc.

B) a second group is represented by zero initial consonant in both elements, as

— erre-arra ("this way-that way")
— itt-ott ("here and there")
— emide-amoda
— emigy-amúgy
— eszem-iszom, and

C) there is a third group where both elements begin with a single consonant, as in

— csip-csup
— térül-fordul
— hetet-havat
— dinom-dánom
— szánom-bánom
— csapot-papot
— tüzzel-vassal and others.

Of the hundred or so examples examined, I have found no counterexamples. Further, it seems that Rules 1 and 2 form an alliance, as it were, to reduce the first element of the freeze as much as possible.

Rule No. 3, the vowel rule, looked equally promising at first sight. Both English and Hungarian abound in examples showing any one of the sequences i(I, i), H ü>æ, a, á, o (ó), with hardly a trace of the reversed order under any circumstances. Of the many occurrences, take e.g.

— knick-knack,
— shilly-shally,
or — tit for tat, and
— bikk-makk
— lig-lóg
or — füt-fát etc. respectively.

However, the F2 principle holds only as long as there is *a high front vowel* in the first element and whatever the second contains is a low and/or back vowel with relation to it (as in the sequences shown above). In Hungarian, the F2 rule does not work for pairs with a back vowel in their first elements. Especially conspicuous in this respect is the frequent /u+.../ pattern. The *u*, with the lowest second formant frequency of all the vowels, should not occur in first place elements to begin with, or at best it should be restricted to reduplicatives and near-reduplicatives as

-pooh-pooh, or
-hook and crook, as in *by hook or by crook* or -choo-choo as in *choo-choo train*.

This, however, is far from being the case in Hungarian. In fact, the proposed (o)a>u sequence occurs precisely in the reverse in an overwhelming majority of the cases, as in

— kutya-macska,
— hu-ha,
— huz-von, (huza-vona)
— csúszik-mászik
— rug-kapál
— búbánat

— bús-borongós etc.,

while the only example I have found clearly confirming F2 is

— lót-fut, and this may well go back to historical reasons.

What helped solve the problem is what looked most discouraging at first. Namely: upon closer examination it turns out that the F2 principle does not really work for English either. Cooper and Ross (1975) remark at one point that they have found "one serious counterexample" to their proposed ordering in

— ooh and aah.

Now, to this we can easily add the trinomial-like interjection

— brou-ha-ha,

and, upon some further search, a number of other pairs with nearly the same pattern that have apparently escaped the authors' attention, as e.g.

— foot and mouth (disease)
— hook and eye
— room and board
and — root and branch

although these latter two could also be accounted for by the possible overriding effect of a short $\xrightarrow{+}$ long rule.

So for good measure and also a sort of control testing, consider the following examples from German:

(von) — Ruf und Rang,
(Das) — Drum und Drang
— Lust und Laune
— Sturm und Drang
(Der Ritter) (ohne) — Furcht und Tadel,
(über) — kurz und lang, and so forth,

with — Hab und Gut being the only counterexample that comes to mind without a thorough search.

These examples are in themselves so overwhelming that one can hardly resist the temptation to add to the list — going back to English again —:

— Cooper and Ross, notwithstanding the syllable rule and alphabeticism, respectively.

The point, of course, is that what we are dealing with is not just a large group of random exceptions from different languages from an otherwise valid rule, but that a new rule is emerging or at least the F2 has to be considerably modified.

Tentatively, this can be very simply stated. As we have seen from the examples, the *u*, a high back vowel, is almost never followed by a high front or even a low front one. The sequence is almost exclusively from high back to lower back.

In the cases where the F2 does seem to work perfectly (i.e. with the front vowels), a similar ***high to low*** and/or ***front to back*** shift in the points of vowel formation can be observed. Consequently, the F2 could — and I am arguing that it should — be replaced by a "*low-back*", or *back and open, rule*, covering both ***higher to lower and/or front to back movements.***

Some question marks remain; consider e.g.

— calm and cool, as especially in:

— calm, cool and collected; or Hungarian

— *jár-kel* — I shall presently come back to this one — but the number of counterexamples, for one thing, is incomparably smaller than that for the originally proposed rule. All in all, ***both English and Hungarian conform to a single vowel rule*** with about the same degree of accuracy that we saw for the other two rules discussed.

Concluding this part of the report, I would like to note that one field the extentions of my studies so far are beginning to be directed at is a group of larger and more complex constructions where freezing seems to be operative, including ditties, nursery rhymes, proverbs and sayings, such as e.g.

— Amit ***nyer a réven, elveszti a vámon***, (approximately: what is lost on the swings is made up on the rounds), and

— Jobb ***ma egy veréb***, mint ***holnap egy tuzok*** (roughly: a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush).

(Note the vowel sequences in place 1 and place 2 elements).

Briefly for the semantic component in freezing. Unfortunately, it is at this point that the picture so promisingly bright for universalists in the phonological area suddenly turns bleak. As numbers of sizable and diversified groups of examples have shown, "if there is anything that can go wrong, it *does*" (Murphy's law), in other words, whenever it appears necessary for a semantic factor to override a phonological rule or even a group of such rules acting (or: trying to act) in unison, it mercilessly does so; and this seems to equally apply to both English and Hungarian.

A highly unusual σ>(σ̈near[e]) sequence becomes rigid for instance in:

— meg*szokik* vagy meg*szȫkik* (approx.: "make or break"), and a similar force may have been active in

— fo*gy*al-*kör*ömmel, ("tooth and nail"), although this pair has the syllable rule going for it, too. Similarly in English, there exist relatively rigid pairs going against basic phonological predictions, as e.g.

— husband and wife

or — brother and sister, both victims of a semantic rule that says "*Male first*".

This remarkable strength of semantic constraints would, of course, not by itself jeopardize the search for semantic universals in freezing, which is yreall *the most controversial issue*. In fact, one could almost logically predict a state of affairs pointing in just the reverse direction. That this is not the case, is clear, however, from the work of authors dealing not only with freezing in English but also occasionally considering examples of various other languages.

One the whole, the picture seems better than absolutely hopeless. Of the 19 semantic domains that for instance Cooper and Ross identify for English, i.e. for which they have found freezes, Hungarian seems to confirm, and thus, reinforce, almost every single one, except where a domain clearly does not apply, such as e.g. *count* vs. *mass* (count and mass nouns), or where it simply lacks a comparable freeze.

The ordering of the cardinal geographical referents and their sub-compounds (North, South, East, West, Northwest, North by Northwest etc.) is strictly and rigidly the same in Hungarian, even at the price of having to violate the otherwise powerful syllable rule:

— Észak-dél (North-South), but this may be little solace for the would-be universalist, also aware, for instance, of German and Spanish that have *West(en)* und *Ost(en)* and *del sur al norte*, respectively.

At one other point, Hungarian conspires with Yiddish to ruin an otherwise uniform cross-linguistic picture in space-axis ordering,

cp.: Y — orop un aroyf ("down and up"),
and H — le-fel and
lent-fent (both: "down and up").

In addition Hungarian has

— ki-be,
— kint-bent ("out and in"),

which may be a rare example of a phonological rule operating succesfully against semantics.

And the worst is perhaps yet to come. Cooper and Ross suggest 2 potential semantic universals that — as they put it — have not yet been shot down. One of them is "*Chronology* in a freeze of two verbs which are intended to be in a temporal sequence, the place 1 verb denotes the earlier action". So, for a painful but necessary universals-shooting, consider

— *jár-kel*, an absolutely irreversible pair meaning "wander around, be on the move, come and go, walk about, travel around" ect., where both *jár* and *kel* are otherwise separate, individual verbs, *jár* meaning *walk* and *kel* meaning *get up* or *rise*.

Finally, here are a few examples of a select list of Hungarian freezes that might be worth noting, partly in terms of "priorities of values inherent in the structure of a given society" or what may partly be attributed to various cultural characteristics:

— ... *sirjak vagy nevessek/kacagjak*
(... whether to "*cry or laugh*").
— *sarló és kalapács*

("sickle and hammer" cp. also Russian *serp i molot*)

— *kereslet és kinálat*

("demand and supply") (lit.: "what is being looked for" on the one hand and "what is being offered" on the other).

— *ige, főnév*

("verb and noun" as opposed to much more usual *nouns and verbs*),

— *koldus és királyfi*

("pauper and prince").

These, and many similar, examples indicate another possible subdirection of further cross-linguistic, and cross-cultural, research.

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PROCESSING STRATEGIES IN BILINGUAL SPELLERS[1]

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0. *Introduction.* This study and the study on which it is based (Luelsdorff and Bloor (1981)) deviate in four major respects from the norm for the study of spelling errors. First, they are studies of target-language, rather than native-language, spelling errors. Secondly, they are based on not only an inquiry into the number of misspellings and the number of different forms of misspelling, but also an investigation of types of misspelling and their causes. Third, the corpus consists of words misspelled to dictation of sentences at grade-level, rather than above grade-level. Fourth, they are rooted in in-depth, single-subject investigations which yield a misspelling profile for a single informant, rather than characteristics of the misspelling behavior of a group, grounded in the notion that the locus of language is the individual (Luelsdorff 1982), rather than the community, although the two intricately interact.

This paper presents a summary statement of the major, but by no means only, processing strategies which are held to underlie and explain the 977 vowel and consonant "substitution" errors — excluding those found in the conduits d'approche (cf. Chapter VII) — detected in 6,162 words of English dictation administered over a 14-month period to a 12-year-old male second--year student of English in a German Hauptschule in Regensburg, the capital of the Upper-Palatinate in Bavaria. Bernhard and I met once, sometimes twice a week for a period of from 1/2 to 3/4 of an hour, with lessons focusing on dictation from his first and second year English textbooks *English H 1* and *English H 2* (Friedrichs 1970, 1971) and composition, in this case writing letters to a pen-friend in the United States, Lisa, from Tuscumbia, Alabama, age 14. Bernhard was failing English, although he was doing very well in most of his other subjects, especially math, and was referred to me by his parents for remedial work. His main problem with English seemed to me to be his inability to concentrate, although others remarked that he could concentrate if he wanted to. My own experience with Bernhard was that he was often distracted, forgetting pens, pencils, books, notebooks, and appointments, and insofar as his dictations were concerned, frustratingly absent-minded, often forgetting to do his homework, which typically consisted in reading the passage to be dictated and writing 5—50 times words which he had misspelled. Especially exasperating was Bernhard's tendency to persist in misspelling words which he had just written, sometimes as many as 5—50 times. The dictation procedure followed the recommendations of Deyes (1972), namely, reading the text three times:

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[1] This paper is Chapter VIII of my *Constraints on error variables in grammar: Bilingual misspelling orthographies.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1984.

(1) When the dictation is given, the pupil should listen in order to get a general idea of its content without writing;
(2) When the dictation is to be written, the teacher should divide the text into convenient groups of four or five words each. They must be read, however, as connected groups and not as separate words;
(3) The teacher has to be careful to use the weak forms of *can*, *to*, *at*, *of*, etc., when the context calls for them;
(4) The third reading should be done at the same speed as the first reading, but with breaks at the end of every sentence or two sentences. In this case the students have time to correct a sentence just read without being distracted by the need to listen to the next sentence at the same time.

Since my interest was not only in helping Bernhard overcome his deficiencies in English orthography but also in ascertaining the causes of these deficiencies, Deyes' further recommendation of a fourth reading with the students' having a copy of the correct text in hand was not adopted, since this fourth step would have obviously led to the staggering of the statistics on the conduits d'approche.

The study of vowel and consonant "substitution" (see below) errors is a major part of a larger study of putative "transpositions", errors of addition and omission errors of anticipation and perseveration and orthographic conduits d'approche. The fundamental distinction between errors of substitution, on the one hand, and errors of displacement, transposition, addition and omission, on the other, justifies their being the exclusive subject of discussion in this summary statement of processing strategies, where segments are subordinated to strategies, rather than strategies to segments. Compared with the results of studies of the spelling performance of different categories of monolingual and bilingual learners conducted within an identical framework, the conclusions drawn in these investigations could be used to determine those error types which are characteristic of the class of German learners of English as a whole, could serve as a basis for a general typology of orthographic errors in English made by foreign learners, could contribute to a general theory of orthographic error, take a step in the direction of the study of the acquisition of spelling skills by Germans and bilinguals in general, and as a basis for the development of materials for teaching the structure of English orthography to Germans and others designed to prevent and remediate errors potential and actual (cf. the several recommendations made throughout this study).

Drawing on Chomsky and Halle (1965), we sharply distinguish among three levels of adequacy in the study of errors, the observational, the descriptive, and the explanatory. The first, temporally and logically, entails the observation of a set of deviations between the form produced and the community production norm, noting, for example, that the suffix in *appearence* is spelled with an ⟨e⟩[3], as opposed to the community-normative *appearance*, in which the suffix is spelled with an ⟨a⟩. The second, the description of errors, entails a statement of the correct relationship between the discrepant production and the community norm. In the above example, the second ⟨e⟩ in the deviant production is said to *correspond* to the third ⟨a⟩ in the norm. Notice that it would be incorrect to conceptualize the relationship between deviant ⟨e⟩ and normative ⟨a⟩ as one of *substitution*, since substitution, either conscious or subconscious, implies a processual view according to which normative ⟨a⟩ has been replaced by discrepant ⟨e⟩ which in the instance of a speller unaware of the normative spelling could in principle not be the case. Three reasons occur to us why an analyst might wish to consider an error of the above type an instantiation of a substitution operation. First, observation of the productions in an *independent* corpus in which normative ⟨a⟩ occurs, leading to the norm-centered view that non-normative ⟨e⟩ has been substituted for normative ⟨a⟩. Second, the observation that ⟨e⟩ varies with ⟨a⟩ in the spelling productions of the informant. In the former case, the postulation of ⟨e⟩ as the deviate of ⟨a⟩ violates what has been called the "Independence Principle" (cf. Luelsdorff 1975), resulting in the assignment of a norm-deviate structure, namely ⟨a⟩ → ⟨e⟩, which cannot be justified on the basis of observations of the productions of the informant viewed independently of the community norm. In the latter case, the relationship may be expressed by ⟨a⟩ ~ ⟨e⟩, since the alternation under discussion is to be observed in the protocol for the informant in question. Since our interest in this study is in the nature and causes of deviant productions in the spelling of an incipient German/English bilingual speller who had had exposure to the British English spelling norms of the words he was required to spell in sentences to dictation, i.e. *the mechanisms involved in long- and short-term memory loss*, we view the deviations produced in terms of the processes of the addition, omission, substitution, and displacement of phoneme/grapheme correspondences in the norm as revelatory of the processes of *memory loss*, and in this sense as psychologically real, yielding an insight into the quality and quantity of those processes which should be accorded special attention in programs designed to prevent and remediate spelling errors, without concomitantly claiming that these processes are psychologically real in any sense other than the one intended, for example, that they were still active in the processing of the errors involved at the time the dictations were administered. The complementary, equally viable, approach, is to treat the erroneous products as functions of the application of non-standard GPCs assignable to different sets of processing strategies available to the language user, dispensing entirely, *from this perspective*, with the most misleading labels "substitution", "addition", "omission", "displacement", etc., and the concepts behind them, since, from this latter perspective, the introduction of such notions reflects incredible confusion. The importance of this difference in perspective cannot be overestimated. The third level of adequacy is the explanation of errors, entailing a statement of the cause(s) of the relationships yielded by the descriptive level of adequacy. In English orthography, for example, overgeneralization is fostered by system-internal irregularity such as the one-many phoneme/grapheme correspondence in

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[3] Orthographic represenations are enclosed in angle brackets (⟨ ⟩), autonomus (unless otherwise noted) phonemic representations in slashes (/ /), and phonetic representations in square brackets ([ ]). 'GPC' abbreviates grapheme /phoneme correspondence, 'PGC' phoneme/grapheme correspondence, and an asterisc prefixed to either a GPC or a PGC stands for a noncorrespondence in English or German, depending on the case. The letter+number combinations in parentheses refer to the designations of the examples in the corpus which they follow.

$$/\mathrm{w}/ \dashrightarrow \left\{ \begin{matrix} \langle \mathrm{wh} \rangle \\ \langle \mathrm{w} \rangle \\ . \\ . \\ . \end{matrix} \right\}$$

whose failure to be committed to lexical memory explains why a spelling error of the type ⟨w⟩ for ⟨wh⟩, as in ⟨wich⟩ for ⟨which⟩, occurs. The importance of distinguishing between the description of an error and its explanation, between the mechanism by which it occurs and the cause of its occurrence, has been stressed in the most recent error-analytic literature (Cutler 1981), where it is claimed that statements of cause and statements of mechanism are logically independent and suggested (Cutler 1980) that whereas causes of errors might differ across languages, individuals and occasions, error mechanisms ought to be speaker- and language-universal.

1. *Processing strategies.* We proceed with an examination of the major

types of processing strategies underlying the "substitution" errors in our corpus, using "substitution" in the above-qualified sense, as part of our ongoing attempt to specify the entire set of strategies employed by German learners of English.

1.1 *Letter-naming*. Recapitulating Luelsdorff (1984), letternaming, i.e. pronouncing the names of the letters of the alphabet, e.g. English ⟨a⟩=[ei̯], ⟨e⟩=[Ii̯], ⟨i⟩=[ai̯], ⟨o⟩=[oU̯], ⟨u⟩=[jUu̯], or German ⟨a⟩=[aː], ⟨e⟩=[eː], ⟨i⟩=[iː], ⟨o⟩=[oː], ⟨u⟩=[uː] has been described as one of the devices characteristic of the invented spelling of young children (Read (1971), Schreiber and Read (1980), Cook (1981)) where letter symbols are generated on the basis of preliterate children's phonetic analysis of the spoken word and their knowledge of the written alphabet and letter-names.

We place three conditions on a theory of letter-naming used as a strategy for spelling: (1) that the informant know the names of the letters; (2) that the names of the letters be either identical with, closely approximate, or contain the sounds of the words they are used to represent; and (3) that the letters not correspond to those used in the standard spelling. (If the letters do correspond to those in the standard spelling, it is clearly impossible to distinguish between letter-naming used as a spelling strategy, on the one hand, and letter--sounding used as a spelling strategy, on the other). We view this phenomenon as an overgeneralization of those instances where the names of the letters partially resemble the sounds the letters are used to legitimately represent, hence the abilities to (1) letter name and (2) use letter-naming as a spelling strategy as constituent components of the spelling competence of the normal, fluent writer. Since this relationship is one of similarity between the sound of the letter name and the sound of the words the letter-name or the sequence of letter-names is used to represent, it is echoic. Were this relationship completely regular, whereby the names of the letters were identical with the constituent sounds of the words, or the sounds of the words predictably derivable from the names of the letters, such as appears to be the case, or nearly the case, in Japanese *kana*, the orthography would be optimally echoic.

Clear examples of English letter-naming in the Bernhard corpus include the vowels ⟨a⟩, ⟨e⟩, ⟨i⟩, and ⟨u⟩:

Table 1 English Letter-Naming

Vowel	*Target*	*Attempt*	*Page*
⟨a⟩	paints	pans	A 2 (2)
⟨e⟩	Here	Her	A 6, A 9 (2)
	jeans	jens	A 75
⟨i⟩	likes	liks	A 5
	nine	nin	A 9
⟨u⟩	juice	just	A 20

Unambiguous examples of German letter-naming include the letters ⟨a⟩, ⟨e⟩, ⟨i⟩ and ⟨u⟩:

Table 2 German Letter-Naming

Vowel	*Target*	*Attempt*	*Page*
⟨a⟩	John	Jan	A 14
⟨e⟩	cornflakes	cornfleks	A 2
	eighth	egth	A 11
⟨i⟩	evening	ivening	A 1
	sleeps	shlips	A 5
⟨u⟩	to	tu	A 9
	soup	sup	A 49

Apparently interpretable as examples of either English or German letter-naming are English or German ⟨o⟩, which were prononunced virtually the same by the person administering the dictations:

⟨o⟩	Toast	Tost	A 6
	bones	Bons	A 49

Lax /ɛ/ is misrepresented in 69% of the error tokens by either ⟨a⟩ or ⟨e⟩. The high frequency of ⟨a⟩ appears all the more enigmatic, since *⟨a⟩ → /ɛ/ is not a regular GPC in either English or German. We find a plausible explanation for ⟨a⟩ → /ɛ/ in an *extended* use of the concept of letter-name. Ordinarily, when one speaks of letter-naming used as a spelling strategy (cf. above) one refers to using a letter to represent a sound which is identical to the sound of the name of the letter, justifying the assertion that this phenomenon is based on the equation use=mention, where use is the letter-sound and mention is the letter-name, as in attempt: ⟨spek⟩ for target: ⟨speak⟩ or attempt: ⟨spik⟩ for target: ⟨spike⟩. Were we now to center upon just those articulatory features which the name of the letter ⟨a⟩, i.e. /e/, has in common with the target vowel /ɛ/, i.e. the intersection of the set of features defining /e/ with the set of features defining /ɛ/, thereby arriving at the archisegment /E/, we would find that /ɛ/ would be just as likely to be represented by ⟨a⟩ as would /e/, under a spelling strategy based on letter-naming. We do in fact find ⟨a⟩ → /e/, letter-naming used as a spelling strategy for /e/ (cf. Table 1 above). Succinctly stated, the data (cf. attempt: ⟨whan⟩ for target: ⟨when⟩ (A 78), attempt: ⟨allrady⟩ for target: ⟨already⟩ (A 89), attempt: ⟨thar⟩ for target: ⟨there⟩ (A 19), attempt: ⟨sad⟩ for target: ⟨said⟩ (A 96), attempt: ⟨thar⟩ for target: ⟨their⟩ (A 8) dictate introducing in bilingual contexts the notion of *the place of articulation of a letter-name* as the basis of a spelling strategy in addition to letter-naming proper. This is not to claim that the informant perceptually identifies /ɛ/ with /e/, but that he judges them articulatorily sufficiently similar to assign them identical representations under a letternaming strategy. It is also to claim that vowel similarity judgments assign priority to *place of articulation* (in this case not central) over manner of articulation (in this case tense/lax), yielding the prediction that /e/, for example, will be judged more similar to /ɛ/ than to either /i/ or /I/, a prediction borne out by the fact that ⟨a⟩ is not among the 21 types of misrepresentation of /i/ and /I/, with the sole exception of the lone example ⟨a⟩→/i/ in attempt: ⟨plase⟩ for target: ⟨please⟩ which we analyzed as a slip of the pen (cf. Chapter III, English /i/).

Precisely this abstract sense of letter-naming as a spelling strategy has been attested in studies of children's acquisition of their native orthographies. In an investigation of developmental strategies of spelling competence in primary school children, Beers (1980, pp. 38 - 39), for example, notes three and two stages in the acquisition of short ⟨e⟩=/ɛ/ and short ⟨i⟩=/I/, respectively:

A. Short ⟨e⟩ as in ⟨met⟩
    (1.) ⟨a⟩ for ⟨e⟩ — ⟨gat⟩ for ⟨get⟩
    (2.) ⟨i⟩ for ⟨e⟩ — ⟨wint⟩ for ⟨went⟩
    (3.) correct form
B. Short ⟨i⟩ as in ⟨sit⟩
    (1.) ⟨e⟩ for ⟨i⟩ — ⟨mes⟩ for ⟨miss⟩
    (2.) correct form

where (A1.) and (B1.) confirm place of articulation of letternames as a spelling strategy, which we have referred to above as "abstract" in the sense that its effective utilization entails abstracting away from the tenseness vs. laxness which phonetically differentiates these vowels. Note that (A2.), ⟨wint⟩ for ⟨went⟩, might have constituted a counterexample, since the features distinguishing the letter-name of ⟨i⟩ (=/ay/) and /ɛ/ include that of place of articulation, were it not for our suspicion that ⟨went⟩ is typically pronounced [wĨnt] and not [wɛ̃nt] in this part of the States, i.e. Laurel, Maryland, bordering on the south. Our suspicion is strengthened by the author's report that ⟨many⟩ was spelled ⟨mene⟩, ⟨e⟩ by the author's own account (see above) constituting the first step in the acquisition of the correct orthographic representation for short ⟨i⟩ (=/I/), cf. ⟨mes⟩ for ⟨miss⟩.

Finally, we introduce the notion of a sequence of letternames as a spelling strategy. Not predicted by the interlinguistic transfer theory of error is the representation ⟨ou⟩ for English /ow/, amply in evidence in the error data and exemplified by:

Error Type	*Frequency*	*Target*	*Attempt*	*Page*
⟨ou⟩ for ⟨oa⟩	3x	⟨Goal⟩	⟨Goul⟩	A 66 (2)
⟨o⟩	3x	⟨cold⟩	⟨could⟩	A 76
⟨ow⟩	2x	⟨showed⟩	⟨shoud⟩	A 75 (2)
⟨oCe⟩	1x	⟨clothes⟩	⟨couse⟩	A 78

The transfer theory of error must be modified accordingly so as to include the principle that a native-language grapheme *sequence* may be used to represent a target-language sound even in the presence of native-language single graphemes corresponding to native-language phonemes similar to the target-language single phonemes to be represented should the combined phonetic effect of articulating the names of the graphemes in such a sequence be similar to the target-language sound under representation. Here by "native--language grapheme sequence" we do not mean only a sequence of graphemes adhering to the graphotactic conventions of the native language, such as German ⟨ei, ai⟩, as in ⟨Meister⟩ 'master' and ⟨Kaiser⟩, but also grapheme sequences, impermissible in the native language, whose composite pronunciation function is similar to the foreign language sound under representation such as *⟨ou⟩ in native German vocabulary used as an invented spelling for English [oU], "invented" because although the informant had been exposed to some of the major and minor correspondences of the English secondary vowel pattern ⟨ou/ow⟩, for example, [aU̯] : ⟨mountain⟩, [ʌ] : ⟨cousin⟩, [U] : ⟨could⟩, he had no introduction to the correspondence [oU̯] as in ⟨cantaloup⟩, ⟨shoulder⟩, ⟨poultice⟩, ⟨soul⟩, ⟨thorough⟩, etc.

1.2 *Overgeneralization.* If ⟨X⟩→/Y/ and ⟨Z⟩→/Y/ in the standard orthography, where ⟨X⟩≠⟨Z⟩, the use of ⟨X⟩ for ⟨Z⟩ constitutes an overgeneralization. Attempt: ⟨Mery⟩ for target: ⟨Mary⟩ (A 80) is an overgeneralization of the regular pattern for the representation of the checked alternate of English ⟨e⟩ to environments which intersect with those in which ⟨e⟩ regularly represents /i/. ⟨or⟩→/ɜ̂/, evidenced in attempt: ⟨borstey⟩ for target: ⟨birthday⟩ (A 9 (2)), must be an overgeneralization of unstressed ⟨or⟩→/ɜ̂/, such as the agentive, to stressed syllables since the exceptional ⟨or⟩→/ɜ̂/ in stressed syllables is found in words which were not part of the informant's vocabulary, e.g., ⟨borough⟩, ⟨thorough⟩, and ⟨worry⟩. Negative transfer from German is ruled out as a possible explanation for the use of ⟨o⟩ for either ⟨a⟩ or ⟨oh⟩, as in attempt: ⟨wont⟩ for target: ⟨want⟩ (A 6) and attempt: ⟨Jon⟩ for target: ⟨John⟩ (A 14 (2)) because there is no *⟨o⟩→/a/ GPC in German; the errors involved are attributable rather to the overgeneralization of the predictable major pattern for the checked alternate of English ⟨o⟩, as in ⟨conic⟩, ⟨rob⟩, ⟨possible⟩, etc., to cases which are unpredictable. Inasmuch as the misspellings exemplifying the use of ⟨o⟩ for either ⟨a⟩ or ⟨oh⟩ recur, and in the instance of attempt: ⟨wont⟩ for target: ⟨want⟩

(A 6) recur throughout the 14-month dictation period, we are dealing with a conventional error, where we distinguish between (1) *lexical conventional errors* and (2) *rule-governed conventional errors*, the former referring to a consistently incorrect graphemic representation ⟨G_1⟩→/P_1/ whereby there are other representations in the corpus ⟨G_2⟩→/P_1/ where ⟨G_1⟩ ≠ ⟨G_2⟩, the latter referring to the consistently incorrect graphemic representation ⟨G_1⟩ → /P_1/ for all occurrences of /P_1/. The conventional error attempt: ⟨wont⟩ for target: ⟨want⟩ for example, is a lexical conventional error, since /a/ (=P_1) is represented by ⟨a⟩ (=G_2) in attempt: ⟨an⟩ for target: ⟨on⟩. Rule-governed conventional errors are unattested in the author's own field experience, but are in evidence in studies of the early acquisition of native orthographies (cf. Beers 1980 where short ⟨e⟩ (=/ɛ/) is consistently incorrectly represented by ⟨a⟩, as in attempt: ⟨gat⟩ for target: ⟨get⟩).

Regularization and irregularization are special instances of overgeneralization, the former referring to the over-generalization of the predictable pattern to the unpredictable, the latter to the overgeneralization of the unpredictable pattern to the predictable. The qualitatively and quantitatively most frequent misrepresentation of /I/ in our corpus consists in the use of ⟨i⟩ for ⟨o⟩, ⟨a⟩, ⟨e⟩ and ⟨iCe⟩, as in attempt: ⟨wimen⟩ for target: ⟨women⟩ (A 55), attempt: ⟨sausitches⟩ for target: ⟨sausages⟩ (A 56), attempt: ⟨pritty⟩ for target: ⟨pretty⟩ (A 75 (2)), and attempt: ⟨givs⟩ for target: ⟨gives⟩. We interpret all of these instances of ⟨i⟩-representation, with the exception of attempt: ⟨wimen⟩ for target: ⟨women⟩, as regularizations to the checked alternate representations of the major pattern for the vowel /I/, which, like the remainder of the primary vowel representations, corresponds to its checked alternate when followed by (1) a functionally compound consonant unit, e.g., ⟨x, dg⟩, (2) a cluster of consonant units, e.g., ⟨—nn, —lth⟩ (⟨sausitches, pritty⟩) or (3) a word-final consonant unit or units (⟨givs⟩). ⟨women⟩, analyzable into at least two morphemes, does not follow the pattern for the free alternate pronunciation of a primary spelling unit in monomorphemic words, in which case it would be pronounced [wóU̲mən], is hence unique in its spelling. The informant's ⟨wimen⟩ is a closer approximation to its pronunciation, and ⟨wimmen⟩ would have been even closer, since, as noted above, the checked pronunciation occurs before wordinternal *clusters*. Remarkable about the total set of misrepresentations of [e] is the fact that they are not restricted to misrepresentations of the unpredictable cases, 1/3, (17/51) misspelling the regular representation ⟨aCe⟩, for example, attempt: ⟨leate⟩ for target: ⟨late⟩. We thus note a strong tendency to *irregularize* the regular cases in addition to the intuitively more anticipatable but weaker tendency to regularize the irregular cases, for example, attempt: ⟨stake⟩ for target: ⟨steak⟩. Interestingly enough, this latter strategy is restricted to the regularization of ⟨ea⟩, suggesting the notion of a regularization-prone orthograhphic representation, but leaving unexplained why some irregular orthographic representations should be more regularization-prone than others. One hypothesis which readily suggests itself is that there is an inverse relationship between regularization-proneness and frequency of irregular spelling-type, but the testing of this hypothesis lies beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say, pending detailed investigation of this question, that /e/, together with /ε/, is a *minor* correspondence of the secondary vowel pattern ⟨ea⟩, the major correspondence being /i/, while the major correspondence of both ⟨ei/ey⟩ and ⟨ai/ay⟩ is /e/. The hypothesis predicts that words of the type ⟨break⟩, ⟨great⟩, ⟨steak⟩, and ⟨yea⟩, containing the minor correspondence ⟨ea⟩ → /e/, will be more frequently regularized to sequences containing ⟨aCe⟩ than words of the type ⟨abeyance⟩, ⟨obey⟩, ⟨reign⟩, and ⟨veil⟩, on the one hand, and ⟨bait⟩, ⟨day⟩, ⟨player⟩, and ⟨wait⟩, on the other, containing the major correspondences ⟨ei/ey⟩, ⟨ai/ay⟩ → /e/, respectively.

Two further special cases of overgeneralization we term "simplification" and "complication", the former referring to the use of a major primary vowel pattern for a major secondary vowel pattern, the latter to the use of a major secondary vowel pattern for a major primary vowel pattern. Note that simplification and complication are not to be equated with regularization and irregularization, respectively, since both simplification and complication are regular, referring as they do to *major* patterns. The major correspondences of the secondary vowel patterns ⟨ui⟩ and ⟨oo⟩ are /(j)u/ and /u/, respectively. Hence, we interpret attempt: ⟨juse⟩ for target: ⟨juice⟩ (A 30) and attempt: ⟨Pure⟩ for target: ⟨Poor⟩ (A 92) as simplifications consisting in the assimilation of major secondary vowel patterns to a major primary vowel pattern. Of the error types characteristic of the misrepresentations of /ow/ we attribute the use of ⟨oCe⟩ for ⟨oa⟩, as in attempt: ⟨Prarkrode⟩ (A 32) for target: ⟨Park Road⟩ to the overgeneralization of the major correspondence of the primary vowel pattern to the major correspondence of the secondary vowel pattern, hence to simplification, and the use of ⟨oa⟩ for ⟨oCe⟩, as in attempt: ⟨cload⟩ for target: ⟨clothes⟩ (A 78) to the converse, i.e., the overgeneralization of the major correspondence of the secondary vowel pattern to the major correspondence of the primary vowel pattern, hence to complication. ⟨f⟩ for ⟨gh⟩, as in attempt: ⟨laft⟩ for target: ⟨laughed⟩ (A 89), is a simplification — one letter for two — and a regularization — the representation of /f/ by regular ⟨f⟩, rather than irregular ⟨gh⟩.

1.3 *Transfer*. Our error corpus is replete with examples which support the transfer theory of error, which we regard as a necessary but by no means sufficient theory of errors encountered in the target language competence and performance of bi- and multilinguals (see below). We present several examples in the domain of vowel and consonant-letter substitution errors which support the transfer theory of error, and an extended example of a consonant error which does not. Several of the examples are illustrative of the "collaboration", or, better, "collusion", of several strategies held to account for the erroneous output.

35% of the misspellings of English /i/, namely, ⟨i⟩ → /i/, as in attempt: ⟨Hi⟩ for target: ⟨He⟩ (A 36), attempt: ⟨wir⟩ for target: ⟨We're⟩ (A 70), attempt: ⟨filds⟩ for target: ⟨fields⟩ (A 7), attempt: ⟨chise⟩ for target: ⟨cheese⟩ (A 49), and attempt: ⟨lori⟩ for target: ⟨lorry⟩ (A 55), we interpret as resulting from the misemployment of the German GPC ⟨i⟩ → /iː/ transfer strategy, as in ⟨dir⟩: [diːR] 'to you' or ⟨mir⟩: [miːR] 'to me', in English or misemploying the strategy of German letter-naming — the name of the German letter ⟨i⟩ is [iː] — in English, not excluding the possibility of these two strategies conspiring. A further 12% of the misspellings of English /i/, as in attempt: ⟨bie⟩ for target: ⟨be⟩ (A 95) and attempt: ⟨kiep⟩ for target: ⟨keep⟩ (A 34) to the negative transfer of the GPC ⟨ie⟩ → /iː/ from German.

Renderings of ⟨i⟩ by ⟨e⟩ for /I/, as in attempt: ⟨thes⟩ for target: ⟨this⟩ (A 6) and attempt: ⟨sex⟩ for target: ⟨six⟩ (A 17) although very few in number, are of theoretical interest. Since they are related to attempt: ⟨wiesit⟩ for target: ⟨visit⟩ (A 43), they will be discussed together. It is informally widely noted that English orthographic ⟨i⟩ is frequently pronounced [iː] by beginning German learners of English. This we trace to the fact that ⟨i⟩ is pronounced [iː] in a few frequent German monosyllabic words, e.g., ⟨dir⟩: [diːR] and ⟨mir⟩: [miːR] glossed as above. Reading English as though it were German thus results in a pronunciation of ⟨this⟩ and ⟨will⟩ containing [iː], and this is indeed the way in which the informant pronounced these words, supporting our repeated observation that spelling errors cannot be understood unless the informants' actual pronunciations are taken into consideration as opposed to the standard pronunciation norms. Note that there is nothing necessary about the ⟨i⟩ → [iː] pronunciation in German, since ⟨i⟩ is also articulated [I], namely before two consonants, as in ⟨Kinder⟩: [kÍndəR] 'children' and in monosyllables, in fact most monosyllables, as in ⟨mit⟩: [mIt] 'with' and ⟨in⟩: [In] 'in', so that the negative transfer of ⟨i⟩ → [iː] is the exercise of just one of two options. The pronunciations [ziːs] for ⟨this⟩ and [viːl] for ⟨will⟩ we thus derive from German letter-naming and/or letter-sounding as a pronunciation strategy and the misspellings ⟨thes⟩ and ⟨well⟩ for ⟨this⟩ and ⟨will⟩ from English letter-naming as a spelling strategy. The misspelling attempt: ⟨wiesit⟩ for target: ⟨visit⟩ is relevant inasmuch as it is an unambiguous piece of orthographic evidence for the fact that there exists a German spelling-pronunciation in English words corresponding to the standard pronunciation [I]. The important question of which factors, if any, enable one to predict whether [I] will be correctly spelled, or misspelled as a product of English letter-naming based on German letter-naming/sounding in a given case, must, for lack of an adequate understanding of the processes involved, remain unanswered.

⟨t⟩ is most frequently misrepresented by ⟨d⟩, and then only post-tonically: ⟨gardengad⟩ for ⟨garden gate⟩ (A 9), ⟨jamtords⟩ for ⟨jamtorts⟩ (A 11), ⟨god⟩ for ⟨got⟩ (A 32 (2)), ⟨frond⟩ for ⟨front⟩ (A 44), ⟨mead⟩ for ⟨meat⟩ (A 51), ⟨wrid⟩ for ⟨write⟩ (A 61), etc. We posit the combined effect of two processes in order to explain this all-pervasive post-tonic voicing: (1) the negative transfer of the German rule of syllable-final obstruent devoicing to English and (2) orthographic hypercorrection consisting in the voiced misrepresentation of obstruents which are devoiced in standard. In order to show that the German rule of syllable-final obstruent devoicing is operant in the informant's English, we point to the observations that (1) standard English syllable-final obstruents are often phonetically devoiced and (2) this devoicing is very frequently reflected in the informant's English misspelling of standard voiced obstruents by letters corresponding to voiceless, e.g., ⟨picturekat⟩ for ⟨picture card⟩ (A 9), ⟨fint⟩ for ⟨find⟩ (A 11 (2)), ⟨salet⟩ for ⟨salad⟩ (A 57), ⟨pont⟩ for ⟨pound⟩ (A 51), etc. Representations of the type voiceless consonant for voiced are in fact so frequent that the negative transfer of the German rule of syllable-final obstruent devoicing should be regarded as the primary process underlying the misrepresentation of the English voiced obstruents. The hypercorrection is explained by the informant's accommodating himself to his teacher's corrections of his misrepresentation of voiced consonantism in pronunciation and spelling. It is conceivable that even at least some of the correct representations of the English voiced obstruents originate via this route — devoicing then hypercorrection — resulting in the correct representations for the wrong reasons.

Of those misspellings of the past tense which are most plausible — ⟨Vt⟩, ⟨d⟩, and ⟨t⟩ — all are represented in the data:

⟨it⟩ for ⟨ed⟩: ⟨paintit⟩ for ⟨painted⟩ (A 52)
⟨d⟩ for ⟨ed⟩: ⟨colld⟩ for ⟨called⟩ (A 71)
⟨t⟩ for ⟨ed⟩: ⟨laught⟩ for ⟨laughed⟩ (A 75 (2))

The overwhelming majority of these misrepresentations may be accounted for by either phonetic spelling (⟨Watcht⟩ for ⟨watched⟩ (A 76)) or phonetic spelling subsequent to the negative transfer of the German rule of syllable-final obstruent devoicing (⟨inveitet⟩ for ⟨invited⟩ (A 78)). It is the rare exception such as ⟨Parkd⟩ for ⟨parked⟩ (A 68) which cannot be completely accounted for by either. ⟨Parkd⟩ reflects only partial application of phonetic spelling, namely the omission of ⟨e⟩ from preterite ⟨-ed⟩.

We point to a parallel between the misrepresentation of the preterite discussed above and a category of non-standard spelling which frequently appears in the writing of native speakers in kindergarten and the first and second grades, namely the use of ⟨t⟩ to render ⟨ed⟩ in the past tense form of certain verbs, namely just those which undergo vowel deletion and regressive assimilation (cf. Luelsdorff 1969), as in ⟨likt⟩ for ⟨liked⟩, ⟨lockt⟩ for ⟨looked⟩, ⟨pikt⟩ for ⟨picked⟩, etc. (Gentry and Henderson (1980:118)).

Inasmuch as the regular correspondence of ⟨t⟩ and ⟨d⟩ are sounds which are contained in their letter-names, i.e. [t] in [tiː] and [d] in [diː], respectively, the phenomenon referred to above as "phonetic spelling" is also an example of letter-naming — phonetic spelling, letter-naming, and obstruent devoicing conspiring to yield the misrepresenting product.

We proceed to an extended example of a consonant error which the transfer theory of error does not explain, namely, the non-transfer of the German rule of consonant-doubling. In German the shortness of vowels is often designated by the doubling of the following consonant, as in *Pfiff* 'whistle', *Metall* 'metal', *Egge* 'harrow', *Gewitter* 'storm', *Paddel* 'paddle', *Schrott* 'scrap-metal', *Etappe* 'stage', etc. Were this German regularity transferred to English, it would facilitate spellings in which short vowels are followed by geminates and interfere with spellings in which short vowels are followed by single consonants. Since all of the examples of ⟨t⟩ for ⟨tt⟩ involve instances in which ⟨t⟩ is preceded by a *short* vowel, as in ⟨beter⟩ for ⟨better⟩, ⟨leters⟩ for ⟨letters⟩, ⟨litel⟩ for ⟨little⟩, however, we clearly cannot attribute these misspellings to the negative transfer of the German consonant doubling rule. Furthermore, since the misspellings *recur* and *persist* throughout the entire duration of the dictations, they also cannot be considered unmonitored slips of the pen. In view of these latter two features, recurrence and persistence, we relegate them to the category of conventional errors.

If erroneous consonant singling cannot be accounted for by negative transfer of the German rule of consonant-doubling, neither can erroneous consonant-doubling. The 4 cases of ⟨mm⟩ for ⟨m⟩, e.g., ⟨hammster⟩ for ⟨hamster⟩ (A 5) and ⟨Kammara⟩ for ⟨camera⟩ (A 11 (2)), may not be traced to the transfer of the German rule of consonant-doubling which requires the doubling of a consonant in stems ending in a consonant if the preceding vowel is short and stressed (⟨Scheffel⟩ 'bushel', ⟨Lappen⟩ 'rag'), except ⟨k⟩ and ⟨z⟩, which in such cases are written ⟨ck⟩ and ⟨tz⟩, respectively (⟨Kuckuck⟩ 'cuckoo', ⟨Schwätzer⟩ 'gossip'), although there are exceptions (cf. Schmidt and Volk (1976:18—19), and even exceptions not among those listed as such (e.g., ⟨Kanne⟩ 'can', ⟨Wanne⟩ 'tub'), because more than one stem consonant follows ⟨m⟩ in ⟨hamster⟩ and ⟨camera⟩ ends in a vowel. As in the case of ⟨mm⟩ for ⟨m⟩, the instances of ⟨nn⟩ for ⟨n⟩ also cannot be explained by the negative transfer of the consonant-doubling rule from German, since, in addition to cases which meet the structural description of the rule and are doubled (e.g., ⟨runns⟩ for ⟨runs⟩ (A 11)), there are cases which do not meet the structural description of the rule but which are doubled anyway (e.g., ⟨evenning⟩ for ⟨evening⟩ (A 2), ⟨dinning⟩ for ⟨dining⟩ (A 2)) and cases which do meet the structural description of the rule but are not doubled (e.g., ⟨runing⟩ for

⟨running⟩ (A 72). The examples of ⟨nn⟩ for ⟨n⟩ do however amply evidence total cognatization (see below), e.g. ⟨winn⟩ for ⟨win⟩ (A 65), cf. German *gewinnen* 'win', ⟨beginn⟩ for ⟨begin⟩, cf. German *beginnen* 'begin', ⟨Kann⟩ for ⟨can⟩, cf. German *kann* 'can', and the identification of English ⟨when⟩ with German ⟨wenn⟩ 'if', even though they differ in meaning.

By orthographic "cognatization" we understand the partial or total orthographic assimilation of a target cognate to the corresponding native language cognate. The 4 occurrences of ⟨ch⟩ for ⟨gh⟩ in ⟨lauchs⟩ for ⟨laughs⟩ exemplify partial cognatization where the misrepresentation of the target is a partial recapitulation of the spelling of the corresponding native-language cognate cf. German ⟨laucht⟩ 'laughs'. The 2 occurrences ⟨shwans⟩ for ⟨swans⟩ (A 76) and ⟨schwam⟩ for ⟨swam⟩ (A 89 (2)) exhibit at once partial cognatization, with the English spelling ⟨sh⟩ of /š/ in the German initial cluster /šv/ and negative transfer of the German initial cluster /šv/, there being no initial /šw/-cluster in German. ⟨Dezember⟩ for ⟨December⟩ (A 66), on the other hand, instantiates total cognatization, cf. German *Dezember* 'December' as does ⟨Preis⟩ for ⟨Prize⟩, cf. German *Preis* 'prize' (A 17). ⟨ä⟩ in attempt: ⟨Bäter⟩ for target: ⟨better⟩ clearly reflects negative transfer from German, where ⟨ä⟩ → /ɛ:/, as in *Bär* 'bear'. We do not regard ⟨Bäter⟩ as an instance of cognatization of English ⟨better⟩ to German ⟨besser⟩, however, since (1) adjectives are not capitalized in German unless they are substantivized or occur in sentence-initial position, (2) German ⟨besser⟩ is written with an ⟨e⟩ in the stressed syllable, not an ⟨ä⟩, and (3) cognatization would have entailed a representation with ⟨-s-⟩ or ⟨-ss-⟩ for English ⟨-tt-⟩. On the contrary, it rather dramatically illustrates what might be termed "decognatization", reflecting as it does a dissimilation of the standard representations of the respective cognates, and instantiates transfer only insofar as it contains the German vowel ⟨ä⟩. The case of attempt: ⟨prais⟩ for target: ⟨prize⟩ (A 14 (2)), where the vowel spelling in ⟨prais⟩ is the vowel spelling of neither the native nor the target representation, while the final consonant is that of the native, underscores the gradient, rather than categorial nature of cognatization as a processing strategy.

2. *Summary and conclusion.* Both orthography and the study of orthographic error have been grossly neglected in the linguistic literature, possibly traceable to the unjustified absence of an orthographic component in the more popular theories of grammar.

The major processing strategies are grouped as follows where A=Attempt and T=Target and::=corresponds to:

Transfer

I Intralinguistic
  A. English Letter Naming

        1. Articulation of English Letter Name:
           A: ⟨Her⟩:: T: ⟨Here⟩.
        2. Place of Articulation of an English Letter Name:
           A: ⟨mess⟩:: T: ⟨miss⟩
        3. Sequence of English Letter Names:
           A: ⟨could⟩:: T: ⟨cold⟩
    B. Regularization: A: ⟨pritty⟩:: T: ⟨pretty⟩
    C. Irregularization: A: ⟨leate⟩:: T: ⟨late⟩
    D. Simplification: A: ⟨juse⟩:: T: ⟨juice⟩
    E. Complication: A: ⟨cload⟩:: T: ⟨clothes⟩

II Interlinguistic
    A. German Letter Naming
        1. Articulation of German Letter Name:
           A: ⟨cornfleks⟩:: T: ⟨cornflakes⟩
        2. Place of articulation of German Letter Name:
           A: ⟨Jam⟩:: T: ⟨John⟩
    B. German GPCs: A: ⟨steschen⟩:: T: ⟨station⟩
    C. Cognatization
        1. Partial: A: ⟨preis⟩:: T: ⟨prize⟩
        2. Total: A: ⟨mußt⟩:: T: ⟨must⟩
    D. Decognatization: A: ⟨schlips⟩:: T: ⟨sleeps⟩

Although the corpus is replete with examples which support the transfer theory of error, which is thus a necessary subtheory of the theory of constraints on bi- and multilingual spelling errors, it is by no means sufficient.

Prideaux (to appear) develops the thesis that a set of factors has emerged within psycholinguistics which reflects and highlights the earlier Praguian concern with functional considerations, in particular, that the Prague School notion of "cooperation of means" has developed independently within psycholinguistics, and "that such 'means" as the psychological analogues of communicative dynamism, the role of context, and the importance of grammatical structure, along with specific processing heuristics, all interact as the language user goes about tasks of language comprehension and production". In the above, we have cited several independently motivated examples of how spelling strategies and strategies related to spelling conspire in written bilingual production, confirming the Praguian functionalist credo of the cooperation of means, the functional unity of orthographic rules.

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DANISH AND SLAVIC PHRASEOLOGY
CONTRIBUTIONS TO AN ANALYSIS OF IDIOMATICS ON A CONTRASTIVE BASIS

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1. The purpose of this treatise is to throw light on phraseology in Danish and Czech, and to a certain degree in Slavic languages in general. We have considered the possibility of eliminating the comparison (the stylistical comparison). This subject, therefore, is not described in detail, and a separate study is planned for the type of comparison which is based on the comparative conjunction *jako* in Czech and *som* in Danish. For this reason the "jako-som-problem" receives less attention in the present study.

The material consists of printed collections of phraseologisms (to a lesser degree this applies to the Danish material) and our own observations; Hašek's famous novel about Švejk for instance contains a large number of this trope (the comparison) as well as other phraseological expressions, but space permits only brief quotations.

Our method is the contrastive; observations in one language are at each stage confronted with corresponding ones in the other language, our aim being to point out resemblances and differences Danish/Czech, with glances now and then at Russian and Polish. The standpoint is linguistic, aiming at a structural analysis. Semantic problems are not predominant.

The observations are usually made first in the foreign language, after which the mother tongue is consulted, but this order of presentation is not followed consistently — we shall often be guided by observations in Danish that lead into the problem.

A brief presentation of the concept of phraseology is necessary. Phraseology is not a clearly defined concept. One has a general idea of what it is, but a clear definition has not been achieved. All philologists do not attach the same meaning to the word (apart from the fact that we have in mind partly the learned discipline, partly the total stock of such figures of speech in a given language); some scholars include proverbs and single words, others do not. The investigations in this field are insufficient; indeed, comprehensive works do exist, in older times too, but registrations along firm principles only appear in later decades. The objective is not to establish what phraseology is — we shall confine ourselves to describing the phenomenon and finding characteristic qualities.

A long series of phenomena are usually collected here, as a rule without any precise line of demarcation. They are called figures of speech, sayings, standing expressions, possibly also including proverbs, we meet "feste Redewendungen", expressions, set phrases, stock phrases etc. to mention some frequent designations. And under *mudrosloví* in Czech fall *úsloví, pořekadlo, přísloví,* also "hantýrka" (a word of German origin) about slang and argot. What ties these "expressions" together will be discussed below.

The collective name phraseology is in itself unsatisfactory. In Danish the word *frase* normally means a sequence of insignificant words, a "sheer" stereotyped figure of speech ("empty phrases", "hollow phrases", "mock phrases"), often polite standard formula ending a letter, conventional phrases to fill in the conversation. The grammarian usually demands from a sentence that it contains a verb inflected in tense, though this demand is no longer strictly upheld. But a phraseological expression, quite on the contrary, is very often emotionally loaded, but not necessarily. Thus, the phraseologism does not conceal a *frase* in the sense described for Danish (nor a *phrase* as this word is used by the Transformational grammar) — but the English *phrase* is certainly also used for the Danish *frase*, a stereotyped figure of speech. For the sake of completeness: the *frase* as used in shorthand theory also differs from our *frase*. It is understood as a group of words which "actually" stand close together, no question being asked as to why they do.[1]

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[1] Space allows only for brief remarks (without systematization) on the stenographical phrase as this term is viewed by theoreticians of stenography. Aage Alvin in his *Lærebog i dansk fagstenografi* (1946), states for instance phrases (in that sense) of the type i-besiddelse-af, som-svar-på, vi-tillader-os 'in-reply-to etc.', phrases based on nouns: Deres-brev etc. 'your-letter' etc., or with indication of time of the type i-den-sidste-tid, lit. 'in-the--last-time'; other cases include i-det-hele-taget 'generally-speaking' etc. Also the non--expert no doubt must find these phrases natural. Phrases consisting of pronoun and auxiliary verb are more remarkable (p. 38), such as vi-har, har-vi, der-er 'we-have, have-we, there-is etc.'. — Aage Alvin uses the term "båndfraser" 'band-phrases' denoting grouping of three words; the two first words as well as the two last words are written as one word according to the rules of the textbook, but in these cases they are united in one outline: idet-vi-er 'since-we-are', jeg-har-ikke 'I-have-not' etc. This is joined by — as described in the continuation of the textbook (1948), p. 46 — a long series of words written in one word. Examples include i-denne-forbindelse 'in-this-connection', går-ud-på, grund--til-at, lade-sig-gøre, det-har-vist-sig etc.

Thus the word phraseology is not distinct, and notoriously it throws the thought off the scent. The Russian dictionary of linguistic termini gives in a parenthesis a long series of words replacing frazeologičeskaja edinica (sometimes shortened FE). They are not repeated here, we shall just point to the fact that some of them include the word automatisized, in the same way idiom, lexicalized and indivisible, further improper (compound) and un-free (not-free) sequence of words, and standing compound (ustojčivoe slovosočetanie).

Fraseologia according to the Polish terminological dictionary is *dział leksykologii* badający ustalone w języku zwroty.

There is something to be said in favour of working in the word *idiom* (we would then be in accordance with certain philologists writing in English), but other solutions must be considered: the word idiom may perhaps be reserved for the single word in figurative meaning (the phraseologism is not a single word).

Idiomatics raise boundless problems. This is clearly seen from a "report" (we shall refer to it as Tezisy) of 1961, written by seven Russian linguists who in concise articles state their attitude to the tasks connected with the creation of a Russian phraseological dictionary; Tezisy contain a shrewd analysis of the essence and the problems of phraseologism. (Russian phraseological dictionaries were published in 1966 and 1967, and a very valuable ***Frazeologičeskij slovar' russkogo jazyka***, Pod redakciej A. I. Molotkova, appeared later, its third edition dated 1978).

Almost twenty years after Tezisy, the Polish philologist Andrzej Bogusławski maintains (1979) that the problems of phraseology are far from solved, the limits of phraseology have not been drawn up. His work contains a penetrating investigation of phraseologism; he lays down its formula (first a simple formula, then he extends the formula and makes it more precise); especially he tackles heavy theoretical problems of the transplantation of

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Pitman's *Phonographic phrase book* from the beginning of the 20th century states a great number of English words written in one word in shorthand.

Stenografija. Učebnik dlja srednej školy (Moskva 1952) gives several examples of words written in one outline. Let us mention a few of them (p. 189): rabočie-massy, narodno-echozjajstvo, rešitel'naja-bor'ba, and (p. 191) v-nastojaščee-vremja, po-krajnej-mere, tak-čto, blagodarja-ėtomu, za-poslednij-god, (193) v-dannyj-period, (194) govorit-o-tom-čto, v-silu-togo-čto etc.

The merit of Alvin's Danish theory of phrases (the shorthand phrase) is the distinct systematization (the division by number of members, by the grammatical view, by the character of the subject matter discussed).

The phenomenon is only vaguely illustrated in B. Trnka's *Pokus o vědeckou teorii a praktickou reformu těsnopisu. Facultas philosophica universitatis Carolinae pragensis. Sbírka pojednání a rozprav. XX*. Praha 1937.

Obviously, the phrase in this sense does not concern our examination, but it should be emphasized that an investigation into the shorthand phrases is of invaluable importance to linguistic pedagogues (practising the spoken language).

these expressions from one language into another (the problem of the bilingual dictionaries).

A recent study by Brita Lønstrup, Denmark, on denotation and connotation in many cases touches our problem.

The present work is especially indebted to Jaroslav Zaorálek's big collection (1947) of popular figures of speech in the Czech language (abbreviated Zaorálek or Z).

Before proceeding to characterizing the phraseologism we might put the question: can we beforehand cut right through the total mass of phraseological expressions? From a sociolinguistic point of view one could ask if idiomatics belong to a certain layer of society — but it is seen immediately that phraseologism belongs to the common language. The speaker uses these expressions without reflection, without hesitation, the vast common language includes them in a normal way: phraseologism, in fact, must be current and universally known (is institutionalized); phraseologism is "open", the property of everybody, public, and at the same time it can be called "closed" in the sense that a given linguistic community (or part of a community) may possess its own "private" expressions, barring other citizens. A married couple may have their personal figures of speech — they do not become phraseologisms; phraseologisms are not born here.

The phraseologism may be value loaded; it is not necessarily emotionally "coloured" etc., and you cannot indicate one definite stylistical effect. A collection of idiomatics should include all strata of the language; the language of science, for instance, is not left out. Here you will also meet expressions as "holde øje med", 'keep an eye on', "give sig i kast med", 'tackle' (a problem) etc. An expression as "kunne noget på fingrene", 'he has it at his finger tips', is hardly coloured in any sense — although it may give way to "beherske til fuldkommenhed", 'master perfectly', "være fuldt fortrolig med", 'be completely familiar with' etc.

And yet we are facing a paradox: it could be said that a polarization takes place. Typically, phraseologism belongs to poetical language (the comparison and other tropes are often of great beauty), though we have difficulties in regarding the individual figure of speech as a phraseologism — and just as typical is the phraseologism in quite common language, the "popular" everyday language, with its countless expressive words and word connections, often vulgarisms; here is seen affinity to slang and speech-play, linguistical nonsense.

The language "in the middle", the everyday language, is constantly stamped by phraseology — but official language may reasonably be said to be poorer in idiomatic expressions; the speaker will be reticent with regard to images, figurative language and paraphrases that variegate and animate the style. This also applies to legal language and to the language used by politicians, who cannot with impunity adorn their speech with a wealth of phraseologisms.

This does not prevent expressions such as the Danish "få noget op på skinner", literally 'get something up on the rails' (succeed in starting a project) from occurring in recent political debates. Such expressions may be accepted by the spoken language. We must, of course, stress the fact that phraseologism is not sub-standard essentially.

The division should obviously be made along other lines. Something seems to show that the trope, the metaphorical expression, in one stylistical layer has a different character, a different substance than in another stylistical layer, and again we stress that phraseologism is not sub-standard. We have then in mind the metaphor, the euphemism, the comparison etc. Each of them can to the same degree arouse poetical and vulgar effect. But what we have perceived is a quality of the trope — a division has not been made which defines phraseologism. Phraseologism is one manifestation of figurative language, the trope is another (overlapping occurs). It is a decisive factor that the comparison (for example) of the individual writer, is not changed into a phraseologism, not even if it is incorporated into the familiar quotations, in German called "geflügelte Worte", because we demand universal use and anonymous origin of phraseologism. What phraseology covers is discussed below.

Perhaps we should operate with two kinds of phraseologism (they have no formal marks): 1) such as, without reservations, belong to the common language, every speaker uses them and takes an indifferent attitude to them, they are not value loaded, they are indispensable, they are taken for granted, they cannot be replaced by a "rigid" or "better" expression, or rather, you feel that there is no reason to reject them in favour of an expression that is "nicer", more "respectable", "more correct". Examples include *holde øje med* 'keep an eye on', *have for øje* 'have an eye for', or *et håb tændtes* lit. 'a hope was kindled'. And 2) phraseologism which "spices" the speech and might be exchanged with "nicer" expressions. Or consider *have krammet på* 'have somebody under one's thumb', which perhaps gives way to *master*, *have power over*; or *tage under sine vinger* 'take somebody under one's wing' which the speaker will possibly reject in favour of *beskytte* 'protect'; we cannot go too deep into this problem here, let us just mention *stikke halen mellem benene* 'run away with one's tail between one's legs', which the speaker might replace by "take a neutral attitude", "omit protesting", "withdraw from the battle" etc.

Later on, analyzing the contents of the linguistic sign, we shall come to the view that the demarcation between phraseology and non-phraseology is closely connected with the division of the contents of the sign into two parts, one of which motivates phraseology.

2. Though we cannot with any certainty define phraseologism, we can describe it and note its characteristic features. What ties the phraseological expressions together, is the *image*. Jan Amos Komenský says, as we learn from Zaorálek, in his introduction to *Moudrost starých Čechů*, published in the middle

of the XVII century: "přísloví neb připovídka jest krátké a mrštné propovědění, v němž se jiné praví a jiné rozumí", and a few lines later "pro jadrnost rozumu, aby ..."; thus, already Komenský points at the two characteristic features: the phraseologism gives us an image and a key expression, a frank and drastic expression that ornaments and spices speech – though not in the sense that the phraseologism is necessarily sub-standard or humoristic.

Phraseology is a swarm of commonplaces, colloquialisms, idioms, sayings, figures of speech, "standing expressions" – it is interesting that Czech *mudrosloví* is repeated in the Danish "visdomsord", 'words of wisdom', as a collective concept; let us briefly add some Danish termini without interpretation: fyndsprog, tankesprog, lærdomme, folkeord, skæmtesprog, rimsprog and slagord (without systematization, the talk is about apophthegms, maxims, popular language, jesting language, rhymed sayings, slogans); further levnetsregler and kjernetanker appear (see Kjær and Holbek 1972), enlightening rules for conduct, thoughts of the highest importance for human beings.

As to Czech language, Fr. L. Čelakovský collected (in the middle of the last century) such expressions under the designation pořekadla (přísloví 'proverbs' being kept apart from pořekadla). We are facing a confusing, diffuse mass of expressions, the common feature of which is the origin in the image – the task of posterity was to clarify them and to find distinctive designations for the types. What is central for Zaorálek (p. VI in his introduction) are the word connections for which the designation "rčení" slowly stabilized itself ("talemåde" seems to render that word in Danish). These rčení partly have the most original shape – the comparison. An example is *zelený jako sedma*, which is understood as 'very pale (with anger, but possibly cold, too)'.[2] Partly they have the shape *sedět na dvou židlích*, which needs no translation. The remaining types, we are told, come into being via a shortening of the rčení-type. – In the present study, cognate points of view necessitate consigning the comparison to an independent article.

But the *image* is not simply identical with idiomatic expression – the poetic image, for instance, is not comprised of idiomatics. Danish *æsel* 'donkey', or *vatnisse*, lit. 'pixie of cotton wool' used to characterize a person, does not change the expression, we suppose, into an idiom (this is in dispute). "Din ko" etc. (cow is used as an invective, and the Danish words say "your cow!" here) are assigned to phraseology by Lønstrup. (We do not agree. The author of this article has written a brief study on the structure of invectives in Danish and Slavic in *Mål og Mæle 3*. 1979). Apparently, we can say that phraseology is equal to transferred, figurative meaning — but transferred, figurative meaning, in stylistics called *translatio*, does not indicate phraseologism.

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[2] The expression *zelený jako sedma* is not easily seen through, literally it says, we suppose, "green like a seven" (the figure 7). *Sedma* is 'seven, a seven'. Is there any connection with the symbolism of the seven? Does Sedmibolestná Panna Maria (see SSJČ) throw light on the matter?

We must bear in mind that the image does indeed appear in the comparison. This is especially the domain of the image, but we meet it only in *comparatum* (the second member of the comparison), seeing that *comparandum* (first member of the comparison) is the notion of reality, cf. *høj som en flagstang* 'tall as a flagstaff', where *høj* is actually *høj* 'tall'. (It is different if we talk about the logical comparison: *han taler som en præst* (and he is actually a priest)).

This dominating role of the image leads us into stylistics, which precisely deal with the metaphoric language. The two disciplines to a certain extent operate with common conceptions — look at the metaphor, the euphemism, the comparison etc. — but each of them views things from its own starting point, from aesthetic and from grammatical points of view. Stylistics above all deal with literary, written texts, phraseology equally deals with spoken and non-literary language; again we bear in mind that the phraseological expression is not sub-standard.

The image (in phraseologism) is worn, becomes trite, it may degenerate and become a cliché. Lønstrup 1978 does not exclude the possibility that a **bolen kak byk* might come into being — replacing *zdorov kak byk*, seeing that a townsman hardly associates anything in reality with the word *byk*. (In a separate article we discuss the incalculable relationship between comparandum and comparatum).

In Czech the worn image may be illustrated by *sám na sebe plést* (or *koupit*) *karabáč* in the sense 'cause sufferings for oneself, furnish the enemy with arms', almost corresponding to the drastic Danish *lave et ris til sin egen røv* 'make a rod for one's own arse'.[3]

We have emphasized that the image puts its stamp on the phraseologism, but nothing prevents self contradiction in the expression, the image may be false, ironical, a caricature (in German Zerrbild). Let us mention *I er rigtignok et par kønne planter!*, where the words denote "beautiful plants", but the meaning is 'You are indeed naughty, you behave badly'. Further *klart som blæk*, lit. 'clear as ink' (from German we know *klar wie Butter*). Or the second member may be diametrically opposed to the first as in *bleg som en postkasse* 'pale as a pillar box' (which in Denmark is red).

Can we operate with a logical image at all? This is uncertain. The image is supposed to be incalculable, and it must interest us if the image in certain circumstances is logical. No doubt we often move into the domain which is called speech-play.

Czech examples of the image serving as a caricature are: *chlupatý jako*

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[3] Cf. here remarks of Gunnar Jacobsson (1978) on a certain Russian gross oath which, being often used, becomes hackneyed, bleaches out.

žába (Zaorálek 585) 'fringed, shaggy as a frog' — but the frog is smooth. *Chytrý jako telecí maso* (Z 483) 'wise as veal' demonstrates the positive wise being annulled by comparatum. *Polepší se jako řemen v ohni* (Z 522) '(he) improves like a strap in the fire' (which today must be considered unintelligible) actually says: does not improve. Another case: *těší se jako nahý v kopřivách* 'enjoys himself like the naked in the stinging nettles'.

In phraseology popular wit unfolds tersely and frankly, often with funny exaggerations. People have an eye for speechplay, play on words and puns. Very much to the point is Czech *jít na malou stranu*, which says 'relieve nature' — Malá strana at the same time being the name of a residential quarter in Praha.

In Kjær and Holbek 12 we find *Alting forgås, men aldrig får gås træsko* (mark here the allusion forgås/får gås) with the curious information that everything comes to an end, but geese never wear wooden shoes (nonsense). From other sources we notice *Hellere rig og rask end syg og fattig* 'better rich and healthy than ill and poor', which is sheer nonsense (we cannot even call it pseudo-wisdom).

Let us briefly present the catachresis, the use of incompatible images as Ulla Albeck says (p. 118). Examples include *Tidens tand læger alle sår* 'the tooth of time heals all wounds'. We cannot go deeper into the subject, see keen observations in Lønstrup (1978:28), among them *Han æprer hende på hænder og fødder* 'he carries her on his hands and feet'. It is different with unintentional contaminations of the type *han kæmpede mellem liv og død* 'he fought between life and death', which needs no commentary. Distortions of that kind and cases where proverbs and figures of speech are pieced together are properly listed under speech-play. But at the same time it is not clear if they possibly throw light upon an essential quality of the phraseologism: it must have its definite look, it goes to pieces if changed.

Let us note that phraseologism tolerates linguistical incorrectness, cf. *Ih du godeste!*, an exclamation like 'Oh, dear', but there is no *den godeste bog jeg har læst, only the best book etc.

The views differ much as to what should be registered under phraseologisms. If the framework is wide enough, proverbs, single words and stock phrases may be incorporated — the present study concentrates solely on the latter, the figures of speech, though this creates difficulties.

The superior requirement is that the unit is anonymous — it is created by the people —, that it is universally known and used. This does not debar occasionalisms, which may possibly catch on. An example of comparison created today is *rolig som et glasøje* 'quiet as a glass eye', noticed in Farum (1979). With this nothing is said about its possibilities of becoming a household expression. As mentioned already the private figures of speech of a married couple (or others) are not phraseologisms.

Kjær and Holbek eliminate (p. 15) from the masses of proverbs maxims and aphorisms created by named persons; in the same way, familiar quotations that are difficult to define (the "geflügelte Worte" of the German) as well as quotations. To be sure the student of idiomatics must take up the same attitude, and the present study will also, in principle, keep the proverbs outside the scope of this study. This raises problems, seeing that proverbs and figures of speech may overlap (the contacts are unravelled with acuteness by Kjær and Holbek). Our view is that the proverb is a totality with an unchangeable form, usually it is one whole sentence (yet not necessarily containing a verb, cf. *Bedre sent end aldrig*, saying 'better late than never', or Czech *líná huba, holé neštěstí*; the proverb expresses the philosophy of the people, their experience and wisdom of life, something which is constant and steady, of universal validity, it has a didactic character, whereas the non-proverb (the figure of speech) stems from the imagination of the people and has rather a poetical stamp, it makes the language vivid and has — with certain reservations — stylistical objectives. The figure of speech has been called building materials to be put into varying contexts; it can be changed grammatically and sometimes be negated — again we make reservations seeing that we regard a rigid mark as an essential mark; the figure of speech will show severe restrictions as to inflection, cf. *jeg tager hatten af for* and only with difficulties *jeg tog hatten af for*, if *tage hatten af for* is taken in the sense 'esteem highly'.

Fragments of proverbs, it seems, must be listed under phraseology. Examples include *komme først til mølle*, or *tomme tønder*, where the continuation is left out; and proverbs that are pieced together belong, we suppose, to speech-play. If an anonymous origin is claimed, fragments of verses must be omitted too (like *Lykken er ikke gods eller guld* quoted without continuation), and likewise lines from plays; the same holds true of allusions, here we have in mind e.g. bits from revues, reference to current debate etc. But such a statement has rather a declarative character; we meet insurmountable difficulties in sorting out non-anonymous figures, in this way the numerous bible quotations, such as *falde blandt røvere* 'fall among thieves' from St. Luke 10,30.

The interesection of proverbial figures of speech (*købe katten i sækken* 'buy a pig in a poke') and proverbial comparisons (*forslå som en skræder i helvede*, lit. 'be sufficient like a tailor in Hell') is described in Kjær and Holbek (1972:17).

The attention is concentrated on what — on an unstable basis — we call figures of speech, "talemåder", "mundheld", 'sayings, saws'. (With regard to the difference between talemåde and mundheld, Ludvig Heiberg says, according to Kjær and Holbek (1972:19), that talemåde becomes mundheld if used constantly by a single person on any occasion). Standing expressions, stock phrases, are also included. The terminological difficulties (a possible demarcation between Danish talemåder, figures of speech and the other types of relevant expressions) naturally also appear in Czech. They will not be treated in detail here; but we have noticed the definitions in *Naše řeč 27*: 206:1. rčení (lexikalisované obrazné spojení slov, 2. pořekadlo (obrazné spojení slov, vyjadřující jistou situaci), 3. úsloví (přechodní útvar mezi rčením a pořekadlem). — Zaorálek has gathered them under rčení; rčení are all obrazná spojení slov, schopná časování, all metaphoric word connections with verbal inflection, even if inflection is limited to certain grammatical tenses or persons.

It is questionable whether oaths constitute phraseologisms: ***Fanden ta' mig***! lit. 'may the Devil take me!', which has no connection with ***Fanden tog ham, havde taget ham.*** We shall not pay much attention to this detail. The position of invectives is questionable too (we have touched upon that above). For example *Ko*!, which has a parallel in Czech, whereas the specific Danish type *Din ko*!, lit. 'your cow!' is unknown. This type of invective is usually considered specifically Danish (or Scandinavian), but let us add that Kr. Sandfeld (1900) found some parallel features in other languages.

Are the counting-out rhymes phraseologisms? A Danish example is ***Ellera sellera sibra sold rip rap bondeknold*** (for '1—2—3—4 etc.'). We omit them because they cannot be universally known. As to words of command, e.g. *Alle ret*! 'attention!' we also here take the view that they belong to a certain circle of speakers, not the community as a whole.

The prayer is not a phraseologism: *Giv os idag vort daglige brød* certainly has monolith character, but they are the words of Jesus. A fragment *det daglige brød* 'the daily bread' constitutes a phraseological expression (and blasphemous distortions go under speech-play).

Phraseology is not a specific "section" of a language, although we believe that we are able to extract the cases by certain criteria and gather them separately; the expressions are present everywhere in the language (and the fact that they behave in a different way under different circumstances, is mentioned elsewhere). The phraseology has been called one manifestation of the figurative language, the poetic language another manifestation. The tropes and figures of stylistics will probably be met equally in the same degree inside and outside phraseology. (The question of denotation/connotation will be discussed later). Let us regard the metaphor. *Møde en kold skulder*, lit. 'meet a cold shoulder' for facing an unsympathetic attitude (English has "give him the cold shoulder") we without hesitation call a phraseologism; it is different if we call the foliage of autumn the *gold of autumn*. The poet may say *læbernes koral* 'coral of the lips' (which will be treated when we discuss *læber så røde som koral* in our study on the comparison). It should be mentioned that the Polish *Słownik terminologii językoznawczej* (1968) under Metafora says usta czerwone jak koral (podobieństwo) wobec *koral ust* (metafora). We cannot call *læbernes koral* idiomatic, in the sense of phraseologism; most often the metaphor of the poet is only understood in the context.

In everyday language the metaphor has no special characteristics, cf.

møde en kold skulder without any "møde en kold overarm". The metaphor may have a vulgar effect, cf. *jeg bestilte engang i tidernes morgen en flaske øl*, lit. 'once in the morning of time I ordered a bottle of beer'.

The synecdoche has to do with an exchange with regard to quantity, the *pars pro toto* is well-known. 400 gram *pr. næse* ('nose'), meaning 'per individual' or 'a head' is supposed to be a phraseologism. An example from Czech is *otcovská střecha* about the paternal roof.

A hyperbole (*amplificatio*, for a magnification) is often met in the art of poetry. Everyday language, too, knows the exaggeration, which is often grotesque or comical. Examples include *skyde gråspurve med kanoner*, lit. 'shoot house sparrows with a gun', or *gøre en myg til en elefant*; here the Russian says *delat' iz muchi slona*.

By litotes is meant a moderation, a diminution, and often a positive evaluation is expressed by means of two negations, thus *han er ikke umusikalsk*, in fact to be understood as 'has an ear for music', and *ikke uden evner* is in reality 'to be gifted'. We shall not go into details and are content with two Czech examples: *nikoli nepatrný* to be understood 'considerable', and *ne neradostný* for 'glad'.

The euphemism expresses something in a milder form, subdued, in Danish illustrated by *der er kold luft mellem dem*, 'there is cold air between them', *de stod hinanden fjernt* 'there was a great distance between them', which may cover pronounced enmity. Let us also mention *han er gået bort, sov stille hen, blev kaldt hjem til Gud, hans tid var omme* as expressions for death. For 'to die' we find (among numerous others) in Czech the euphemism *odejít na pravdu* (*boží*) quoting Zaorálek p. 281, further *být na pravdě*(*boží*) p. 664. As to illness Zaorálek (1947:618) gives *leží jako lazar* (SSJČ spells it *leží jako Lazar* and explains with bezmocně).

The euphemism may be jovial or comical, cf. *se for dybt i glasset* (*kruset*), lit. 'look too deeply in the glass (mug)', to which a Czech parallel (Z 636) runs *nahlédl hluboko do baňky* (or *do sklenky*) with the verb in the preterite; a parallel partially occurs in *dal si z ruky do hlavy*, resembling Danish "bøje armen" 'bend one's arm'.

Under expressions for the illegitimate child (see Z 617) we find a euphemism like *nepočítá otců*, which is supposed to mean 'does not count his fathers', besides numerous distasteful, sometimes incredibly coarse expressions. So the paraphrases are often rude (it is problematic to register them under euphemisms). Danish has a good-natured expression as *han har trukket grønsværen hen over sig*, lit. 'has pulled the green turf over himself', or *har stillet skoene* (*sutterne*), lit. 'has taken off his shoes (slippers)'. But, naturally, Danish is not free of coarseness of the type *knibe røvhullet sammen* (vulg.) 'tighten one's arsehole', *slå sin godnatski*, lit. 'fart for good-night'. In Marek Nowakowski's novels corresponding Polish expressions appear.

The Russian linguistic dictionary gives the following example of euphemism *On v početnom vozraste*='he is old', or *On porocha ne výdumaet* corresponding to Danish *han har ikke opfundet krudtet* 'has not invented gunpowder' (Note here that Danish has preterite, Russian uses the perfective verb výdumaet. As to the meaning of this perfective verb, the student will normally say that it denotes future, but this explanation is not satisfactory, and we refer to Bondarko's thoughts in his *Vid i vremja* from 1971, which cannot be explained here).

Let a Czech example illustrate irony (as a stylistical notion): *těší se jako nahý v kopřivách*, mentioned above; or Danish *et par kønne planter*, used ironically.

The comparison plays a very great role in phraseology (and will be treated separately). It may be poetical, often of great beauty. The original comparison of the poet is outside phraseology, but a short description is indispensable, as it allows the phraseological expression to appear more distinctly with special characteristics. In this connection it is but natural to mention the comparisons of the Song of Solomon from The old testament and parables of Jesus. We need only take some initial lines from our hymn book: *Som dug på slagne enge*, or *Som markens blomst*, or a line of great effect *Som himlenes favn er din kærlighed, Gud* 'like the embrace of the heavens is your love, our Lord'. We cannot go deeper into this sphere. Briefly we mention from Danish poetry: *Som en rejselysten flåde* 'like a fleet eager to depart' or *Min pige er så lys som rav* 'My girl is fair like amber'. Far more frequently the comparison is unpoetical and belongs to everyday language (Zaorálek's big collection has, indeed, the title *Lidová rčení*). It can be safely said that the comparison is less welcome in professional language. It is difficult to imagine the number of comparisons in a given language (the collective language). Ogol'cev (1978) estimates around four thousand for Russian. Only a precise count in Danish by corresponding criteria would make it possible to compare the number. The unpoetical comparison has quite another distinctive mark than that of the poet: often it is bluff, popular, racy and witty, very often rude and vulgar, with a latrine element, thus *som lort i en pissepòtte* 'like shit in a pisspot', *han fo'r afsted som en ski i et par lærredsbukser* 'rushed away like a shit in a pair of canvas trousers'. — To the poet the comparatum (the second member of the comparison) is explanatory and emphasizing, whereas the everyday comparison attaches weight to the sensational element (see also Lønstrup's distinction between everyday language and creative language).

Later on our question will be if the broad gamut with comparatum in the popular comparison is reflected in structure (to a given comparandum often a whole series of pictures correspond). We have taken comparison in the classical meaning: the two members we have mentioned are gathered around *particula comparationis*, whereas Lønstrup uses the word comparison in a broader sense. Generally speaking we can ignore *tertium comparationis*.

Saturation in the use of images varies notoriously with the epoch, and in a varying degree it leaves its stamp on the individual writer, but it enables the expert to date a text. What occupies us is that the metaphoric expression employed by the poet is not a phraseologism (in spite of its phraseological stamp), seeing that we require an anonymous origin. But this does not imply that the trope as such is not phraseology. The trope does not belong to a definite stylistical layer in the sense that it is bound to a definite social layer or demands a definite context. From the use of the trope you cannot guess at the social level of the user. Švejk in Hašek's famous novel says *Už je na pravdě boží* (the arch duke Ferdinand was the victim of an attempt, see the first chapter of the novel) — the beautiful image absolutely does not harmonize with the speaker. It would be incorrect to speak of some "affinity" between the trope and the phraseologism, since in many cases phraseologism can be defined as one of the tropes and is a trope. The clearest formulation seems to be that phraseologism (FRA) is one manifestation of the figurative language, the trope is another, but these words do not say that it is a matter of two identical streams each of them being viewed from its own angle; the position of the single word then will cause us trouble.

In the FRA (phraseologism) *møde en kold skulder* we find a trope, *kold skulder*, a metaphor. The trope is not necessarily a FRA, since it might be the original find of the individual speaker. The hyperbolic expression, e.g. *øjne så store som møllehjul* 'eyes as big as mill wheels' (from a fairytale) is not a FRA, but may possibly become a FRA. The litotes is not a FRA (but may, of course, develop into a FRA). The euphemism is not a FRA — yet it may be a FRA. — We must entrust this to the student of stylistics, but the notions of stylistics seem to be suitable for a classification of the phraseologisms.

Space does not allow for discussions of the figures of stylistics. These are above all phonetical matters (symbolics and imitation of sound), rhymes of various types and puns — all of which are well known from idiomatics. Below we shall add some observations as to rhymes.

In the author's opinion the single word (with figurative meaning) causes special difficulties to the scholar. When the phraseologism is made up of a number of words (in other words: more than one), constituting a firm entity, it is thereby said that the single word (a word standing alone) is outside phraseology (but within idiomatics) — some philologists have a different view. If the single word were registered under phraseology, the number would become tremendous. — But what is remarkable about the single-word, is exactly its figurative meaning, and terminologically it seems to be an advantage to talk about *idiom* in contradistinction to *phraseologism* (though the word idiom in the publications of certain philologists writing in English means phraseologism).

The distinction here causes trouble. We consider the word *næse*. In *han* *havde næse for* (the continuation may run *bevægelserne på aktiemarkedet* 'had a flair for the fluctuations on the stock exchange'), we shall no doubt classify it as FRA. The expression fulfills our demands (they are enumerated below): it is difficult to insert an adjective, for instance *han havde stor næse for*, lit. 'big nose' (but, indeed, a *han havde ringe næse for* seems acceptable, a piece of information that he had little flair etc.); the numerus is stable: *brødrene havde næse for* (there is no *næser*, plural, here). — If we observe *Baby havde næse efter oldefar*, saying that the child had the nose of great-grand-father, this *næse* is the same *næse* as above — in the latter case a regular *næse* 'nose' is meant. We reckon it non-FRA (later on we shall deal with the question of connotation).

An apparent FRA we have in *han fik en næse af ministeriet* (in the dictionary under: *at få en næse*) — but the same thought is expressed in *Ministeriet tildelte ham en næse*, 'gave him a reprimand'. We do not reckon it a FRA, but *næse* is, incontestably, taken in a figurative meaning. Zaorálek (1947:218) states *dostat od něhoko za něco nos* (a reproach, punishment for something). — *Tre elektriske pærer var gået*, saying that 'three electric bulbs "had gone"', is universally understood — we have no FRA, but certainly a figurative sense. Figurative meaning does not indicate FRA, but FRA contains figurative meaning.

FRA contains more than one word. The author of the article is inclined to count the type *stille sig*, a so-called reflexive verb, as a single-word, and *stille sig positiv til en sag* 'take a positive attitude etc.' then does not become a FRA. (*Stille sig* is detached from *stille* and is regarded as a new and independent word. This problem cannot occupy us here).

Only apparently can the characterization queer, eccentric be attached, in general, to the phraseological expression (*på lige fod*, with its completely normal words, speaks distinctly against that thought), although it often "spices" speech. Odd turns easily lead the observer astray: Danish *derude hvor kragerne vender*, lit. 'out there where the crows turn round', or Czech *kde lišky dávají dobrou noc* to describe a place far away. And often we mix up the phenomenon with what is in fact the slogans of today, jargon and slang ("tage højde for" in the sense of 'calculate', and "få op på skinner" 'realize a project' etc.). In fact, most often normal and current words are coupled up into standing expressions, stock phrases: *på lige fod* 'on an equal footing' may illustrate this, its components in no way being extraordinary.

Most words (and Babkin et al. in Tezisy 1961, makes the interesting parenthetical remark: potentially every word) possess some (or many) supplementary meanings, a connotative content making them suitable for figurative use.

Yet the perception of a *peculiar stamp* as a characteristic quality will engage us when studying the comparisons. Here we confine ourselves to the remark that the odd word — being different from the surrounding text through its unusual stamp, being obsolete or vulgar etc. — often proves to belong to slang or to be based on speech-play.

We have underlined the *anonymous origin* of phraseologism: it is created by the people. Undoubtedly phraseologism is most often based on the idea of one single individual, but language as a social phenomenon has the decisive word with regard to its incorporation in the language. In a peculiar way later generations have to "learn" such turns of speech (at school, in family life) — the meaning of the expressions is by no means self-evident. The figures of speech have stiffened. But this stage of things is no hindrance for new creations. The poet may add new phraseologisms or transform old ones. We find an interesting observation in Tezisy p. 20: the writer Gladkov transforms *nosit' na rukach* 'love and take care of' as in Danish "bære på sine hænder" into *nosit' na ladóške* 'palm'.

Phraseologisms are current (they may, of course, be dialectical), they are used traditionally, they are understood by the whole linguistic society, and it must be underlined that the number of figures of speech is *great* — do they possibly together with the idioms outweigh nominative language?

Phraseologisms — in Danish as in Slavic — constitute a firm block in the collective language. As an image we may use a container (ignoring the fact that we cannot definitively isolate phraseologisms) into which something is filled in the upper part, at the same time as something runs out from the bottom: new expressions may be accepted like *kold krig*, Russian *cholodnaja vojna*, and words that have become halfway incomprehensible, may be preserved for a long time, cf. Danish *hammel, gribe tøjlerne, hyppe* etc. Inertia is experienced in both cases, which is to the benefit of research: a reasonable registration is possible.

Though we stress anonymous origin, we must point out that quotations, naturally, are not excluded from phraseology. They cannot always be traced back. Thus *falde i god jord* 'fall on fertile ground' is biblical (the parable about the sower).

3. The description of phraseologism from different points of view we will gather in what is especially characteristic: the *monolith stamp* of the phraseologism. This celostnost' značenija is also noticed by Babkin in Tezisy (the word monolith may be criticized).

In a primitive way we depict this : exactly that given combination establishes the phraseologism, it is *hoc unum*, the connection is "automatized", it is stiffened, fossilized. Only exceptionally the phraseologism is ambiguous; *ikke bryde sig om* means 'not like, I do not like' as well as 'take a quiet attitude, I do not care'.

It seems possible to classify such expressions by some guide word: a noun, a verb etc. may decide the classification, or the turn of speech is without a verb. Here Fernando's division (1978 : 317) of genuine idioms, semi- and marginal idioms is interesting; idioms are understood as phraseologism, in her opinion a gamut appears.

The phraseologism may be fossilized, it may serve to preserve old words. *Rykke op med rode* shows an -e (in the noun *rode*) from Old Danish; *trække på samme hammel*, where *hammel* stands for a "double tree", *hyppe sine kartofler*, saying "earth up one's potatoes" (according to the dictionary: look after number one, have an axe to grind) contain notions now sunk into oblivion; in the same way *råbe som en rejekælling* lit. 'shout like a woman who sells shrimps' (the Danish author Martin Andersen Nexø has described these women, whom he remembers from his childhood). The FRA (phraseologism) is universally known — its components may be unknown. A given word is possibly only met in the FRA; this seems to hold true in *sidde* (et påbud) *overhørig* 'ignore (an order)', the word *overhørig* hardly exists as an isolated word (this raises the question: can a FRA come into being *because* the word is becoming obsolete); that figure of speech is so remarkable that it invites the creation of nonsense (sidde overhørig > overhøre siddende 'ignore when sitting'). Here also *give sit besyv med* 'give one's opinion, add one's opinion' — there is no isolated "besyv".

From Czech we have drawn the example *To je na mne mor* (Zaorálek 1947: 197) 'it makes me tired, it is unhealthy, unpleasant for me'; *mor* means 'pestilence'.

A Russian example is *razvodit' tary-bary* (*s-kem*), stated by Jarancev (1978:52), with the annotation not-literary, meaning 'boltat' o čem-l., vesti pustye razgovory', 'idle talk, or talk scandal, gossip'; originally, *tary-bary* is equal to boltovnja 'chat', but now the word exists only in that phraseologism.

Facing a sequence as *lede efter en synål i en høstak*, lit. 'search for a sewing-needle in a haystack', in other words a more copious FRA, we are tempted to make this drawing: |______|______|______| And facing a comparison between two relationships we might be tempted to depict this as follows: |______|______|______|______| Thus, quoting a line from a book by our great philologist Holger Pedersen, *alfabetet x passer til sproget y som en knytnæve til et blåt øje* 'the alphabet x fits the language y like a clenched fist a black eye' — but in that case we are overlooking the fact that, in reality, the image deals with fist/eye (the alphabet and the language being understood literally). In fact, we have here |______|______|.

Simplifying the technique of noticing our observations, we shall reduce the figure to ______|______, rykke op | med rode, and with a Czech example vzíti se | za nos, the latter is 'mind one's own business, leave others alone', from Mašín (1924:108). Consequently the non-phraseologism may be noted $\overline{\underline{\qquad\qquad\qquad}}$. The question whether $\overline{\underline{\qquad\quad|\qquad\quad}}$ presupposes $\overline{\underline{\qquad\qquad\qquad}}$ will be discussed elsewhere; it is superfluous to point out that a phraseologism is not marked by intonation or emphasis, and typographically it is not "italicized" — but there are cases where gesture and mimics signalize whether $\overline{\underline{\qquad\quad|\qquad\quad}}$ or $\overline{\underline{\qquad\qquad}}$ is meant. The so-called double exposure will be discussed below.[4]

Thus, *immovability* (sometimes a limited immovability) is characteristic; we must take into account a competing constituent, which may be marked like this $\overline{\underline{\qquad\quad|\!\sim\qquad\quad}}$ $\overline{\underline{\qquad\quad\sim\!|\qquad\quad}}$ and, unspecified, $\overline{\underline{\qquad\quad\sim\!\!\!\!\!|\qquad\quad}}$. For instance in Danish

kigge for dybt i glasset
kigge for dybt i kruset

'look too deeply into the glass, or the mug'. Czech has a parallel (parallels are listed in a chapter to follow):

do baňky side by side with
do sklenky.

Another example, from Zaorálek (1947:145):

$$\left.\begin{array}{l}\textit{vyplenit}\\ \textit{vyhubit}\\ \textit{vyvrátit}\end{array}\right\}\ \textit{něco}\qquad \left.\begin{array}{c}\textit{do}\\ \textit{z}\end{array}\right\}\textit{kořene}$$

for Danish *rykke op med rode* 'pull up by the roots'. As to Czech we also state *míti dobrý/zdravý kořen* 'be healthy, strong, also used about things'. In the same way *zapustit (někde) kořeny/kořínky* 'slå rødder', 'take root, get accustomed to (a place)'. And two animals occur in the phrase *tam dávají lišky/zajíci dobrou noc*, indicating a place far away.

From the Russian we note (Jarancev 1978:56) an expression corresponding to Danish "stikke næsen i sky", lit. 'put one's nose into the cloud', i.e. 'be arrogant':

$$\left.\begin{array}{l}\textit{zadirat'}\\ \textit{zadrat'}\\ \textit{drat'}\\ \textit{podnimat'}\\ \textit{podnjat'}\end{array}\right|\ \textit{nos}$$

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[4] Here it should just be mentioned that innumerable wits and puns (kalambury in Russian) are based on the use of proper meaning for non-proper meaning. Systematically this comes under investigations of speech-play, linguistic nonsense. The cartoonist of a newspaper, illustrating a text like "Ministeren tildelte hr. X en næse" "conferred a nose on Mr. X", which means 'reprimanded', will easily resort to a picture, a drawing, of a real human nose. — Add to this jocular translations that strictly follow the original word by word.

Our words about competing constituents give no information as to appearance or non-appearance of both verbal aspects.

Further we find in Russian side by side *zarubit' na lbu* and *zarubit' na nosu*, where Danish has "skrive sig bag øre" (behind one's ear). (Kure, in his famous dictionary from the beginning of the century, adds *u sebja*, which seems to be superfluous). The examples are stated by N. A. Kirsanova in Tezisy p. 20. In the same way *prikidyvat'sja durakom/duračkom*, or about being faithful until death *do mogily/do groba/do grobovoj doski*. Further we state *sojti s uma/ spjatit' s uma* with different stylistic colour. Let us add *pal'cem ne ševel'nut/ne dvinut'* with annotation colloquial.

The *restrictions* in connection with phraseologism is what attracts our attention. In many cases an annullment of a negation is excluded: *han har ikke opfundet krudtet*, lit. 'has not invented gunpowder' (characterizing a less gifted person) does not tolerate an alternation of that kind. En passant we mention Russian *porocha ne výdumaet*. — In cases like *forstår ikke et muk, forstår ikke et kvæk, uden et muk* 'does not understand a word of it all etc.', only a negative form appears. Or let us mention *ikke rigtig klog* about a silly, or rather an insane, person, or *hænger ikke på træerne* 'not available'; negation is indispensable.

A FRA may have the form of a question solely. This is perhaps illustrated by *Hvad gi'r De mig?*, the words say 'What do you give me?', but in fact it is an expression of surprise.

It may reasonably be said that the FRA may be ego-orientated. Emotional utterances in certain cases seem to be connected with the ego: *jeg tager hatten af for* (*Darwin*)=I esteem highly (English knows the same expression) is fully acceptable, whereas *du tager hatten af for* is less probable, and the same applies to *han* 'he' etc. and the plural.

It is a constant feature that grammatical changes are not permitted (even if this is not to be taken strictly). A Danish oath runs *Kraft knuse mig*, saying "May the devil crush me", but there is no Kraft *knuste mig (preterite), nor any Kraft knuse *os (the oath is lost, the FRA is absent, and such sequences, upon the whole, could hardly exist and are merely constructions).

A rigid form is seen in the Russian *šapkami zakidaem* (*kogo*)*!* with the annotation not-lit., i.e. 'we defeat him quickly and easily' (as a rule about an external enemy) — in other words, reserved for l. pers. plur.

Imperative can be excluded or is in some cases excluded: *drikker som en svamp*, lit. 'drinks like a sponge' (drinks like a fish) shuns the imperative. (At any rate, an imperative can only be forced through with difficulty).

Inflection of tense may be unknown as in *Der står kvinder bag alt* saying that there are women behind everything. The inflection is facultative in *zadirat' nos* etc., mentioned above, where the information is given: most frequently in present and past tense (in other words less inclined to appear in future and in infinitive). Remarks follow below on the verbal aspect in Slavic.

With nouns numerus may be fixed: *alle stak halen mellem benene*, "with the tail between their legs" — here is no **halerne*, plural, 'the tails'. Our ***tomme tønder*** 'empty vessels (which are said to make most noise)' is not changed into the singular. A figure of speech runs *har brændt mine skibe* 'have burned my ships' (the classical origin is of less interest here), not *mit skib (and not min *båd 'boat'). Probably we cannot find *brænder* or *vil brænde* (present tense and future). Further *Det faldt damerne for brystet*, i.e. 'the ladies were shocked', where no plural is imaginable (*brysterne*, plural, means the 'bosom') — unless aiming at a humoristic effect, speech-play; and imperative is excluded. — Information in one of the Russian sources (Jarancev) is valuable here, stating in what tense, number etc. the given FRA most frequently appears.

Definiteness (grammatical definiteness) may be fixed and be decisive: *mellem brødre er prisen hundrede kroner*, lit. 'between brothers the price is loo crowns' (other customers would have to pay more), is , but considering *mellem brødrene var der et smukt forhold* (*brødrene* is the definite plural), 'there was a beautiful relationship etc.', we find . (An inversion is imaginable here, though rarely occurring: *brødre imellem*). Here we note briefly *som helhedæsom en helhed* ('totality'). Let us also note *bøje kn*≠ (FRA), but *bøje knæet* (*knæet* is a definite form: 'the knee', 'das Knie') is FRI, our sign for a free connection; the FRA says 'surrender', the FRI means 'bend one's knee'. — Restrictions of that type (definiteness) are for evident reasons unknown in Czech (in Slavic in general, practically) — but restrictions of similar types cannot be excluded.

We shall let some characteristic cases illustrate what has been said. A Danish turn of speech runs (see above) *har ikke opfundet krudtet* 'porocha ne výdumaet', used about an unintelligent person. Beside this we do not find the positive *han har opfundet krudtet, nor an utterance that he will never invent gunpowder. Popular wit knows the addition "nor the soup plate" (in Danish "den dybe tallerken"), thereby perhaps creating a new FRA. That Danish uses the so-called "førnutid", the perfect, (Russian has a perfective verb) has been discussed earlier. (p. 156).

With the phraseologism *som sild i en tønde*, lit. 'like herrings in a barrel' the speaker may deliberately put a verb in front (with certain limits). In the same way he is free with regard to the grammatical subject (again with certain limitations): as far as one can judge, the subject must be *animatum*, presumably human beings, and (logically) plural. One can imagine *de sidder tæt som, står tæt som, ligger sammenklumpet som sild i en tønde* etc., 'they sit close together etc., they live huddled together etc.'. Not *sild i *to tønder*, 'herrings in two barrels' — in that case the FRA would be wiped out, and what remains, would be a corrupt FRA, a relict (it would be difficult to consider *som sild* a phraseologism).

Tomme tønder buldrer mest, lit. 'empty vessels make most noise' (which, being a proverb, can hardly be called a FRA) does not permit an exchange with *fustager* instead of *tønder*; grammatical tense cannot be changed, a negation is excluded — changes of that kind would wipe out the FRA.

The phraseologism ends, it seems, with its last word; it can hardly continue with arbitrary additions — they would, possibly, annihilate the FRA. But if we consider *s"el sobaku* (explained elsewhere) we see that this figure of speech tolerates or rather demands *na čëm, v čëm*. And the FRA *zadirat' nos* (see Jarancev (1978: 57)) about "stikke næsen i sky", i.e. 'behave arrogantly', is indeed finished, it is a complete FRA, but it tolerates (and sometimes demands) a *pered kem* (this holds true of zadirat', zadrat' and drat', not of podnimat' and podnjat'), but confined to *pered kem* (other prepositional members seem to be excluded).

The non-realization or the incomplete realization of the grammatical possibilities are not the characteristic mark of the phraseologism. Compulsory aspect, i.e. obligatoriness of one aspect (the expression appears in one aspect, not in the counter-aspect) is something we meet outside phraseology, too.

When Slavic languages form part of the analysis, the position of the *aspect* becomes conspicuous. We do not have in mind the peculiarity that figures of speech in Czech contain (may contain) perfective aspect where, according to Danish conception, an imperfective aspect is expected, cf. *nasere i nahému do kapsy* (vulg.) from Zaorálek: 585, denoting bragging behaviour. What should be noticed is that the FRA often allows for only one aspect solely (only the perfective or only the imperfective aspect), cf. some expressions for cunning: *má v rukách zlato* or *hodí se do vozu i do kočáru* with ip aspect, but with the pf aspect *udělá z hovna kotletu* (vulg.), or *obrátí na malém plácku* (Zaorálek: 675).

In the given expression one aspect appears (even if this is not valid generally). But the expression is, perhaps, also met in the counter-aspect, and in that case it cannot be predicted whether phraseologisms are created. We oppose

1. brát si (něco) k srdci,
2. vzít si (něco) k srdci,

two phraseological figures of speech (Zaorálek: 332) with *different* semantics: 1.=grieve at, 2.=vštípit si to, dobře si to zapamatovat, which is supposed to be covered by 'fix in one's mind'.

In Tezisy: 5 Babkin calls attention to a corresponding phenomenon: phraseological *rezat' po živomu* (from MAS we see that it means adopt rigorous measures against someone, something, that is near or dear to oneself) cannot be transferred to pf aspect (we must here ignore the problematics of Aktionsart). But this relationship — the word connection is attached to one aspect solely — does not point out the phraseologism, cf. *zapet'* and *zapevat'* (Babkin's example), each of them having a meaning of its own apart from the meaning they have in common.[5]

This very essential feature of the monolith unit: its *immovability* (a relative immovability) in grammatical respect, its "rigidity" and the element we have called "hoc unum", is joined by the distinctive mark *inviolability* (Šanskij (1972:173) uses the designation *nepronicaemost'*): insertions in the entity are impossible or at any rate rare; *na sed'mom nebe*, our Danish *i den syvende himmel*, is perceptibly disturbed if changed into "i den sædvanlige syvende himmel", 'in the usual etc.'. Perhaps we might call it a "broken FRA", the phraseologism is not completely wiped out, vague outlines are still to be made out.

To this should no doubt be added that the place of the word in the monolith unit is *fixed*, that is to say that the word order is rarely broken.

What has been said can be summarized in two primitive drawings, showing that we do *not* meet (or we seldom meet)



and



The language, however, has the power to break the rules: *han var i den såkaldt syvende himmel* 'in the so-called seventh heaven' might be forced through (see example just given) — we are, possibly, then rather facing a fragment of a FRA. And the components of the FRA may also be moved about (to a certain degree), they may be placed "at a distance" (we are then making use of Šanskij's expression *distantno*) as evidently in Danish *der lå et hus*, the words say 'there lay a house', meaning 'there was a quarrel', recognized as a matter of course in *sikke et hus der lå* 'what a quarrel etc.'. — Šanskij illustrates the permissible insertion with *ne zgi bukval'no ne vidno*; the usual expression is, according to MAS (*ni*) *zgi ne vidno* (or *ne vidat'*) about pitch darkness. (A natural phrase in Danish is *hvor han slog sine folder som ung* covering the idea 'where he knocked about as a young man', but we cannot say (only with extreme difficulties anyhow) *de folder, han slog som ung*; add to this that the word *folder* is enigmatic semantically).

As regards the question of the constant word order one more remark: Jarancev (1978:56) states the FRA *zadirat' nos* (other verbs appearing side by side with zadirat'), adding parenthetically *pered kem* and with the annotation not-liter. Examples from Russian fiction show *ne zadiral nosa* with word order 1-2. (as claimed), but also *ty nos dereš* (2.-1.), and further *tebe tože nos zadirat' ne sleduet* (2.-1.); we meet *nos* in the plural in *zadirali nosy* (1.-2.).

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[5] In another connection this will be most important. We have in mind the study of disharmony between perfective prefixed verb and the secondary imperfective verb.

And the comparison (having Czech and Danish in mind we talk about the "jako-som-relationship") permits an exchange, though with clear restrictions, cf. *Som himlenes farn er din kærlighed, Gud*, the word *som* cannot be moved; it is of course different in a case like *en gudinde lig svævede hun*, the words say "a goddess like etc."; this does not concern our jako/som-relationship.

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We must carefully bear in mind that the described *rigid stamp* also appears outside phraseology: again and again we see that certain words have a tendency to go together, they provoke each other as it were — but a phraseologism is not created, the requirements are not complied with. What we observe belongs, in the opinion of the author, to combinability, sočetaemost' in Russian. Thus the verb *bore* 'drill' shows rather poor combinability, the word *hul* 'hole' suggests itself: *bore hul*, it is so to speak a neighbouring notion (one might object that *bore en tunnel* suggests itself, too) — but a monolith unit is not created: nothing prevents *han borede fem huller* 'five holes', *borer et stort hul, det hul der skulde bores* etc., 'the hole that had to be drilled', and *bore* as well as *hul* are taken in the usual meaning of the words, they are not images (as to the contents of the sign, see later). Thus we cannot approve Lønstrup's words (1978:5) in connection with her exposition of Apresjan's conception, illustrated by *prokolot'* in two contexts: Lønstrup considers *prokolot' dyročku* "an almost idiomatic figure of speech".

Bore hul 'drill a hole' evidently differs from *vise tænder* (FRA; but *bore hul* is non-FRA), lit. "show teeth"; there is no *de tænder jeg viser, lit. "the teeth I show" (that the verb *vise* 'show' may have many objects, does not concern us). In the same way it differs from *rejse børster* (FRA); *børste* is here 'bristle', which as a verb covers our FRA ('to demonstrate that one is ready for a fight'): there is no *de børster jeg rejser (several words may serve as object for the verb *rejse*, approximately 'raise' (for instance a loan, *støv* 'dust', en proteststorm etc.)).

4. Institutionalizing and integrity have been underlined in the preceding chapters. To this should be added as an essential or rather the most essential fact that in the phraseologism the "usual" meaning of the individual components does not come out, the word is not "the same" as what we meet outside the FRA (there are reservations). Primitively, we can depict it  and, with a view to our reservations  and . Here we are no doubt facing the *decisive feature* (key feature) of FRA, the very essence of phraseologism. So, what is remarkable is not that the *image* appears, which has already been accounted for; it is rather the enigmatic origin of the

image that is peculiar. The word "says" something different from what it does normally, but this explanation, it proves, is unsatisfactory. For the present we shall talk about a secondary meaning versus a primary meaning.

Here we agree with Andrzej Boguslawski (1979). For the Polish philologist, too, it is fundamental that what is said in the components is not equal to the totality of the expression. His first (simple) formula runs $a+b \neq c$, needing no explanation. The same is said in Boguslawski's second (and more precise) formula (we must ignore the third formula here):

$$e'_1+e''_1 : e'_2+e''_2 \leftrightarrow c'_1+c''_1 : c'_2+c''_2$$

which (Bogulawski: 29) is interpreted: Die Kommutation („:") der miteinander verknüpften Ausdrücke mit den anderen zu den entsprechenden Klassen gehörenden Ausdrücken setzt keine symmetrische Kommutation der inhaltlichen bzw. Sinnelemente (d.h. der Ausdrücke, die sie verkörpern, „c") voraus.

It is not clear if this thought is covered by our example: *jeg tager hatten af for Darwin/jeg tager hatten af for skoleinspektøren*, the former being 'I highly esteem D.', the latter 'take off my hat' in its direct sense.

More to the point is the opposition
professor s"el kolbasu (free connection)

professor s"el sobaku (e.g. v matematike) (used phraseologically, meaning 'is an expert in, has profound experience in'). By way of experiment we depict the two sequences through ovals, divided in expression and contents, an arrow illustrating the replacement. A change in the contents gives an unknown result



(1) *jeg tager hatten af for Darwin* differs from (2) *jeg tager hatten af, når jeg træder ind* 'take off my hat when I enter the room'. The former is a monolith unit (FRA), the latter is a free connection (FRI). Without hesitation we would say *han tog hatten af* (preterite), *tag din hat af*! (imperative) (and besides we might talk about *cap* instead of *hat*). The detached *tager hatten af* is associated with sentence number 2 (tager hatten af, når jeg træder ind).

Our sentence (2) is, without problems, replaced by *jeg tager hatten af for skoleinspektøren*. In *jeg tager hatten af for* we have a double exposure of the phraseologism, in other words, the FRA demands a FRI, and (1) exists by virtue of (2). This seems, however, to be doubtful. It will be difficult to claim double exposure considering an expression as *tage højde for*, lit. "take-heightfor", which means 'calculate a risk, a threatening danger etc.'. And an extreme case like *gå nedenom og hjem* (from an old Danish folk tale, lit. 'go round below and home'; in the folk tale a person walks on the bottom of a river, in other words he dies; and the English version, expressing the meaning of the phrase, is "go to the dogs, go bust"); it is, surely, more correct to say that beside the metaphoric expression appears often the same figure of speech understood directly, and that  presumably has lived in some undefined past, whereas a definite state of language knows only. We can consider cases like *han havde et hus på hånden*, saying literally 'he had a house on his hand', meaning that for instance the estate agent had reserved him a house for a certain time. The problems are numerous, sequences like *han må være sikker på hånden, han var sikker på avancement* 'was sure he would be promoted' give us an impression of that. We cannot go deeper into the role played by such double exposure in some business slogans.

Lønstrup (1978:12—13) sees a coherence *transferred use/consituation* and a coherence *phraseologism/context*. This seems to be imprecisely formulated. Our phrase from above, *jeg tager hatten af for skoleinspektøren*, we read as "I raise my headgear etc.", i.e. direct meaning; but with the addition "who boldly refused to obey his minister" the understanding is "highly esteem" (FRA) where the consituation must be said to show FRA.

The following may give a Czech example: *chodí s kloboukem v ruce*, partly understood directly (the words for hat and hand in their regular meaning), partly understood "he is polite, perhaps to a too high degree".

As to the question of double exposure we shall again oin t out the Russian *s"el sobaku...* (saying that he is a connoisseur of, has profound experience of etc.), where, indeed, no nominative *s"el sobaku* can be demonstrated. This stock phrase appears in most Russian expositions of the problems of phraseology; and jesting about the words Vartan'jan (1960:4) translates word by word *V grammatike on s"el sobaku* into 'Il mangea un chien en grammaire'.

A Polish example is *rzucać grochem o ścianę*, explained 'mówić na darmo, bez żadnego efektu' (in Urbańczyk's Encyklopedia, under the article Frazeologia), approximately 'speak to deaf ears'.

Trying to attain the "basic pattern" through transformations causes disappointment: in vain we operate with

$$\text{jeg } \underbrace{\underbrace{\text{tager}}\,\underbrace{\text{hatten af for}}}_{\text{stand bare-headed}} \text{ Darwin}$$

or

$$\text{on } \underbrace{\text{s''el sobaku}}_{\text{dined.}}$$

The phraseologism is not generatable.

5. Continuing what has just been outlined and aiming at a short presentation of the problems of contents of the sign we shall consider the figure of speech *på lige fod*, lit. 'on equal foot', English 'on an equal footing'. We see at once that the meaning is not that the foot (the anatomic notion) is stretched out, indeed, it has nothing to do with the human foot. The composition *lige fod* (without the preposition) has practically no independent existence in Danish (one can of course say: *lige fod* means etc.) as *venstre fod* 'left foot' has. In front of the latter we can put the preposition *på* without difficulty, whereas such a role for the word *på* seems to be less convincing in *på lige fod*.

Lige is many things, in the same way *fod* is many things. A primitive scheme



illustrates the fact that when the given sub-signification (for sub-signification Louis Hjelmslev uses the Danish word "bemærkelse") of *lige* is combined with the given sub-signification of *fod*, *lige fod* appears to be used in the phraseologism *på lige fod*, which is unambiguous. This does not differ from the relationship

en dygtig medarbejder:
en dygtig dragt prygl

('an efficient colleague', 'plenty of thrashing, a good beating'). The semantically fluid *lige* and the semantically fluid *fod* are brought together, the compound annulls the fluid character, and in our case the stock phrase *på lige fod* comes into being — a free connection might equally have appeared of the type *på venstre fod* 'on the left foot'. That the noun determines the semantics of the adjective is well-known, cf. *stærk medicin*, *stærk udvikling*, *stærk muskel* etc, *stærk* 'strong' displaying many semantic shades. Briefly we insert the remark that the mechanism is of the same kind as with prefixation of the verb; the fluid *prefix* (in Slavic as in Danish) is coupled to the fluid (diffuse) *simplex*, creating a verb of strict semantics, narrowed down via the prefix (even if unambiguousness is not necessarily created); see for instance Danish *udsætte* with broad semantics (there is no room for detail here); yet it is narrowed down as compared with the very broad verb *sætte* 'put, place something etc.'.

Russian, too, knows (according to MAS) *byt'* or *stojat' na ravnoj noge* (s kem) 'associate with somebody as his equal'. Further *byt' na družeskoj* or *korotkoj noge* (s kem) about friendly relationship; but detached *korotkij* is obviously also used for 'friendly'.

6. Those who investigate the meaning of words have for centuries realized that the contents of the sign are divided; they fall into several sub-significations, *polysemia* occurs: one and the same word contains several meanings, for instance *pande* in *håret redt ned i panden* 'hair combed down over the forehead', and the same word in *rende panden mod en mur*, approximately 'run one's forehead against a wall', in transferred meaning (fight in vain). Or let us mention the word *nød* (nut) and the same word (in slang) used about the human head: *få en i nødden*, (a blow on one's head). In the same way philologists have turned their attention to *homonymia*: two (or more) words coincide when spoken or written, though they have nothing to do with each other, cf. *nød* (nut), *nød* (distress, poverty), *hæfte* (a notebook, but also ordinary imprisonment), *hede* (high temperature, heat, but also 'heath'). Examples from Czech include *kolej* 'hostel for youth' as well as 'railway track', and *pila* 'saw' and 'sawmill'.

It is difficult to keep the two phenomena, polysemia and homonymia, apart (see for instance Lønstrup (1978:14)).

A brief quotation from Fernando (1978:316) runs: Idiom combines the properties of many types of language phenomena and yet is not completely any one of these,. She has depicted that in the following drawing



the sector in the centre being idiomatics.

The question of a logical connection between direct and transferred meaning engages the philologists. Most frequently the traces are wiped out, the investigation thus becoming the task of the etymologist. The scholar we just quoted gives an interesting example of preservation of original contextual meaning (1978:335), certainly only recognized by etymological research: English *blue blood* (let us add Danish *blåt blod*) is derived from the Spanish *la sangre azul*, the latter to be understood literally: through the white skin of the Romans the veins could be seen, whereas they were not visible through the dark skin of the Arabs. — The Russian has also *golubaja krov'* 'of aristocratic origin' as stated by Frazeologičeskij slovar' (1978:213) with the annotation "ustar."). And in Czech we find *míti modrou krev* for this idea (whereas *býti ze zelené krve* designates the illegitimate child), see Zaorálek (1947:158).

Koefoed (1971:84) says: ""fod" is found in a lamp, a mountain or a staircase, besides being part of the body and a unit of measurement" (our translation). The question is here whether we ought to call the anatomic notion of "fod" proper meaning and call the remaining kinds of meaning improper.

Næse is part of the face, it has to do with breathing, and the olfactory sense has its seat here: further we know *have næse for* (bevægelser på aktiemarkedet, for instance, as explained earlier) with transferred meaning, in stylistics called *translatio* — this is polysemy. But *næse* in *skoens næse* (toe of the shoe) comes under homonymy.

The human nose when we consider *pudse næse, snyde næse, pudre næsen, næsen løber* 'blow one's nose etc.' is not "the same" as when we look at *stikke næsen i andres affærer, stikke næsen i sky, vende næsen hjemad, have næse for* (mentioned above), *tildele nogen en næse* 'reprimand' (deliberately we have not distinguished between phraseological and figurative use in our examples). From Czech we note, with figurative meaning, *strkat nos do všeho* (Danish and Czech show a parallel FRA). The expression is also known in Russian *sovat'* (*svoj*) *nos* (kuda, vo čto); *sunut'* is also used here.

We have touched upon the turn of speech *på lige fod* and stated its rigid character. We find *konkurrere på lige fod, ansøge på lige fod* (compete, apply for), but there is no *den fod vi konkurrerer på er *lige* — this is a fixed connection of a phraseological kind. If we consider *støtter på foden* 'lean on one's foot', *fod* forms part of a FRI, seeing that it might quite as well have been *den fod jeg støtter på* 'on which I lean', or *han støtter sig på fødderne, på højre fod, på begge fødder*, the notion of leaning in various contexts, and no rigid character is observed. It is easy to see that *han satte foden under eget bord*, expressing that 'he got independent, his own master' does not permit any replacement: there is no *han satte foden under egetræsbordet* 'under a table of oak wood' (apart from jocular use), nor any *de satte fødderne under eget bord* (let alone 'under their own tables'), nor any *det bord han satte foden under, var hans eget* 'was his own' — the meaning would then be lost, the phraseological character would be absent. Perhaps it could be claimed that there is an allusion to a phraseological expression.

For a phraseological connection (*på lige fod*) we have used the signal FRA, and for a free connection (*på venstre fod*) the arbitrary signal FRI.

We must bear in mind that the word in its "not-usual" meaning is not reserved for FRA, we meet it just as well in FRI, cf. *Olgas knæ/Volgas knæ* 'Olga's knee, the elbow of the river Volga'. In the latter case *knæ* might be replaced by "the sharp curve of the river". — Czech, too, knows *koleno* for the anatomic notion as well as for the curve of the river, *koleno řeky*, plus curves in various connections. *Volgas knæ* is not a FRA, it shows what we might call transferred meaning.

In *han falder på knæ ved kirkens indgang* 'kneels down at the entrance of the church' we have proper or direct meaning, but in *jeg falder ikke på knæ for chefen* we have improper, not-direct meaning. *Falde på knæ* in itself does not inform us whether the first or the second meaning is expressed (we have double exposure as described earlier). Here we shall briefly note: *bøje knæet* 'bend' (notice *knæet*, definite form of *knæ*, as English *the knee*, German *das Knie*) is FRI, but *bøje knæ for Gud* (*knæ* does not have the definite article or rather ending here) is FRA 'obey the Lord' — systematically this belongs to the preceding chapter.

The Czech has — to mention a few instances — *na stará kolena* (něco dělat) (see Zaorálek: 138), meaning v pokročilém věku, indicating that the person in question is at an advanced age, as well as *pamatovat na stará kolena*, reminding us of old age, teaching us to be far-sighted, with a metaphoric use of *kolena*: besides that the word has, naturally, its direct meaning. — This figure of speech is elaborated in *Čeština všední*: 330—31. — Russian examples include *gladit' po golove* with double exposure 'pat somebody's cheek' as well as 'indulge somebody, comply with somebody's wishes'.

We could also mention *købe hat* 'buy a hat', *være med til at købe hat, være med på at købe hat* (a translation is of no interest); these are sequences of a type different from *samle alt under een hat*, lit. 'gather everything under one hat', but of phraseological type; *være på hat med* for 'have a nodding acquaintance with', *tage hatten af for* as explained earlier, or *lade hatten gå rundt*, saying 'let the hat go round', which means collect money for some special purpose. The latter type was illustrated by Czech *chodí s kloboukem v ruce*, explained above.

We may compare *gartneren solgte mig et par kønne planter*, meaning that he sold me a couple of beautiful plants, to *I er ellers et par kønne planter*, described earlier (from a stylistical point of view the trope of sentence number 2 comes under irony).

Our examples show that we must reckon with 1. direct meaning, 2. non-direct meaning, and 3. non-direct meaning of another kind than in point 2.

Generally it is presumed that the linguistic sign, besides giving the neutral, objective contents, often (not necessarily always) contains emotional and affective ideas, but this matter has not been clarified. A distinction between a *primary* and a *secondary* meaning is possible and appropriate. Other designations are known: Koefoed (1971) states, for the primary meaning, an extentional and a referential meaning, and for the secondary meaning, an intentional and emotional meaning; further the distinction *denotative* and *connotative* meaning, preferred by us (even if these termini are criticized below). A possible terminus, perhaps useful to pedagogues, might be "cold" and "warm" meaning — the word "warm" in a given context, it is true, then has the cold meaning ("which has a high temperature") and a warm meaning ("cordial etc.").

We shall confine ourselves to the aspect of the problem (semantic division) that touches on phraseology (and this will occupy us very much when preparing the comparison), i.e. the interplay between contents and phraseology, but we are compelled to deal with the difficult barrier between phraseological and non-phraseological contents when confronted with what lies beyond the direct meaning.

For denotative and connotative we use the abbreviations *D* and *K* (we find it advantageous to use K for connotative). D and K, however, contain numerous enigmas. The denotative contents of the word refer to "the thing itself" (the denotate, the "virkelighedsobjekt", reality-object, in Lønstrup's words), and the connotative contents lie outside — we shall elaborate on this below.

The distinction D/K is not the same as the encyclopaedic explanation of the dictionary and its division into meanings and sub-meanings (Danish "bemærkelser" if we use Hjelmslev's word) in the sense that D meant number one and K the remainder. Isačenko's exposition of 1972 is instructive here.

It is superfluous to remark that we are not facing everyday language versus poetical language. If one tries to construct an auxiliary language demanding above all that it is easily comprehensible (one could mention Basic English), one will no doubt have recourse to the denotative meanings, ignoring the connotative. We can imagine an elimination of connotative meanings — this would not destroy the language. It reminds us of the thought expressed in Koefoed (1971:84): ... "eller om forskellen eventuelt hænger sammen med modsætningen mellem sprogbygning og sprogbrug" ('... or whether the difference, possibly, is attributable to the contrast between linguistic structure and linguistic usage').

By contrasting direct and figurative, transferred meaning we can better deal with the relationship D/K. Let us briefly add that D cannot be said to be what the word "first and foremost" means. The study of combinability (sočetaemost') is not identical with the study of the contents of the sign, but these two examinations go hand in hand. (And if we discuss the problem: *æsken ligger*, but *kassen står på bordet*, talking about a small box and a big box, with the verbs *lies* and *stands* depending on the volume and size of the subject, *usus* is illuminated).

Nor is the correct answer that the boundary is between spatial and non-spatial meaning. It is difficult to maintain that D is concrete, whereas K is abstract, though this often comes true. The opposite is the case in *han tilbragte ungdommen i fængsler, ungdommen tilbragte aftenen på gadehjørner* 'he spent his youth in prison, youths spent the evenings on street corners'; here we must presume that *ungdom* has for D something abstract (a period of life), and, for

K, something concrete (the collection of young people, a certain group of the totality of human beings). And D, indeed, is classified without difficulty as abstract (*elske*, *lykkelig*, etc., Russian *ljubit'*, *sčastlivyj* etc.).

A reliable method to elucidate denotative contents is not available. Lønstrup, for instance, dissolves connotative meaning into components of contents and here presumes a hierarchic structure. That dissolution is not the division of the dictionary, but conceptual division. This is demonstrated on *kvinde* 'woman', where Russian *ženščina* might have been chosen, too (the notions of human being, sex, age). The method can probably be employed in a small number of cases, in the remaining cases it will fail: a *ramme* 'frame' (of pine for instance) leaves no doubt about the denotation, but it is difficult to account for the components of contents; the clear difference from the connotative contents is evident, cf. *undersøgelsens rammer*, *indenfor lovens rammer*, *udenfor arbejdets ramme*, 'within the scope of etc.'. Let us briefly mention Isačenko's study of 1972 on Figurative meaning etc.: non-abstract nouns are categorized by abstract criteria.

A composed word gives uncomplicated contents (this is close to what communication research teaches us about inverse proportionality: a word of high frequency proves to carry a small quantity of information and develops insignificant connotative contents or none). Lønstrup's example is *undervisningsassistenttimeløn* (this giant word may, actually, occur) 'wages per hour of an instructor' — the multitude of grammatical definitions qualify the word, making it precise, barring emotional contents (and a dissolution into components will concern syntactical questions).

With regard to D/K the *simplex* of the verb often causes numerous reflections: cf. *brænde* 'burn' (burn something which may be anything in the world; *brænde af begær* 'from desire or lust'; *brænde sine skibe* is a FRA), whereas a *prefixed* verb covers a lesser semantic area as described elsewhere, cf. *han afbrændte* (*fyrværkeri*) 'let off fireworks', only few objects being possible, *huset nedbrændte* (used intransitively). This is not to say that a prefixed verb is unequivocal, but the semantics are narrowed down (see later).

It is important that Lϕnstrup shows that a consideration of the *isolated* word is necessary to attain a decision as to the denotative contents of a given word (the present study adopts a sceptical attitude here).

According to Lønstrup we must concentrate on the lexeme (the entry-word of the dictionary). She says this in general, not distinguishing word-classes. (It implies that we recognize what is outside D, considering the non-isolated lexeme). The enormous importance of this fact for the study of phraseology has been touched upon earlier (when the phraseologism was characterized). — But the clarity of that thought is lost when the same scholar goes on to place the syntagme and the sentence side by side with the lexeme, which prevents consideration of an isolated position. The philologist's view that connotative contents always presupposes denotative contents will be attended to later.

Koefoed (1971) has made reservations: denotative meaning refers "as far as possible" to the neutral meaning of the word. It is doubtful whether every lexeme does have a denotative content. Such content seems to be most easily observed with nouns rather than with other word classes, yet within fixed limits as suggested. But where is the "reality object" when we leave the class of nouns?

A distinction between D and K appears, naturally, when we consider the *adjective*, cf. *en rund bordplade* 'a round table-top', differing from *et rundt tal*, English accidentally also using this adjective, a "round number"; in the same way Russian has *krugloe čislo*.

As to *verbs* one could for instance mention Danish *trække*, roughly translated 'pull', which seems to provoke a certain general idea (making an effort you move an object closer to you); establishing an opposition to *skubbe* 'push' is of little use, because then we would have to explain this verb; only in very few cases can acceptable oppositions be established; a difference, more or less pronounced, appears when we consider uses as *det trækker* 'there is a draught', *theen trækker* 'the tea is drawing', *lotteriet trækker* 'the lottery draws', *en prostitueret trækker* 'walks the street', *revyen trækker fulde huse* etc., 'is a draw' etc. — We must ignore other word classes here.

Denotative contents are not necessarily present. If a "reality-object" is demanded and we consider abstract nouns (*fred*, *kærlighed* etc., *mir.*, *ljubov'* etc.), adjectives and verbs ,we must say that D is lacking. For K covers, indeed a notion of an "accompanying meaning". We are not facing K without D. (A solution would be to rename D and K).

Great difficulties in this respect will crop up when a *prefixed* verb is considered. In Danish as in Slavic the prefixed verb, if transitive, will demand an object (explicit object). Two things must be remembered here: prefixed verbs are dominant in corpus, and with the addition of a prefix, the verb most often becomes transitive; this is among the most characteristic features of prefixation. The object gives the verb meaning (space compels us to ignore the role of other members of the sentence here). In other words we cannot (in such cases) observe a prefixed verb in an isolated position, cf.

antage {
et tilbud 'accept an offer'
en trosbekendelse, en teori 'a confession'
nogen i barns sted 'adopt somebody as if it were one's own child'
personale 'engage'
=formode 'presume' (... that etc.)

Or we might have chosen Russian *prinjat/prinimat'*, to which several objects may be attached. Some of them are polk, tovar; kogo na službu, v universitet; posititelej, gostej; zakon, predloženie, na sebja objazatel'stvo, radio, lekarstvo, prinjat' kogo za drugogo, prinjat' važnyj vid, tjaželyj charakter (listed without systematization).

Should the verb *antage*, not observed in an isolated position, or Russian *prinjat'*, be kept outside D and K? Does it mean that the verbs are placed outside D and K and disregarded?

In the same way *afholde* (et møde, en fest, et bal) 'arrange' etc., but *afholde udgifter* 'pay expenses', *afholde nogen fra noget* 'prevent from'. Countless cases appear, but we cannot go into detail.

Participles of the verb are supposed to follow the same lines (most often we have then ignored the principle of observing the entry-word). Expressing our thought briefly, we point at the difficulties of identifying D in the word *opsat* (the hair may be "opsat" in a certain way; a meeting may be "opsat" 'postponed', and the word may mean 'be very eager, desire very much'). We must leave out remarks about the present participle as well as nouns motivated by prefixed verbs. Thus a great number of words contain a doubtful D, if the demand for an isolated position is to be respected. It is on a selective basis we have spoken about the denotative contents of the sign.

To Lønstrup, D appears as a *constant* (and general) meaning, whereas K is *variable*. (For the sake of clarity we insert the remark that using the word constancy we have the word in the given state of language in mind, not constancy from a diachronical point of view).

If, using the word constancy, we have in mind the connotative meaning as a totality, extracted in corpus, we meet with great deviations depending upon the taste of the epoch and the individual writer.

Variable is emphasized as the characteristic quality of K; in the author's opinion variable should be taken in two senses: understandable (to a certain degree) if *translatio* is present, incalculable if a *phraseologism* is present. (K eludes a semantic analysis, cf. *Stormagterne rørte ikke en finger*, lit. 'the Great powers did not move a finger', where the word *finger* cannot be explained. The Russian has the same FRA *pal'cem ne ševel'nut'*).

An observed word does not necessarily contain K, but may acquire K. Thus *skovl* 'shovel' is a real, regular shovel (D), but in a modern phraseological expression: *få skovlen under ham*, lit. 'get the shovel under him', we must classify it as K (earlier we have quoted a parenthetical remark by a Russian scholar about the unlimited possibilities of expansion).

D is supposed to be increased when we say *rumskibet flyver* 'the space ship flies' with the verb *flyve* 'fly' in its usual meaning, and similarly when the refined bomb of our time is designated simply a bomb. An increase of K appears presumably, in *den kolde krig* 'cholodnaja vojna'.

K recognized in inflected forms can probably not be registered under increase, but in a certain sense something has been added as compared with the lexeme. We shall not go deeper into this problem, and confine ourselves to stating *rygende uenige* and *rygende på en cigar*, the former about a high degree of disagreement, the latter containing 'smoking' in its usual sense. — That connotations are poor in composed words has been mentioned above.

Lønstrup's conception — K presupposes D — is not always well founded. Certainly, her view is supported by a case like Danish *ben* 'bone' (as well as 'leg') and Danish *ben* for 'dubious extra income e.g. flowing from membership of some organization', but in numerous phraseologisms the thread is thin or absolutely absent.

K is something we meet with *translatio* (transferred meaning, figurative use) and with the phraseologism — the distinction between the two notions is provisional. Contrary to the usual view K marks the language to a very high degree, K is in no way a curious thing that appears "now and then". Bogusławski (1979:31) says concerning the weight of the connections of expressions in a bilingual dictionary: "Im Gegenteil, wohl nicht weniger als 3/4 der Anstrengungen in der zweisprachigen Lexikographie werden immer den Ausdrucksverbindungen gewidmet werden müssen".

It would be incorrect to say that K in translatio (for which we are considering a signal FIGU, which we find more suitable than for instance the signal TRANSL) and K in phraseologism (FRA) is recognized in units of more than one word, seeing that the single-word, too, may express a transferred meaning; but a distinction according to the number of words is valuable in several coherences. It is exactly the separation of figurative use and phraseologism that causes great trouble (can we in Danish keep "vending" apart from "talemåde"?) A sequence as *han fik en næse*, i.e. 'was reprimanded' bears the mark of phraseologism, but it seems more correct to say that *næse* 'nose' is simply used figuratively.

The verb *skide* (vulg.) 'shit' will, separately viewed, show denotative contents "evacuations — vulgar language", but does not reveal any K (and K is indeed not obligatory). If we observe the turn of speech *skide på* (likewise vulg.,) about ignoring, neglecting a person, a prescript etc., connotative contents apparently emerge, which cannot be related to *på* (the preposition), and it is doubtful whether it was latent in the verb *skide*. This is as strange as what is seen when a prefix is added to simplex (described earlier).

D and K — as far as the author understands the problem — may be interchanged. With *salig* 'blessed' we have in mind a person in the heaven of religion; but in a secular meaning, the word appears in for instance *han er salig, når han har tændt sin pibe* 'blessed or blissful when he has lit his pipe'. It is not excluded that the latter idea suggests itself as number one to the observer, associating in the first place *salig* with the material meaning. It is not in any simple way clear what is D and what is K (though after a short consideration we see that in this case the physical meaning cannot be number one). The

Danish *flab* is different; this is 'chap, jaw of an animal', but moreover a person characterized by rude language, a puppy, unlicked cub — only on second thought do we establish D and K.

It is superfluous to point out that connotative meaning does not necessarily create phraseologisms. But exactly here big problems are encountered (as mentioned cursorily): phraseological and non-phraseological use of figurative meaning, a problem that has also been tackled by Lønstrup.

With the verb *bære*, roughly translated 'carry', the notion of transporting something is no doubt felt as the primary, denotative meaning, whereas the meaning 'endure', *bære* figuratively, is related to connotation. Considering *han bar vore sygdomme* (Matth. 8,17) a phraseologism cannot be claimed (the text might as well have run: bar vore lidelser, trængsler 'bore our sufferings and tribulations', *bar* being taken just in a figurative meaning). Saying *han havde en tung byrde at bære på* 'carried a heavy burden' we may have in mind A. a sack of coke etc., and B. a feeling of guilt, grief etc. Only the surroundings clear up whether we are dealing with D or with K.

It may reasonably be maintained that the connotative contents of the word or at any rate something lying outside D forms part of the phraseological expression — which, of course, refers to the image. Can we when studying phraseology exclude, in principle, denotative contents? This is questionable.

Without doubt *Der står kvinder bag alt* (about the role of women; they "stand behind everything") is a phraseologism. The utterance has a monolith mark (not: ... ladies ..., and not: behind various things ...); and a FRI appears in an utterance like *Der står tre kvinder bag havelågen* 'three women are standing behind the garden gate'. But by *kvinder*, in our FRA, is undoubtedly meant the denotation *kvinder* (regular kvinder, corporal beings), although we would expect K. This embarrases us, and, obviously, we must be content with the fact that *something* in the FRA mentioned, but not the figure of speech as a whole, contains K, viz. "står" (not to be understood as denoting a standing position as opposed to a lying one — in the FRI mentioned above *sidder* might replace *står*). In other words: in a FRA something must be K. — This problem we know from Tezisy 1961, too: one of the components or both are used metaphorically. (It is difficult to doubt that *Der står kvinder bag alt* has a monolith mark — and it is difficult for us to accept "Uncle said that there stood women behind everything" (in Danish the tense is changed on account of the indirect speech).

For the time being we shall elaborate on the distribution on FRI and FRA, establishing (the view will be changed below)

D	FRI
K	FRA.

K attracts FRA, and D pertains to FRI. There is a coherence K/FRA, but also figurative meaning outside FRA should be remembered. Koefoed (1971: 84) rightly calls attention to an enigmatic factor which we shall depict ⇄ (arrow and counter-arrow) and approach from another starting point. The question is whether idiomatic use leads to K, or whether K leads to idiomatic use. (Koefoed contrasts English *negro* and *nigger*).

Again we shall consider *han satte foden under eget bord* meaning 'he became independent, he established himself, no longer living in rented rooms'. Nothing in *fod* (D) gives rise to *fod* in the mentioned expression, nothing serves as a natural explanation for the figure of speech. It seems more reasonable to say that *fod* (D), directly understood, is placed together with *bord* (D) 'table' whereupon both words fade, leave D and become K



though we cannot ascertain with any certainty what K covers, apart from its being non-D. Fading is hardly the right word; this suggests an idea of wear and tear, which undoubtedly occurs with a great number of images (see Lønstrup's remarks on clichés); the present study is inclined to presume that D is automatically eliminated at the birth of the phraseologism.

The figure of speech *vande høns* 'blubber' (and several others) raise the question of whether we have FRA or FIGU (a figurative use outside FRA). The words say 'water, irrigate' and 'hen', but the meaning 'cry, weep' is not attached to anything in *vande* or anything in *høns*. Let us briefly mention the FRA *have en høne at plukke med nogen for* 'have a bone to pick with somebody', or the FRA *du har skudt papegøjen* "shot the parrot" for 'have made a lucky hit', which is evidently not a case of D. Considering *Det er jeg ikke meget for* (FRA) weakly expressing one's opposition, we search in vain for K — to be sure *ikke meget for*, lit. "not much for", is "something else" than in FRI, but where is the proof?

We might, for example, operate with "close-K" and "distant-K", for the latter an "extra-K" is a possibility. In the same way as the distinction D/K the distinction FIGU/FRA causes difficulties. K inspires to figurative meaning (possibly, we keep the meaning in check) which is not FRA, and at the same time K inspires FRA (semantics are incalculable). (In both cases we meet the problem of "arrow and counter-arrow"). A possible solution is to view what we meet in the contents of the sign in FRA (or rather in the meaning of the FRA) as something that in an indeterminable way drifts away from K (whereas we do not attach that to D), depicted by means of a spiral



Isačenko and Lønstrup, too, point to the problem FIGU versus FRA (our abbreviations). (Earlier we have mentioned Fernando's distinction between pure idioms, semi-idioms and marginal idioms).

By way of illustration: *Afdøde have skænket overlægen sit hjerte til forskingsformål* (FRI)/*sygeplejersken havde skænket overlægen sit hjerte* (FRA), 'the deceased had donated his heart to the chief surgeon for research purposes', and 'the nurse had given the chief surgeon her heart' (FRA)='was in love with him'. Here we see double exposure. In the FRA we presume K — but on second thoughts an extra-K (the *spiral*).

The same phenomenon is illustrated by *Hunden sætter sig på bagbenene* (FRI)/ *Hansen sætter sig på bagbenene* (FRA) with double exposure: The dog sits down on his hind legs/Mr. Hansen cuts up rough.

We consider *Det var vand på* (*militarismens*) *mølle*, lit. 'water on the mill of militarism' (in which double exposure can hardly be alleged). In this FRA K cannot be attached to *vand* 'water "(*livets vand* 'aqua vitae' contains K). Apparently we (in the FRA) are dealing with K, since it is non-D. It is, however, futile to look for K. An attempt to interpret *vand* as "argumentation in favour of, a statement supporting something" leads to nothing: we cannot even glimpse the denotation *vand* D, which according to Lønstrup is a presupposition for K. Nor can *mølle* be interpreted as "view, attitude" (it is easier to associate *mølle* 'mill' with chattering). — Some sentences follow without comment: *han bad om et glas rent vand skyl tallerkenen i det rene vand*; *Himmelbjerget er det rene vand ved siden af Mont Blanc* — "rene vand" being 'pure water', and in the FRA meaning 'nothing, without any importance, zero'.

We stop at the explanation that we are facing a *conglomerate* "vand-på-mølle"; the image is an entity which qua totality evokes a definite understanding (which is not attained by those who dissect the figure of speech into single words — for this reason phraseologisms in a foreign language cause us insuperable difficulties).

The Russian *s"el sobaku* ... has been mentioned more than once ('he is an expert of'). This figure of speech defies any analysis of *s"el* and *sobaka* (pursuing the two words, each of them separately, with a view to their combinability, we do not reach a solution; in vain we consult Anisimova (1975): with *est'* we find, apart from current connections, *est' čužoj chleb, darom chleb est'*).

Phrases are often inexplicable, and the native speaker will have to learn them at school or from his family[6].

We have operated with three possibilities



but this scheme is unsatisfactory if we adhere to the view that a given expression of sign corresponds to a contents of sign. The difficulties of pointing out D and K, for instance in prefixed verbs under certain circumstances, are counterbalanced when we waive the demand for isolated position as a condition for establishing denotative meaning, i.e. let the surroundings decide the meaning of the word: then it seems possible to separate *udsætte vagtpost* 'post a sentinel' from *udsætte møde, udsætte et musikværk* etc. 'postpone a meeting, arrange a piece of music for ...'.

It seems that a word may be found outside D and K (without a spiral as an explanation). For instance: *han stod i begreb med at emigrere* 'was on the point of emigrating'. *I begreb med* is idiomatic. *Begreb* differs — as we expect — from *begreb* in a neutral sense (*et filosofisk begreb, almindelige moralske begreber, ikke have begreb om et emne,* meaning 'a philosphical concept, common moral concepts, I don't know a thing about it'). It is questionable whether we can attach such a neutral sense to the word at all, and it is difficult to catch sight of a connotation. The phraseological expression perhaps contains a *begreb* lying "outside" the normal *begreb* and not being identifiable (it is a loan translation from the German *Begriff, im Begriff sein, stehen*).

It is well known that dealing with a given word we have



wavy lines indicating an unknown relation. This is seemingly self-evident — but pedagogue and translator will know that here we have the cause of numerous errors of translation. Danish *hjerte* has no reflected image in Czech *srdce*. What corresponds to Danish *den nøgne sandhed, gøre forestillinger, ren tidsspilde, hul røst,* etc. is not predictable; roughly translated: 'the naked truth, make representations to (in diplomatic language), waste of time, a hollow voice etc.'.

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[6] Inexplicable Czech figures of speech are treated for instance by Pavel Eisner (1946) (Chapter XXI: "Každému svoje Poděbrady", pp. 147 - 50).

We have desired to separate FRI and FRA. Obviously, we are not entitled to establish the theory.



seeing that K equally well conveys figurative meaning in the single word, and FRA is one manifestation of figurative meaning (besides poetical language) More correct is



but there are many indications for establishing the theory (in spite of its weakness)



in which sequence Danish *hus* is understood as a real house, as family (the royal family), and in the third case it has to do with "make no end of a row" there has been a quarrel).

7. Some additions should be made to the description of the phraseologism. It is characteristic of the relevant expressions and figures of speech that they favour *rhyme and rhythm*[7]. At random we would mention *frisk som en fisk*, *kommer tid*, *kommer råd*, *alle gode gange tre*, *hellere levne end revne* (Kjær and Holbek deal in detail with matters of rhyme and with the rhythm preferred in Danish proverbs etc.). (A jocular paraphrase exists of the last proverb: *Hellere revne end levne* 'it is better to burst than to leave (uneaten food)'. — We shall not attempt a separation according to the character of the rhyme, the various types of rhymes, alliterations etc. (see for instance Kjær and Holbek (1972:33), and Lønstrup, too, has some examples). Examples (proverbs) include *Tie og tænke kan ingen krænke*, *Man skal rette pynten efter mønten*, *Den der*

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[7] It serves no purpose to give reference to literature. The contributions are numerous. To state one example we could mention (from *Ordsprog i Danmark* ved Iver Kjær and Bengt Holbek 1972: 326, in the bibliography) Jensen, Jens M.: *Forlydsrim udlydsrim og rytmiske talemåder i vendelbomål* describing figures of speech from one province in Northern Jutland.

giver, til han tigger, han skal slå's til en tigger, illustrating the principle. We must leave out translations.

Dealing with Czech figures of speech, we would quote *Tu míli měřili dva zamilovaní,* to be understood "that mile is far too long, it has been measured by two people in love", also documented in the form *dlouhá míla, měřila ji s milým milá,* in other words two people in love do not consider a mile long, they do not measure it objectively, love makes the long distance short, a measuring of that kind cannot be valid. Here appears an improper rhyme *míla/ milá,* but a rhyme effect is aimed at (we have quoted the phrase from Zaorálek (1947:405). We are approaching the *puns,* in Russian kalambúr from French calembour, for which phraseologism also has an eye.

Examples of rhymes are *nemá to rohy ani nohy* (Z: 676), saying that something is of bad quality, not completely corresponding to Danish *hverken fugl eller fisk* 'neither bird nor fish'; *roba jako vrba* (Z:686) (with dial. *roba* for 'girl, woman') demonstrates that something is too big as to volume; *má hosti bez kostí* (Z:694) is a euphemism for "he has lice".

Further *udělal hek a byl vek* (Z:663), with a German *weg,* meaning 'he is dead'. *Budeš bit jako Svatovid* (Z:533) means 'you will be thrashed'. We find also (Z:603) *lež jako věž,* lit. 'a lie like a tower'; *ani vrkl, ani cvrkl* (Z:608) about a silent person; *mlátí, mlatí ale nikdy neobrátí* (Z:194), meaning 'he thrashes again and again, the result being only sláma ('chaff, rubbish')', used about a talkative person, a chatterbox.

What is not a rhyme in the proper meaning of the word we meet for instance in *vzkazuje mu tolik zdraví, kolik na té louce trávy* about wishing somebody good health (Z:541), or *nebuď labuť* to be understood 'don't be silly, don't put up with that' with the annotation students' slang.

A Russian example (with partial rhyme) is the phraseologism *uški na makúške* (from Grigor'eva and Motina (1963:23)) (makuška is a 'tree top', and also colloquially 'crown, top of the head') in the meaning 'to be attentive, watchful, be on one's guard'. A genuine rhyme is found in *konéc — delu venec* from the same source (p. 57).

Cases of another type include Czech *myslí, že je jediný* followed by a pensive addition, perhaps murmured: *a je jich jak četyny* as we understand from Zaorálek (1947:585) i.e. 'he believes he is the only one', to which is added 'but there are plenty of them, as many as there are needles on a spruce'. There is a slight resemblance to Danish "tror han da" or "skulde man tro" ('he himself believes, or one might think'). It would hardly be correct to consider the Czech expression a dialogism.

A speaker may resort to irregular words, fantasy words, home-made words in order to create the rhythm: *mazat trata tata,* mentioned Z:667, about rushing away, or perhaps meaning 'clear out at once'. Perhaps counting-out rhymes of the children belong here: *Ellera sellera sibra sold* used by Danish children.

Foreign words may be used, in Czech figures of speech *ancvaj* (Eins, zwei) may occur.

8. Idiomatics naturally appear to us *genuine* Danish, "Danish to the backbone", and the same applies to Czech. As a rule this is correct, and we see, indeed, that good old words survive in figures of speech as well as in proverbs. This preserving capacity of phraseologism has been mentioned previously, illustrated by *trække på samme hammel* etc., *hammel* is 'rudder bar'; impenetrable expressions like *give sit besyv med* 'give one's opinion', in which *besyv* is a mystical word, and others. Words that are incomprehensible (or only understood in the given context) survive, or the expression is adapted, restored as it were, and the phraseologism continues to survive. The expression *der er ugler i mosen,* lit. 'there are owls in the moor', saying that something is wrong, seems to have replaced the older one *der er ulve i mosen,* 'wolves etc.' after the wolves disappeared in Denmark, meaning there is mischief brewing.

Czech *zprav se jako řemen v úhni* (ůhni) is "corrected" in certain sources to *v uhlí* — part of the expression is renewed, the phraseologism survives. We find *polepší se jako řemen v ohni* saying sarcastically and ironically that he "improves like a strap in fire" (meaning "he absolutely does not improve") — but the combination (strap and fire) is enigmatic.

As for the Russian we find in several expositions of our subject the figure of speech *bit' baklúši,* which means 'to idle'. MAS states the noun only in that connection with the explanation' to idle, occupy oneself with trifles'. Kure, in his famous dictionary from the beginning of the century, knows the word *baklúša,* in his translation it is 'træklods, wooden block (from which kitchen utensils are made)' (our translation); the expression mentioned above is translated 'idle, play tricks'. So, originally the figure of speech means ("chop a block into small pieces".

The phraseologism must be genuine Danish (Czech). This, however, does not prevent it from containing foreign words or being based on a foreign connection. In Czech we find *hin* from German in *už je hin*, i.e. 'he is dead' (Zaorálek (1947:663), under phrases about death); likewise *udělal hek a byl vek*=German *weg*, ibid. — As regards Danish we might, perhaps, point out *Ach du lieber Augustin, last not least*, and French *en fin*, etc.

A German pattern is presumed in Czech *dostat domácí nemoc*, i.e. 'longing to go home' (from German *Heimweh*), thus Zaorálek (1947:211) (English has *homesickness*). *Ten není ani sladký ani hořký* is said to be genuine Czech, whereas *ani sladkỳ ani kyselỳ* is a Germanism. The expression *stálo za to* is evidently borrowed from the German. — Mašín (1924) has several remarks on Germanisms, in some cases gross Germanisms.

9. Two languages will show several *parallelisms* in phraseology. The general view that you will now and then meet identical figures of speech, does not hold true — there are numerous parallelisms. Let us mention some cases at random chosen among a multitude of parallelisms.

Vstal dnes levou nohou napřed, Z:613 under expressions concerning our mood, almost like Danish *få det forkerte ben ud af sengen* 'the wrong leg etc.', denoting crossness. The Czech has also the more drastic *vstal dnes po prdeli,* or *vzhůru prdelí* (*prdel* is vulgar for posterior); *hore zadkem* also occurs. There is a weak resemblance to the Danish *være på røven* (vulg.), speaking of bad economics.

Zalézt do peří 'creep down in the feathers' about going to bed, but more distinctly in Danish *komme op af fjerene. Andělíčci derou* (or *drhnou*) *peří,* meaning 'fine snow is falling' (Z:258) resembles "englene ryster dynerne". *Darovanému koni na zuby nehledět,* saying that one should not look a gift horse in the mouth (Z:165), i.e. not criticize a gift, has a parallel in Danish, see Kjær and Holbek (1972:26): "ikke skue given hest i munde".

Dělat (*něco*) *s těžkým srdcem* (Z:333) like Danish 'gøre noget med tungt hjerte'. *Tady je dobrá rada drahá,* noted from SSJČ:I, XIV, =her er gode råd dyre, about a difficult situation. The same source shows *dělat si z něho dobrý den* for 'make him ridiculous', with resemblance for instance to the Danish *han gav en god dag i faderens formaninger* 'neglected his father's admonition'.

The Dane meets parallelisms in Czech for *skrive sig bag øre* (Z:694), *det femte hjul til en vogn* (ibid.), or *holde sig i skindet* (Z:680); a partial parallel appears in the expression *je to z lesa* (Z:676), "noget er helt i skoven" (of very bad quality).

In VRČ we find (vol. 3:666) as an explanation of the Russian *proslezít'sja* the Czech *zaslzeti, býti pohnut k szám,* the last words corresponding to our *bevæget til tårer,* 'moved etc.'.

Extremely interesting is the particular coincidence (Z:115) *hodit* or *střihnout, vrazit,* (*někomu*) *jednu* with elliptic *facku* 'ørefigen, box on the ear', corresponding to Danish *stikke ham en* (*lussing*). Let us also state *sahat si za vlastní ňadra* (Z:215), 'gribe i egen barm', in English 'look nearer home'.

Přešlo mu to do krve means 'he has got accustomed to something, it has become "his second nature", Danish 'er gået ham i blodet'; and *dělat* (*někde*) *zlou krev* (Z:158) means 'pick a quarrel', with a Danish parallelism "sætte ondt blod". Czech knows (Z:271) *zdvihnout* (*s něceho*) *poklicku* 'løfte låget for noget', and *naskočila mu husí kůže* (Z:682) is in Danish 'fik gåsehud', got goose pimples.

An interesting case is *to je z pekla práce,* lit. "it is from Hell a job", in Danish 'et helvedes arbejde', where, we suppose, the word helvedes is not understood as genitive!

A parallel occurs in *být* (*něčím*) *jenom na papiře* (Z:247) 'være noget på papiret'. And *nemít* (*něčeho*) *co by za nehet vlezlo* (*or padlo*), have little or nothing' (Z:210) shows an approximate parallel: *så meget som der kan ligge på en negl.*

Popálil se prsty, which is explained 'účastnil se něčeho se ztrátou, hanbou etc.' corresponds to the Danish "brænde fingrene på noget, brænde sig på (et huskøb, when buying a house etc.)"; cf. also the Russian *obžeč'sja na čëm-l.* Czech examples are quoted from *Mašín* (1924). *Příjmout někoho*, *něco*, *s otevřenou náručí* or *s otevřeným náručím* corresponds to our *modtage med åben favn*, *åbne arme.* Czech has *boj až na nůž* about merciless hostility as Danish has *krig på kniven* (it says that a war is going on, but not that the parties are going to carry matters to extremes) (Z:223); doubtless from German. Polish shows a different construction: *być, iść z kimś na noże* about hostile relationship (according to Skorupka).

Hladit (*někoho*) *proti srsti* (Z:333) means 'tease, annoy, torment somebody', cf. Danish *stryge mod hårene.* We meet a partial parellel between *jedna dvě* (or *jedna tři*) *něco udělat* 'do something immediately' (Z:115) and the Danish *gøre noget en-to-tre.* Czech here also knows *ancvaj* (corrupted from German *eins zwei*); Danish children's language has "einsvein-drein".

Zaorálek: 680 states under the theme *touha* (longing; the same article deals with wish, inclination, desire and impatience) *nemůže se udržet v kůži*, almost like our *kan ikke holde sig i skindet.* In these two phraseologisms the same material is repeated, but the semantic accordance is not quite certain. — Further, we shall mention *mluví jako sklepý o barvách* (Z:526). Add to this *pilný jako mravenec* (or *jako včela*) like Danish. *Pije jako houba* shows similarity, likewise to a certain degree *je toho jako hub po dešti* about a great multitude, and accordance is seen with *jako dvě kapky vody* (Z:461) about great similarity.

Further we mention *lehký jako peří* (Z:505), and an incomplete parallel appears in *jsi mi vzácný jako slepičí peří*, reflected in Danish "rager mig en fjer".

With the word parallel we have not in mind a consistent parallelism (that a given word accompanies the word of the other language in all combinations — that would be extremely seldom indeed). We meet *hladový jako pes* for the Danish "hundesulten", a "sulten som en hund" is hardly probable, but equally we meet *opuštěny jako pes*, i.e. '*left* in the lurch', which is not recognized in Danish, and immediately after that we find *lakomý jako pes, žízeň jako pes*, in the same way alien to Danish. The jako/som-relationship will be examined carefully in a separate work, and here we shall confine ourselves to pointing out that a Frenchman, a Hungarian etc. would not meet the same parallels as the Dane.

Czech has *peněz jako hnoje* (Z:611) and *peněz jako hlíny* or *peněz jako hader*

— the former showing a parallel in our *penge som skidt* (like German *Geld haben wie Mist*).

We find *hbity, čiperny jako veverka* (Z:548), approximately Danish *væver som et egern* 'agile as a squirrel', but besides that veverka appears in *dítě kouká jako veverka*, which is understood čile, bystře, 'bright, quick-witted', where the parallel ceases.

The Dane finds no parallel to *fuld som en pave* 'drunk as a Pope', but the pope forms part of other phraseologisms like *neomylný jako papež*; also in the comparison consisting of two relationships: *máš do toho stejně daleko jako papež do nebe* (about a great distance, about being far from something, a goal for instance). (*Papez* forms part of three figures of speech in addition to the above mentioned role as comparatum, see Z:247). — *Flyv ikke før du har fået vinger* from Kjær and Holbek: 22 corresponds to a Czech proverb.

Russian examples include: *naložit' po gorbu*, noted from Tezisy: 20, to which corresponds *gi' på puklen, tæske. Schvatyvat'* (*chvatat' schvatit'*) *na letu* (*čto*), colloquially used for 'understand something, grasp, master, pick up something quickly and easily, about a gifted person' (Jarancev 1978: 18) with a partial Danish parallel *gribe i flugten* 'catch in the flight''.

Brat' (*vzjat'*) *byka za roga*, colloquially 'begin to act in an energetic, resolute way, tackle the most important matter right away' (which we most often meet in *vzjal byka za roga*) seems to be covered by the Danish *tage tyren ved hornene* (and probably *han tog tyren ved hornene*, past tense, would be the most natural situation).

Zasučiv rukava is recognized immediately by the Dane from *smøge ærmerne op*: seize hold of something eagerly, without a pause. *Porocha ne vydumaet* has already been mentioned, and the same holds true of *pal'cem ne ševel'nut'* or *ne dvinut'* (Jarancev: 49) with a pronouced parallelism: partly be idle, partly demonstratively refuse to support somebody, like *ikke røre en finger*.

From Grigor'eva and Motina (1963) we add other expressions which correspond to the Danish ones: *dat' vodu* (*na č' ju-n.*) *mel'nicu, v mútnoj vode rybu lovit'*.. "fiske i rørt vande", *kak dve kapli vody, vskružit' golovu* (*komu-n*). *terjat'* and *poterjat' golovu*. Further *s lica zemli stret'* (*kogo-n.*), *licom k licu* (*s kem-n.*) (vstretit'sja, stilknut'sja), *svjazyvat'* and *svjazat'* (*kogo-n*). *po rukam i nogam, po pal'cam možno soščitat' ne smet'rta raskryt'* (*pered kem-n*)., *podnimat'* and *podnjat' ruku* (*na kogo-n., na čto-n.*), *položá ruku ná serdce, zakon vstupil v silu, smech skvoz' slezy, ne verit'* and *ne poverit' ušam svoim*. Add to this *čërnym po belomu* (napisano), *brosat'* and *brosit žrebij* etc.

The Danish expression *være du's med*, which in English is rendered "be on Christian name terms with", has to our surprise a parallel in Russian, even if not a complete one. What we are familiar with in Danish may be either a person or a profession; it seems in Russian to be confined to the latter; *byt' na ty s cem-libo*. Babkin (1970:198) states several examples, one of them runs *vozmožnost' byt' na "ty" s groznymi silami prirody* (talking about vulcanologists.

Polish examples noted from Skorupka (1967) include: *mieć nóż na gardle* about being in distress, Danish "have kniven pa struben". An interesting example is *być komuś kulą u nogi* 'burden, hamper, impede somebody', Danish *være en klods om benet på nogen*, 'drag on somebody'.

If we succeed in registering all parallel cases, the nonparallel cases are left — but to that should be added a great number of phraseologisms showing approximate parallelism. The collection of parallel cases will be a great benefit to the philologist, the translator and the pedagogue. Parallelisms, as well as the opposite of parallelism, illustrate associations in the language. Associations differ in various languages, which makes observations of accordance especially interesting. The question of association paths, in one language or when two languages are examined, is elaborated in detail by Lønstrup. Primitively, we can depict the problem



Comparing Czech and Danish phraseology we see an amazing difference with regard to the use of *names of persons and places* as constituents: their occurrence in Czech is pronounced, names of persons hardly referring to definite individuals or precisely stated persons, and place names do not always cover actual localities (which on the other hand is not excluded), but rather we are dealing with figures from fairy tales and fables long since forgotten, traditions from older generations.

To state some few examples: *už je z toho Jan*= už je z toho pomatený, which we understand as bewildered or crazy (from Z:111). On the same page *dělat janka*=tvářit se hloupě, dělat se hloupým, přetvařovat se i.e. be affected or rather pretend to be silly. A characteristic case is *jde pozadu jak svatý Martin* 'he brings up the rear', the explanation being that "sv. Martin má svátek teprve po Všech svatych" — the llth respectively the lst of November.

The table of contents, arranged by subject in Zaorálek's book, further states (under *náhle*) the figures of speech (p. 613) *vyletěla jako Kača z pukača* (according to SSJČ a percussion cap gun), and *vyletěl jak Michal ze síně* (or *z konopí*). We try in vain to identify Kača, Michal and an endless row of other persons appearing in phraseology.

When considering place names we soon realize that we must reckon partly with real names, partly apparent names, often witty constructions (which the student of linguistical nonsense should have in mind). Examples include: *hodil by se (do Přeločue na čamrdy* (Z:587), describing thinness (*čamrda*, we understand, is a spinning button pierced by a stick, peg top). Under "abuse somebody, scold somebody" we find (Z:589) *povědět po čem jsou hřibata v Chrudimi* or *po čem je v Pardubicích perník* — a motivation for the use of that place name may be found only after through studies, if at all.

About a glutton we find (Z:594) *vyvede ho za mastnou vidličku az do Vykane* (which is certainly no geographical notion. One might perhaps suppose a coherence with the verb *vykanouti* 'stream (about tears)'?). — That a person is indifferent to something (Z:595) can be said in the figure of speech: *Jemu je Pardubice jako jitrnice* (the last word is corrected to *jaternice* 'Leberwurst, liver paste').

Place names are constructed, we suppose, in a figure of speech about poverty (Z:591) *je z Chudinkova* or *z Nemanic* (i.e. nemá nic), *z Vysokého nedaleko Ponikléha*; also *z Nouzova*. — *Poslat na Výstrkov* (Z:689) expresses the idea of driving away somebody.

In the author's opinion personal names seldom form part of Danish phraseologisms. Of course, comparisons as *smuk som en Adonis*, *gammel som Methusalem* and several others do occur, but numerically they can never compete with the Czech expressions. Figures from Andersen's tales immediately suggest themselves (*som den tapre tinsoldat*, *som barnet i Kejserens nye klæder*). Likewise biblical names: *som den vantro Thomas* etc., 'doubting Thomas' etc.

We shall mention some Danish figures of speech containing such names (omitting translation apart from exceptional cases). Well-known Danish figures of speech, based on personal names, are the following (translation omitted): *spildte ord på Balle-Lars uden at spørge Per eller Poul* (consulting nobody), where Czech has *at' je to Petr nebo Capl* for 'I do not care'. *Ane* or *Maren i kæret*; *det regner, sa' Per Degner* etc. In Danish one can say *Det var ellers en ordentlig Svend*; Svend is a boy's name, but hardly what is found in the phrase, which expresses a great size, a heavy rucksack, a big fish, a thick manuscript etc.

Well-known are *Nysgerrig-Per*, *Bulder-Jørgen*, *Luskemikkel* (about one who slinks away, shirks), *Hyklermikkel* (hypocrite, *Sjuske-Malene*, *Sjuske-Dorte* (slattern, slut), and indefinite expressions of the type *skvaddermikkel*, *skvatimikkel*, *kludremikkel*, *Skrive-Søren*, *Jens* (the Danish soldier), *Mester Erik* (the rattan cane in one of Holberg's comedies), expressions that characterize persons, mostly negatively — we shall not go deeper into this sphere, in fact, we are not dealing with true phraseologisms.

One example should be given of personal names in Russian phraseologisms: *Mit'koj zvali*, telling us that the person in question has disappeared irrevocably, only his memory has been preserved (we have drawn this case from

Babkin's *Russkaja frazeologija* (1970). The expression in unknown in MAS explaining that Mit'ka is diminutive of Dmitrij.

It is well known that observers of language try to adopt a total view, characterizing a language briefly, emphasizing one pronounced feature. This, of course, does not lead to any objective judgment, but is still worth remembering. U. Albeck (1973: 130) in her book on stylistics, says: "the ironical form seems to be remarkably frequent in Danish and may to a certain degree be considered a national form of expression" (the original text is Danish).

The evaluation of the Czech philologist Pavel Eisner of his mother tongue (in *Chrám i tvrz* (1946:321 ff)) is not very flattering: Czech has to a special degree, we understand, an eye for the negative qualities of the neighbour, it manifests itself in frequent use of privativum *ne-*; the positive qualities of a person pass unseen, to a great degree the Czech pays attention to "the mote that is in thy brother's eye".

10. It is seen immediately that phraseologisms do not suggest themselves to the same degree in every situation of life. With the word *prolificacy* we have two things in mind: one could ask to what degree the *single word* is the basis of the phraseological connection (and this seems to be what O. S. Achmanova, in Tezisy (1961:8), has in mind when speaking about *tjagotenie* and *ottalkivanie*), and secondly one may have in mind the prolificacy of an *area of notions*, i.e. to what degree a given sector of life (reflected in the corresponding section of the table of contents according to subject) is provided with phraseological expressions. The latter attracts our attention. We rely on the thematic section in Zaorálek's work. It is easy to see that prolificacy (as described) is not ascertained on the basis of the register's organization. For instance with *kůň* the answer is negative, whereas the voluminous chapter about the comparison has a full column, *kůň*, thus showing high fertility. *Silný jako kůň* in the thematic section appears under *silný*, and the section about figures of speech (apart from comparisons) contains two and a half columns about *kůň*.

The spheres of life do not invite idiomatics to the same degree. The "negative" fields more than others attract the metaphoric periphrase — but the results of our investigation can only be called approximate; a thorough analysis would have to take an endless multitude of details into consideration.

It appears for instance that when *drunkenness* (see Zaorálek (1947:636) about *opilý* forms part of the connection, the expressions are spread over 6 columns (here we would mention Kaj Bom's (1957) work on Danish slang, and a psycholinguistic study by S. Schoubye (1949) on the relation of alcohol to language); it looks as if this area, with regard to space, is only surpassed by *stupidity*, hloupost, occupying 7 columns.

Other big areas, in a rough estimate, are *nepříjemnost and hubenost*. Expressions connected with *hurry*, *spěch*, show relatively strong representation, likewise figures of speech mocking fat persons, *tloušťka*, such as denote what is done in vain, *marnost*, expressions dealing with poverty and misery, *mizina*.

We find prolificacy with *spánek*, expressions for cheating and tricking (*šiditi*), for conceit and pride (*pýcha*), for fear (*strach*), hunger (*hlad*), weakness (*slabost*), and, apparently, to a lesser degree with *nadávati*, *škaredost*, *starosti*, *špinavost*, *úspěch*, *holedbavost*, *silný*, *smích* and *zamračenost*.

A little weaker is the representation with "*whatever the cost*, *at any price*", *špatný*, *úlek*, *mrzutý*, and let us further mention, with more or less the same representation, figures of speech concerning old maids (*staropanenství*), cross-eyedness, hostility, sincereness, also diarrhoea, expressions connected with eating, here also *prohra* (fiasco and loss), *touha*, *tvrdost* and *úplatnost* (to be open to bribery).

For obvious reasons it is impossible to tell how great the prolificacy is with names of persons and places — they are scattered unpredictably, but is is easily seen that their share in idiomatics is remarkably great.

Our remarks on prolificacy are based on an arbitrary evaluation. Prolificacy has nothing to do with actual frequency, but our remarks reflect what spheres of human life attract idiomatics. An exact picture is not attained — even the most sophisticated thematic system will encounter insoluble questions: anger-indignation-resentment-displeasure-crossness etc. elude a classification. Thus, we have also illustrated the difficulties of comparing the prolificacy of two languages.

We can also estimate in which cases prolificacy is slight. We mention for example *sladký* where six comparisons are stated (with *jako* for particula comparationis) and only one figure of speech: *ten není ani sladký, ani hořký* saying he has not got a definite view of something. And with *spolehlivost* 'reliability' only two cases occur. With positive qualities you meet less prolificacy — but if it is a matter of taunts and derogatory statements the language displays great inventiveness as mentioned earlier.

It is also of interest to see what tangible things and beings colour the phraseology, for instance animals, phenomena from nature and weather, what in Danish is called "de nære ting" (lit. the near things), i.e. things from daily life etc.

Some spot tests (from Czech idiomatics) show popular components: from the animal kingdom dog, pig, fish, hen, swine, calf, louse, wolf, sparrow, ox, hare and goose; from the world of nature wind, air; and "the near things" are supposed to include egg, hair, stone, bread and water. Outside this circle we find in numerous figures of speech *žid* 'jew', often in a derogatory sense.

Considering a comparison with a verb as comparandum, we shall probably find — in the opinion of the author — that *simplex* results in a greater number of images than does a *prefixed* verb, due to the semantic narrowing ("specialization") that is the most important manifestation of prefixation. We are then dealing with prolificacy as to principles, different from what has just been described.

Prolificacy of the single word, of course, is not equal to the combinability of the word, its sočetaemost'. Whereas the study of the sentence is old, investigation of slovosočetanie, the connection between the members of the sentence, their relation, has been taken up only in the last decades (in Russian linguistics), as we see from V. P. Suchotin's introduction to A. K. Demidova's work on the regimen of the verb. A copious exposition of slovosočetanie is found in Sørensen (1966:208—62), applicable to Russian in the same way as the works we are going to mention. With regard to reference books of the 1970s, we mention a work by T. I. Anisimova et alii (1975) and one by V. Andreeva-Georg and V. Tolmačëva (on the verb) from the same year. These two works contain a great number of phraseologisms; as an example may serve *Duša (=serdce) ne ležit k komu-l., k čemu-l.* (under ležat') expressing that the person in question has no interest in, no sympathy for, no confidence in somebody etc., and from the last mentioned work *delat' iz múchi sloná*, our Danish "gøre en myg til en elefant", lit. 'make an elephant out of a gnat' (the English say "make a mountain out of a molehill"), under delat'. Both works indicate phraseologisms typographically, but it is superfluous to remark that their main object is to serve as dictionaries of constructions, expound sočetaemost'; as for the verb this means whether it is connected with čto, kogo, komu, prepositional member etc., but information is also given as to which individual words that verb is "fit" to be combined with.

Combinability concerns us (although this, naturally, is not the same as creation of phraseology): a given word is connected with many words, but not with any word. Connotation has been discussed in the previous text, and here we shall be satisfied with fragments of one example, a complete investigation being too circumstantial. We shall look at the verb *nære* in terms of prolificacy, and let the verb form part of current sequences, arranged in a „positive" and a "negative" column — the verb is not predetermined to appear in only one column:

nære

tillid 'trust'	mistillid 'mistrust'
agtelse 'respect'	afsky 'hate, loathing'
kærlighed 'love'	had 'hatred'
varme følelser 'warm feelings'	÷
÷	frygt 'fear'.

Some possible sequences have been mentioned (we ignore the problems of Danish *nære sig* and *nærende*, the latter is a participle as well as an adjective).

We might have chosen a Czech verb instead of *nære*.

11. Retrospect and conclusion. The scholar can build up the study of phraseology in many ways, and many tasks are in store for him. He can pursue the principles of phraseologism in general, or he can collect parallelisms. It will be fruitful to deal with the rhythm in the stock phrases; Kjær and Holbek has observed definite rhythms in Danish proverbs. Examinations of the role of the animal in idiomatics are fruitful, cf. animals and birds in the above-mentioned work, p. 23, and especially the study of the role of names in figures of speech. The use of grammatical tense also attracts the scholar's attention (Danish proverbs seldom show preterite tense for what is universal, see Kjær and Holbek 1972:26; it is different in Slavic).

The present study has not attained a division of phraseological types; the aim has been to create a serviceable working basis. A separate study will concentrate on the comparison (especially Czech ... *jako* ... and Danish ... *som* ...), and this is without doubt a suitable division of phraseologisms (Zaorálek takes the same attitude). Apparently one might divide the total volume of phraseologisms into non-comparison and comparison-solely (the image still being present), but this is an illusion, and we shall do it this way:



seeing that the non-comparison may possess some features of the comparison, and, conversely, comparison may overlap the non-comparison. The arbitrary drawing serves to keep the thought fixed — of course, we are not speaking about one half versus one half.

Zaorálek's division is the following: over 400 pages catalogue figures of speech, comparisons occupy almost one hundred and fifty pages, whereupon a thematical index follows. The title is explicitly *Lidová rčení* (poetical language not being included). It is remarkable that erotica are not included (which seems to be a common feature of the relevant collections), they are considered improper; on the other hand, his work is not reticent or delicate as far as vulgar words are concerned, often latrine words, words for relieving oneself etc. It is well known that Tang Kristensen, the great Danish folklorist, certainly knew and noted erotica, but he did not want to have them printed ("immoral proverbs"). — Mašín's work is a dictionary of constructions, which also contains numerous phraseologisms; the disposition is of less interest here; his basis is printed literature, and as far as one can judge, his examples are drawn from prominent authorships.

So far, our examination has shown a great measure of accordance in structure and role of phraseologism in Danish and Czech. In quite a number of cases the figures of speech are parallel or closely cognate. Possibly, phraseology is more abundant in Czech, more inventive and sometimes more drastic.

ABBREVIATIONS

MAS: *Slovar' russkogo jazyka. I–IV.* 1957–61. Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo inostrannych i nacional'nych slovarej.

SSJČ: *Slovník spisovného jazyka českého. I–IV.* 1960–71. Praha: Československá akademie věd.

Tezisy: *Problemy frazeologii i zadači sostavlenija frazeologičeskogo slovarja russkogo jazyka. Tezisy.* Babkin, A.M. et al. (eds.). 1961. Leningrad: Institut russkogo jazyka.

VRČ: *Velký rusko-český slovník. I–IV.* Kopecký, L. et al. (eds.) 1952–64. Praha. Československá akademie věd.

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THE FACT OF TRANSLATION IN LEARNING ENGLISH AS A FOREIGN LANGUAGE

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There surely is no denying that translation into and from the learner's L1 is a strikingly persistent and prominent feature of all foreign language learning, and not least of EFL. Pedagogically anathematized and outlawed for the greater part of this century (ever since the rise of the "direct method"), translation has nevertheless continued to play a vigorous, even dominant role in the actual process of L2 learning, as teachers know, classroom observers can see and hear, and anyone that introspects his or her own L2 learning can surely confirm. Clear objective evidence of his fact is provided by the long-continued and still continuing debate about the place of translation in L2 teaching/learning — an originally pedagogical argument[1] in which there has, in more recent years, been increasing linguistic involvement, with the findings of Contrastive Analysis being advanced in support of the use of translation,[2] and the "cognitive" doctrines of Transformational Grammar mustered against it.[3] However, the main question disputed in this argument (What part, if any, *should* translation play in L2 learning/teaching?) remains essentially a pedagogiical question. The truly linguistic question (Why *does* translation play such a big part in the L2 learning process?) receives far less attention. Yet, clarificaton of the second question is a prerequisite for any reasoned examination of the first. Moreover, translation of this kind is surely just as hard and significant a language fact as any other of the empirical data that are the object of linguistic analysis, and one that may throw its own special light on the nature and functioning of language.

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[1] The two opposing sides in the pedagogical argument are clearly and forcefully summarized in Gatenby (1948) (against any use of translation) and Allen (1948) (in favour of the kind of translation advocated in the final part of this present article). For earlier, balanced views on this central, controversial issue, see Jespersen (1904) and Palmer (1917).

[2] E. g. Marton (1973a:148), Marton (1973b), and Di Pietro (1971).

[3] As, most strikingly, in Newmark and Reibel (1968:150—51), where it is asserted that the adult learner of L2 brings to the task the same cognitive-generative capability that enables the child to acquire his L1.

In this paper, then, an attempt will be made to take a closer look at the *fact* (as distinct from the desirability) of translation in L2 learning, and at the various distinctions that require to be made for a proper appreciation of its significance in relation to L2 teaching.

1. A basic terminological confusion occurs with the key term "translation" itself. Applied, as it usually is, equally and indifferently to both the learner's and the teacher's recourse to the learner's L1, it blurs a qualitative distinction of far-reaching importance. For the teacher's recourse to translation is a deliberate *choice* of one out of a variety of teaching methods. Whereas (as will be shown in greater detail below) the learner does not *choose* to translate, since he has no alternative, his recourse to his L1 being the involuntary reflex of any language-speaker confronted with the communicative challenge of an unknown, or still largely unfamiliar, language. The stubborn persistence of translation in L2 learning is thus a fact about the learner, not the teacher, precisely because the L1 is an organic part of the former, but not of the latter: the teacher translates in response to someone else's need (the *learner's*), whereas the learner translates in response to his own need. Hence, the pedagogical argument about translation is essentially an argument about the teacher's use of translation; whereas the linguistic question (the one we are concerned with here) is focussed on the learner's reflex and unreflecting use of translation. It is therefore of the first importance for the distinction between these two very different meanings of "translation" in this context to be carefully observed. The translation we are concerned with here is *learner's translation*.

2. In order to do justice to the full extent of the learner's dependence on, and use of, his L1 in learning and L2, due notice must be taken of his covert, no less than of his overt, recourse ot translation in his attempts to understand L2 and express himself in it. Actually, only a relatively small part of a learner's use of translation appears as an *overt* deliberate attempt at matching L2 and L1 forms (especially lexical forms). Far more numerous are the learner's *covert* uses of translation from and into L1, especially in the form of syntactical and lexical transfers from L1 to L2. These occur frequently in the learner's oral utterances, but they are probably found in the greatest concentration in "free compositions", which are necessarily exercises in covert translation (see below p. 201). Indeed, such covert translation is the source of a great, if not the major, part of errors in L2 learning.[4] Hence, it is only

when the covert form of translation is properly taken into account that the full extent to which an L2 learner's efforts are pervaded by translation can be recognized.[5] Then, instead of being lightly dismissed as the unnecessary outcome of bad teaching or lazy learning (or both), translation can be seen for what it really is — the central fact of the whole learning process, at once the learner's chief aid in his endeavours to master the L2, and the main obstacle in his way to that mastery. Nor is it really surprising that this should be so, given what is now known about the interrelation of language and experience.

3. The persistence and all-pervasiveness of translation in L2 learning highlights what is probably the most vital distinction of all, one that has been latterly blurred, and even denied — especially by proponents of the "cognitive" theory of language learning. This is the distinction between L1 acquisition and L2 learning. The essence of this distinction, which lies in the qualitative difference between language as a vital feature of human development and language as an added human accomplishment, has been succinctly stated by Halliday: "... yet the most significant fact about the child's learning of his native language is that he has no language through which to learn it. Such an experience can never be repeated" (1968:95). What Halliday is drawing attention to here is the crucial fact that the acquisition of L1 qualitatively *changes the nature of the learning organism*, determining its maturation as a human being. Hence the claim that a given individual has the same "language learning capability" for L2 as for L1 (cf. Newmark and Reibel 1968:161), even if true, is irrelevant. The possession and fluent control of one's native language is not just one of various possible accomplishments (like being able to paint, or play the piano, or communicate in a foreign language) superadded to one's basic human qualities, but an essential component of being a particular kind of human individual. To refer to a pupil as an "X-speaking learner of English" (X being any other language) is wholly misleading in its implication of a distinction, hence a possible separation, between the pupil and his/her L1. Whereas, in fact, the two are as inextricably intertwined as, say, the pupil and his/her mind, the pupil's L1 being an integral, and indeed constitutive, part of his individual and collective personality. Hence, wherever the pupil is present, his language is necessarily present too. Moreover, by his gradual

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[4] Even those who contend that many of the supposedly L1-induced learners' errors are in fact to be explained intralingually, i.e. by wrong application of L2 rules (cf. Richards (1974)), still concede that a significant part of these errors remains *interlingual*. For recent re-assertions of this interlingual thesis, see Sheen (1980), and Dagut and Laufer (forthcoming).

[5] The very large amount of covert translation which occurs in the learner's *comprehension* of L2 is not easily accesible to an outside observer. But its existence is certain on general psycholinguistic grounds, as illustrated in the example given on p. 201 below.

acquisition of L1, the pupil has slowly built up for himself that complex symbolical representation of the outside "world" which becomes his chief means of organizing and controlling his own personal experience, and in particular of relating to other people; hence it is to this symbolical system that he immediately and intuitively refers in all his dealings with the "world", including any foreign language that he encounters. L2 is thus necessarily filtered through L1, like any other experience. In trying to acquire the new and as yet unfamiliar classificatory system of L2 the pupil naturally proceeds by relating it, as he relates every new experience, to the familiar system of his own language (whereas the child acquiring an L1 is acquiring its first, previously non-existent language system and has nothing but his actual experience to relate it to). And this relating of L2 to L1 (one symbolical system to another) can take no other form but intuitive translation. There simply is, for the school learner of L2, no "objective" non-linguistic world to which the symbols and structures of English can be directly related: everything of which he is aware, whether concrete entity or abstract relation, has already been named and structured for him in his L1, otherwise he would not be aware of it. Already at school age, the individual's world consists not of *objects*, but if *referents* (i.e. language constructs).

A small classroom example will illustrate the point.

Even a banal, seemingly simple, utterance of the kind sometimes used at the start of an EFL course, e.g. *I am a teacher*, is a complex language construct which can only be understood "linguistically", not "objectively" or "directly". For in the message conveyed here, language is the dominant factor. Thus even the word *teacher*, for all its apparently real and directly perceptible referent, is actually an instance of the classificatory power of the language unit "word" to crystallize complex abstract relations (involving social and professional functions) into a single concept. To understand this English word, the learner must therefore be able to relate it to an equivalent classificatory unit that he knows (i.e. one in his L1), since there is nothing else to which he *can* relate it: the physical object referred to is not (and cannot be) directly perceived as a "teacher", but is linguistically classified as such (and might equally have been classified as a "man", "student", "linguist", "doctor", etc., according to the speaker's choice). So that, if an equivalent lexical classification happened to be lacking in the learner's L1, the word would remain not understood by him, no matter how often and how vigorously the teacher pointed to himself as he made the statement, or how patiently and ingeniously he explained it in the L2.

All this is still clearer in the case of the other elements of the seemingly simple statement, *I am a teacher*. That the first person pronoun *I*, the predicator *am*, and the indefinite article *a* are all linguistic constructs surely need not be argued. How then is the learner to understand them — except by translation, there simply being no other possible way of moving from one highly abstract and condensed language symbolization to another? Even in the relatively small number of cases where ostension appears to work (as it obviously would not with *I*, *am*, *a*, and probably, though less immediately obviously, not with *teacher*) the success is indeed only apparent, since the object pointed to in fact merely serves as a trigger to evoke an equivalent language symbol in the learner's L1 (witness his frequently audible confirming translation). For the learner's world (like every language-speaker's) is, as already noted, so interpenetrated with language that it is impossible for him to separate his awareness of "things" from their classification in his L1. With the result that he can no more prevent his spontaneous (even if covert) reaction in that language to whatever is going on around him, including a lesson in English, than he can control his automatic reflexes.

This being so, proposals for blurring or even denying the qualitative difference between L1 acquisition and L2 learning would seem to derive more from determination to apply the "cognitive" doctrine of TG grammar to all language phenomena than from a strict regard for the actual data — including the data to be derived from the introspection favoured by TG theory, since it is hard to believe that linguists themselves learn an L2 (or L3, L4...) "cognitively", rather than by constant reference to their own L1 (i.e. comparatively). For the gulf separating the two processes is truly immense. It is inconceivable that any normal child should not acquire a first language together with, and indeed as the necessary basis of, its other specifically human faculties; whereas the knowledge of a second language is so far from being a necessary concomitant of humanity that it is not acquired at all by a very large number of human beings. Moreover, the acquiring organisms are, as already noted, qualitatively so different: in the case of L1, a still inarticulate creature "moving about in worlds not realized"[6]; in the case of L2, an articulate individual largely formed by language. Hence it is that only L2 needs to *be taught* (and may still not be learnt); whereas L1 is normally always *acquired* (even if, as throughout most of the world, it is not systemmatically taught at all). In so far, then, as language is an integral part of our humanity, we may be said to be in some sense "programmed" to acquire *a* language. But, as every teacher (not to mention every pupil) so well knows, the programming stops there; otherwise, it would be impossible to explain why the average schoolchild has to be virtually coerced into *trying* to learn an L2 (in contrast to the same child's earlier, even eager, acquisition of its L1), and why so much thought and effort over so many years have gone into devising methods (still of only limited effectiveness) to overcome his reluctance to learn, and to improve his chances of success.

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[6] Wordsworth, *Ode. Intimations of immortality 1.* 149.

This is the place to note how the blurring of the qualitative distinction between L1 acquisition and L2 learning is encouraged by a semantic stretching of the terms *bilingual* and *bilingualism*. Since the true bilingual — the person that *grows up and lives* in two different L1s, using them alternately as circumstances require[7] — does really acquire both his two languages in the same "direct" way, and largely independently of each other, the identification (explicit or implicit) of the goal of L2 teaching as "bilingualism" or "the creation of bilinguals"[8] appears to provide empirical grounds for equating the process of L2 learning with that of L1 acquisition. But this identification is, in fact, a hyperbole which, if taken literally, must either trivialize the concept of bilingualism, or foredoom most efforts at L2 learning/teaching to failure. In the first case, there will no longer be any clear terminological distinction to mark the qualitative difference between the true bilingual (whose two languages are equipollent L1s)[9] and even the most successful minority of school and adult learners (whose L2 always remains secondary to and retains various traces of, their L1), not to mention the much less successful majority. And, in the second case, the positing of a goal which is by definition unattainable would, if taken seriously, discourage both teachers and learners from even trying. That the overwhelming majority of L2 learners fall far short of true bilingualism is abundantly clear from their inability to use their L1 and L2 in effortless and appropriate alternation, and also from the fact that they are immediately (sometimes hilariously) recognized as foreigners by native-speakers of the L2 in question. However, attainment in L2 learning is in truth a graduated scale, not an an all-or-nothing affair, and valuable uses can be, and are, made of levels of attainment remote from bilingualism. Once this is borne in mind, it becomes clear that the failure to produce "bilinguals" does not in itself prove that the L2 teaching and learning have failed, but rather that the terms *bilingual* and *bilingualism* have been misused, and therefore that invalid conclusions about both the aims and the methods of L2 learning have been drawn from their misuse.

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[7] Cf. Weinreich (1979:1): "The practice of alternately using two languages will be called BILINGUALISM, and the person involved BILINGUAL". Sheen (1980) accurately describes his very successful learners of L2 English as "near-bilinguals" — a terminological exactitude disregarded by advocates of L2 learning = L1 acquisition (see Note 8)

[8] E.g. Catford (1959:164): "The teaching of English or any language as a foreign language may be described as a process of creating bilinguals". Fishman (1966:121): "It is my contention that language teachers (all language teachers but particularly foreign language teachers) are producers of bilinguals". Both these scholars then proceed to heavily qualify their use of the term "bilingual", with (it seems to me) the trivializing effect noted below in the text.

[9] Cf. Weinreich (1979:77): "Some children learn two languages from the start; they may be said to have two mother tongues".

4. The confusion between L2 learning and bilingualism is facilitated by the blurring of another important distinction — that between learning an L2 in the actual environment in which it is spoken, and learning it in the environment of the learners' L1. Since language is the individual's essential means of controlling his environment and regulating his relations with other members of his community, it follows that the surest and most effective way of gaining communicative control of an L2 is having to live in it, every waking hour of every day, and to use it for the satisfaction of all one's needs, physical, mental and emotional, just as its native-speakers do. This is indeed the situation that comes nearest to reproducing the child's acquisition of its L1 — though here too the L2 learner's possession of an already existing L1 is a qualitatively differentiating factor, witness the correlation of the difficulty and incompleteness of L2 mastery, even in these circumstances, with increasing age: the more fully and exclusively habituated the use of L1, the harder the switch to L2, so that here too the "exposure" to L2 will often need to be supplemented by formal teaching, (as evidenced by the special language courses established, in some countries, for adult immigrants). However, the educational discussion of the teaching/learning of EFL normally pre-supposes that English is an L2 not just for the individual learner, but for the whole community in which he lives and learns. Otherwise, there would really be nothing to discuss, since acquiring English by living as a fully integrated part of a wholly English-speaking environment is an existential, rather than a strictly educational, process. What this shows is that, given the "right" conditions for language acquisition, TEFL is superfluous. But such conditions are precisely what does not, and cannot, exist in the EFL class, encapsulated as it is in the ambience of the learner's L1 and thus devoid of any existential raison d'être. Indeed, it is from the absence of the natural conditions for L2-*acquisition* (as distinct from L2-*learning*) that two of the EFL teacher's main difficulties arise: first, the learners' sense of the strained artificiality of what they are doing and their consequent, often irresistible, urge to relapse into the naturalness of their L1; and secondly (with younger learners, at least), their lack of motivation for making the effort required to master an instrument of communication for which they have no pressing need outside the classroom, and the lack of which is in no way felt in their language contacts with their fellow L1-speakers. Clearly, then, the way in which English may be picked up in its own cultural and social setting by people who use it as a survival tool, has no direct bearing on the problems of TEFL: the classroom cannot effectively be turned into an autonomous little piece of an English-speaking country for one hour a day, however hard gifted teachers may work to achieve this.[10] Blurring the distinc-

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[10] A classroom lesson in EFL necessarily remains, at best, a piece of successful play-acting, rather than an existentially generated switch of communicative codes. Nor is it the teacher's fault that this is so.

tion between L2 learning in an L2 environment and L2 learning in an L1 environment (the TEFL situation) does not help the cause of TEFL, but it does give a false appearance of greater plausibility to the equation of L2 learning with L1 acquisition.

5. Finally, in any careful study of the fact of translation in L2 learning, there are two more distinctions to be clearly borne in mind: (a) between the various stages of the learning process, and (b) between the various ages of the learners.

(a) Since all learning takes the form of assimilating the unknown to the known, it is obvious that the learner's spontaneous reflex of translation will be strongest at the start of the learning process, when the L2 is an entirely unknown and strange "map" of experience to him. Indeed, as has been illustrated above (p. 201), without the aid of his L1 "map" (i.e. translation) the learner could not get started on his task at all. However, as his familiarity with the details of the new, L2 "map" grows, his ability to use its particular conventions in finding his way about the terrain of experience will naturally increase, while his dependence on the familiar L1 map correspondingly decreases. Thus he begins to translate less and "think" (i.e. respond spontaneously) in L2 more.[11] While it is very doubtful whether any L2 learner (as distinct from bilingual) can ever wholly free himself from the influence of his L1, and certain that the great majority fall far short of that, the learner's intuitive recourse to translation is clearly a constantly changing factor in the L2 learning process, and therefore presumably one that needs to be differently evaluated at different stages of that process.

(b) In most of the foregoing discussion, the typical L2 learning situation has been assumed to be that of the school classroom. With postschool and adult learners, however, there is a markedly different situation. While the *fact* of translation remains the same (the adult's need to translate being as great as the school pupil's and for the same reasons), there is now a significant difference in the learner's attitude to this fact, the adult's use of translation being more conscious and deliberate, the pupil's more intuitive and spontaneous. Furthermore, the adult's greater intellectual curiosity and powers of abstraction (in addition to his presumably greater motivation in learning L2) may well lead him to reflect on at least some of the relations between L1 and L2 revealed by translation, so that in addition to being an inevitable part of the L2 learning process, translation now also becomes a tool of contrastive analysis.

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[11] With so little so for known about the actual nature of "thinking", it hardly seems helpful to talk in terms of "getting the pupil to think" in the foreign language. An operationally clearer aim is to get him to respond spontaneously in that language to situations occuring around him (cf. Di Pietro (1971:165)).

This too obviously has implications for teaching which it would be out of place to discuss here.

6. When these ambiguities and confusions obscuring the key terms "translation" and "L2 learning", have been removed, it can be seen that translation is not only a fact of L2 learning, but an absolutely inescapable fact, since the already acquired first language sets the stage, as it were, for the formal learning of any other. This being so, it is surely only natural to assume that there must be some way in which such a central feature of the learner's mental processes can be put to constructive use, instead if being ignored or repressed (ineffectually) as an unfortunate aberration. Indeed, there is something repugnant to common sense in the view that the unavoidable impact of L1 on the learning of L2 is so wholly harmful that L1 is actually the "enemy" of L2 learning (as it has been regarded by the more extreme exponents of the "direct method") and must be uncompromisingly treated as such.[12] This grossly one-sided attitude (encouraged, and perhaps partly justified, by the opposite excesses of the "grammar-and-translation" approach) takes no account at all of the vital facilitating effect of L1 on L2 learning. As noted above (sect. 3), it is only through his L1 that the learner can actually begin to penetrate the unknown symbolical system of L2: and his further progress is made that much the easier, the more similarities there are between the two languages.[13](The full significance of the help afforded the learner by his L1 can perhaps be most strikingly (because negatively) seen in just those cases where his translation from L1 is blocked by the systematic incongruence of L1 and L2, i.e. where L2 has a syntactico-semantic system (e.g. the English aspect dichotomy of the verb) which is totally lacking in L1 (say, German). If such points of interlingual "lopsidedness", as is well known, present the learner with almost insuperable difficulties, this is precisely because his recourse here to L1 is unavailing, and he is therefore left without any means of comprehending the function of the

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[12] A moderate expression of this view is found in Gatenby (1948:218), whereas Sanders (1976:72) "while not wishing to be fanatical about banishing the L1 from the classroom entirely", does imply that such an extraordinary feat, though perhaps not desirable, is certainly feasible. Quite apart from the inherent absurdity of such an approach (see section 3 above), this teatment of the L1 as a "bad habit" to be "eradicated" by appropriate pedagogical means is hardly calculated to enhance the ordinary pupil's desire to learn the L2. The extremes to which opposition to any translation can be, and sometimes has been, carried are illustrated by Bolitho (1976).

[13] It is true that similarities may also occasionally give rise to learning difficulties (as in the case of false cognates). But these are the exception rather than the rule. To generalize from them to the paradoxical conclusion that the more different an L2 is from the learner's L1 the easier it is to learn is to fly in the face of all language learning experience. For such a paradoxical (and therefore unconvincing) point of view, see Lee (1968:188).

distinction made in L2 (c.f. Duškova 1969:29). Hence his control of L2 at these points dissolves into confusion and guesswork. For what he is actually being required to do in such cases is to grasp a new concept — new to him, because it is not systemically symbolized in his own language — and nothing in L2 learning is harder than that (just as nothing in L2 teaching is harder than to find some way of imparting an understanding of, and "feel" for, such a new concept).

Translation, then, is potentially as much of an "ally" as an "enemy" in the process of L2 learning. It only becomes harmful, if allowed to usurp the whole purpose of the learning. And this can quite easily be prevented by keeping it in a subordinate role and having recourse to it only as an *aid* (not an *aim*) in the teaching of L2. The fact that L1 is always present in the learner's mind can be constructively exploited in two main ways: (1) to help eradicate the persistent errors arising from the numerous syntactic and lexical incongruences between L1 and L2, and (2) to provide immediately meaningful explanations of all those lexical items of L2 for which quick and clear explanation by either ostension or L2 paraphrase is not available (abstract words, such as *truth, subtle, remember*; function words, such as *but, or, both... and...*, *however*; idioms, such as *lose one's head, be out of the question, come to the point*). It must be remembered that in all such cases translation (or at least the attempt at translation) by the learner will take place in any case (cf. Palmer 1917:97). The choice, therefore, is not between translating and not translating, but between guiding the learner to make positive use of his natural recourse to L1 and leaving him at the mercy of its possible negative effects (Palmer 1917:99).

The restricted use of translation as an *aid* in the teaching of L2 harnesses the fact of learners' translation to the facilitation of L2 learning, without coming into conflict with the generally agreed communicative aim of L2 teaching. Indeed, paradoxical though it may sound, such translation is actually the best way, in the normal circumstances of formal learning (see sect. 4 above), to counter and reduce the influence of L1, by making the learner consciously aware of the nature of certain of his linguistic reflexes, and thus better able to control them (cf. Allen (1948:34; Harton (1973a:149), and Rivers (1968:153)). Spontaneous, confidently made L1-derived errors are persistently repeated, no matter how often the learner is merely shown and made to use the correct forms: as long as the relevant incongruence between L1 and L2 is not presented to his conscious mind through explanation and exercise, he continues to slip back automatically into the familiar, but in L2 terms wrong, grooves. The judicious, controlled use of translation thus actually helps to weaken the learner's dependence on his L1, and to bring him nearer to the required ability to exchange the forms and patterns of L1 for those of L2. Of course, it is perfectly true that the more often L2 is used in the learning process, the more fluently it will be used, hence the basic validity of the "English through English" slogan. However, if blindly applied without due regard for the irrefragable fact of translation in L2 learning, this slogan may well produce, not fluent L2, but fluent pidgin.

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